INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS │ CPGNNews │ SEPTEMBER 21, 2026
By the CPGNNews Editorial Desk
Born in the Caribbean, Open to the World!
On July 17, 2026, an Iranian attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, where U.S. forces are stationed, killed three American service members. The incident could have remained part of the long sequence of attacks and retaliatory actions that have marked the regional conflict. Several weeks later, however, it took on a different significance when U.S. officials linked Chinese entities, allegedly, to the provision of high quality satellite imagery of the base to Iran before and after the attack. The available information does not publicly identify the Chinese entities involved, nor does it establish that the Chinese government directly ordered or controlled such activity.
On September 13, as he was leaving Ireland, Donald Trump was questioned about the reports. The following day, American statements and Chinese reactions placed the matter within a broader debate over intelligence, the use of commercial satellite capabilities and the nature of strategic competition between Washington and Beijing. Trump publicly played down the allegation, saying that China spies on the United States while the United States also spies on China. Beijing, for its part, rejected the accusations.
The matter therefore remains surrounded by contested elements. Its significance, however, goes beyond the ultimate truth of this particular allegation. It reveals a much deeper transformation in the nature of contemporary power: geospatial information, commercial satellites, digital infrastructure and analytical capabilities can now contribute to the preparation of a military operation long before any visible action takes place. War increasingly begins before the moment of impact. It begins with the collection, interpretation, circulation and exploitation of information.
WAR NOW BEGINS LONG BEFORE THE MISSILE
For much of military history, power rested primarily on visible assets: the number of soldiers, artillery, ships, aircraft, fortifications and the industrial capacity to produce military equipment. These factors remain essential, but they are no longer sufficient to explain how a contemporary military operation is prepared. Before action comes a complex chain of observation, collection, comparison, processing and decision making. Satellites can provide imagery of a territory, navigation systems can determine positions, communications networks can transmit information and computing systems can process it at speeds that traditional methods cannot match.
The real military revolution of the twenty first century therefore lies less in the existence of individual new technologies than in their integration. A satellite is no longer simply an object placed in orbit. It becomes one component of an architecture combining Earth observation, communications, geolocation, computing power, artificial intelligence and decision making. In the case of Muwaffaq Salti, the central question is therefore not only whether Chinese satellite imagery was actually used by Iran. It is also what the allegation reveals about the emerging strategic environment. If commercial information, or information obtained through private actors, can contribute to improving knowledge of a military target, then the traditional boundary between military intelligence and commercial information becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.
This evolution also forces a reconsideration of the chronology of warfare itself. An operation can be prepared long before its visible launch through the gradual accumulation of data concerning infrastructure, movements, communications and the physical environment surrounding a target. Superiority therefore lies not only in the ability to strike, but also in the ability to see early enough, understand quickly enough and transform knowledge into action.
The July 2026 case illustrates a transformation that extends far beyond the Middle East. What once depended primarily on national intelligence capabilities can increasingly involve commercial infrastructure, private companies and international data networks. Information power is becoming more diffuse, but also more difficult to control.
THE PRIVATIZATION OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION CHANGES THE EQUATION
One of the most significant transformations of recent years has been the growing role of private companies in Earth observation. Commercial firms now operate satellite constellations capable of producing imagery with a frequency and level of detail that were once largely confined to major powers. This development has enormous civilian benefits: satellite observation can monitor crops, natural disasters, wildfires, population movements and infrastructure development. Yet the same information can also have strategic value. This is the essence of dual use technology.
States must therefore answer a more complex question than how to protect their classified information. They must also determine what an adversary can reconstruct from information that is dispersed, commercially available or legally accessible. Strategic knowledge can be assembled from data that appear insignificant when considered separately. A satellite image, weather data, logistical information and an observation from another source can, when combined, produce a much more precise picture of a strategic environment.
This transformation is also changing the relationship between government power and the private sector. A growing share of the technological capabilities considered essential to national security is held by commercial companies. Control over strategic information therefore no longer depends exclusively on intelligence services or armed forces. It also depends on markets, digital infrastructure, technology providers and the regulatory frameworks governing their use.
The case of the Chinese companies cited by U.S. officials belongs to this new reality. It does not, by itself, establish direct involvement by the Chinese government. It nevertheless demonstrates how a commercial activity can acquire strategic significance in an environment where civilian and security uses increasingly overlap. It is precisely this grey zone that turns the satellite question into a geopolitical question.
WASHINGTON AND BEIJING: A COMPETITION THAT DOES NOT ELIMINATE DIALOGUE
It would nevertheless be reductive to portray the Sino American relationship as a continuous confrontation inevitably leading toward a new Cold War. Reality is more contradictory. Washington and Beijing are engaged in deep strategic competition, while continuing at the same time to negotiate on trade, technology, artificial intelligence and other matters of common interest. This coexistence of rivalry and dialogue is particularly visible in September 2026.
On September 21, China’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that Xi Jinping would make a state visit to the United States from September 23 to 25, 2026, at Donald Trump’s invitation. Beijing said the two leaders would hold in depth exchanges on China U.S. relations as well as issues related to peace and development around the world. The same day, Reuters reported that the talks were taking place against the backdrop of a fragile trade truce between the two powers and negotiations involving trade and artificial intelligence.
This chronology matters. On September 14, Trump publicly played down reports concerning the possible transfer of Chinese satellite imagery to Iran. One week later, Beijing officially announced Xi’s visit to Washington. The contrast is revealing: the two powers can be engaged in intense strategic competition while maintaining channels of dialogue at the highest level.
Competition therefore does not eliminate diplomacy; it makes diplomacy more necessary and more difficult. Trade, supply chains, advanced technologies, critical raw materials, Taiwan, artificial intelligence, space and intelligence now belong to the same strategic environment. A crisis in one domain can rapidly produce consequences in several others.
The satellite issue must therefore be placed within this broader framework. The American allegation concerning Chinese entities does not automatically mean that Washington and Beijing are engaged in direct warfare. Rather, it illustrates the depth of a competition in which economic, technological, informational, spatial and security domains have become increasingly interconnected.
It is within this coexistence of rivalry and dialogue that the title of this analysis takes on its meaning. Hostility is not being used here as a synonym for open war. It describes an environment in which strategic mistrust, technological competition, demonstrations of power and reciprocal accusations have become sufficiently visible to influence the calculations of states.
SPACE IS BECOMING AN INFRASTRUCTURE OF POWER
This transformation naturally leads to another arena of competition: Earth’s orbit. For a long time, space was associated primarily with scientific research, exploration and technological prestige. It has now become an essential infrastructure for modern societies. Communications, navigation, Earth observation, system synchronization and certain security functions depend on space based capabilities whose disruption could have consequences extending far beyond the space sector itself.
On September 14, 2026, U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink stated that the United States now had space control capabilities deployed in orbit. On September 15, the announcement was widely reported as the first public American confirmation that weapons designed for space control had been deployed in orbit. Washington did not publicly specify their exact nature, number or operational capabilities.
China reacted quickly. On September 15, Beijing denounced the militarization of space and warned against turning it into a battlefield. Russia also called for space to remain free of weapons. The Chinese and Russian statements must naturally be understood within their own strategic contexts, but they demonstrate that space is now explicitly incorporated into security relations among the major powers.
The development reminds us that strategic geography is no longer limited to land territories and maritime spaces. It now has an orbital dimension. States must simultaneously consider their physical borders, digital infrastructure and the space systems on which part of their security depends.
For small nations, the implication is not necessarily that they must develop their own space capabilities. It is that they must understand their dependence on these infrastructures and prepare continuity solutions. Resilience, redundancy, supplier diversification and access to multiple sources of information are therefore becoming instruments of sovereignty.
IRAN AND THE NEW ECONOMY OF ASYMMETRY
Iran provides another illustration of this transformation. It obviously does not possess the same economic, industrial and military resources as the United States. But asymmetry does not mean an absence of capacity to act. An actor with very different resources can seek to exploit specific vulnerabilities in a much more powerful adversary. The logic is not one of parity. It is one of targeted exploitation of vulnerabilities.
American debates over the use of defensive systems against Iranian attacks illustrate a broader difficulty: even a power with superior resources can face constraints of cost, availability and endurance when it must respond repeatedly to threats whose costs and operational characteristics are different.
Modern asymmetry is therefore also about the relationship between the cost of an action, the cost of defense and the ability to sustain that defense over time. A relatively accessible technology can sometimes significantly alter the balance around a particularly important infrastructure.
Technology does not eliminate the hierarchy between powers. It does, however, change the ways in which that hierarchy can be challenged. Information amplifies this dynamic because better knowledge of a position, infrastructure or system can increase an actor’s ability to act. Mastery of information is therefore becoming progressively as important as the physical ability to project force.
THE REAL QUESTION BEGINS HERE: WHAT CAN SMALL NATIONS DO?
This is where the analysis moves beyond the realm of major powers. For small states, the fundamental question is not how to compete with the United States, China or other powers possessing enormous technological resources. It is how to preserve a genuine capacity for decision making within an international system that has become deeply interdependent.
Legal sovereignty remains indispensable, but it is no longer sufficient by itself. A state can be fully sovereign in law while remaining heavily dependent on foreign providers for energy, telecommunications, data, digital infrastructure, financial systems or essential expertise. Strategic sovereignty must therefore be understood as a capacity: knowing what a country possesses, what it depends on, what it can protect, what it needs to develop and what it can reasonably share with partners.
This does not mean autarky. No small state can produce every technology it requires. The realistic objective is rather to reduce critical dependencies, diversify partnerships, develop national expertise and preserve multiple options when international circumstances change.
For island states and vulnerable economies, this approach is particularly important. Energy security, digital resilience, infrastructure protection, scientific education, economic diversification and regional cooperation must increasingly be understood as interconnected components of sovereignty.
THE CARIBBEAN AND THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF POWER
For the Caribbean, this transformation is not an abstraction. The region sits at the intersection of several strategic spaces, between North America, Latin America, the Atlantic and major commercial routes. Its states often have limited resources, small domestic markets and significant exposure to external shocks.
On June 20, 2026, at the opening of a meeting of CARICOM ministers responsible for information and communications technologies, Grenada’s Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell, who oversees science and technology within the CARICOM quasi cabinet, called for an acceleration of the region’s digital transformation. He explicitly linked digital technologies to economic resilience, national security and sovereignty. He also emphasized the need for collective action on artificial intelligence, digital trade, data governance, cybersecurity and digital skills.
This statement matters because it demonstrates that the concerns discussed in this analysis are not merely theoretical. They are already entering the institutional thinking of the Caribbean. Regional sovereignty can no longer be understood solely through the defense of physical territory or maritime borders. It also concerns communications networks, data centers, energy infrastructure, financial systems, digital platforms and the skills required to understand and protect them.
This evolution forms part of a broader process. CARICOM’s updated cybersecurity and cybercrime action plan was launched on October 31, 2025, in Port of Spain, with the objective of strengthening digital resilience, national and regional frameworks, cooperation and incident response capacity. The updated document is organized around six strategic pillars and emphasizes training, regulatory frameworks, skills development and incident response.
Regional integration is therefore taking on a new strategic dimension. A state that cannot independently finance certain scientific, digital or security capabilities can participate in a regional architecture capable of pooling expertise, standards and selected infrastructure. Cooperation then becomes a way of strengthening decision making capacity rather than merely an economic mechanism.
HAITI AND THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC SOVEREIGNTY
Haiti illustrates this new reality with particular intensity. In a country simultaneously facing institutional, economic, security and infrastructure challenges, sovereignty cannot be reduced to a legal assertion. It must also be understood as the effective capacity of the state and society to understand their environment, protect essential systems, produce reliable information and preserve room for decision making when international circumstances become unfavorable.
On March 24, 2026, the World Bank published a detailed assessment of Haiti’s project to improve public financial management and statistical information. According to the institution, the project had strengthened information systems, established a private cloud to support remote government operations, created a national continuity plan and established a cybersecurity operations center intended, among other purposes, to protect the financial system from digital threats. The project also developed an integrated financial management system covering 31 public administrative entities and interoperable with several financial and administrative institutions.
These developments demonstrate that digital sovereignty is not an abstract issue for Haiti. The ability to keep administrative systems functioning during a crisis, protect financial and statistical data and maintain continuity mechanisms already constitutes a concrete dimension of state resilience.
On June 9, 2026, the World Bank also published a broader analysis of digital trust, linking cybersecurity, data protection, artificial intelligence governance and digital sovereignty. It noted that developing economies can face growing dependencies on foreign technologies, talent, digital platforms and data infrastructure, potentially limiting their ability to govern their own data and maintain the resilience of essential services.
For Haiti, the next challenge is therefore to transform existing advances into a durable architecture. Strategic sovereignty does not mean that the country should attempt to produce every technology it needs on its own. It means knowing which data are critical, which infrastructures must be protected, which skills must be developed domestically and which dependencies become problematic when they can no longer be replaced.
The issue therefore goes beyond cybersecurity in the narrow sense. It encompasses public statistics, administrative continuity, territorial mapping, disaster management, urban planning, scientific education and the ability of the state to make decisions based on reliable data. Training engineers, statisticians, cybersecurity specialists, researchers, analysts and infrastructure experts consequently becomes a form of strategic investment. Knowledge is no longer simply an output of government administration. It is becoming an infrastructure of sovereignty.
THE WORLD IS ENTERING AN ERA IN WHICH POWER IS ALSO MEASURED BY THE CAPACITY TO KNOW
The Muwaffaq Salti incident, the American allegations concerning Chinese satellite imagery, Beijing’s reactions, technological competition between Washington and Beijing and the growing militarization of space point to a transformation deeper than a single episode of international confrontation. The boundary between information, economics, technology and security is becoming increasingly difficult to draw.
The September 2026 chronology is particularly revealing. On September 13, Trump played down allegations concerning alleged Chinese satellite assistance to Iran. On September 14, reports concerning the matter became a major subject of public debate in the United States. The same day, Washington confirmed the existence of space control capabilities deployed in orbit. On September 15, reactions from Beijing and Moscow demonstrated that space is now being explicitly treated as an arena of strategic competition.
It would nevertheless be excessive to conclude that every commercial dataset constitutes a weapon or that every economic relationship between major powers necessarily amounts to confrontation. The same technologies can serve agriculture, meteorology, disaster prevention, civilian navigation, scientific research and security functions. The strategic question lies precisely in this dual use and in the ability of states to understand how apparently civilian infrastructure can be integrated into much broader architectures of power.
For small nations, the lesson is less spectacular but potentially more decisive. They do not need to reproduce the capabilities of major powers. They need to determine the areas in which autonomy is essential, those in which cooperation is preferable and those in which diversification provides protection against excessive dependency.
The Caribbean has a long historical experience of interdependence and a tradition of regional cooperation that can become an instrument of resilience. For Haiti and other small nations, the central question is not to mechanically choose between Washington, Beijing or another center of power. It is to preserve an independent capacity for decision making, understand the consequences of dependencies and build institutions capable of transforming information into informed choices.
THE CPGNNEWS VIEW: SOVEREIGNTY BEGINS WITH KNOWLEDGE
What this new phase of international competition ultimately reveals goes beyond the relationship between Washington and Beijing. It requires states to rethink how they understand security, autonomy and their place in the world. Contemporary power is no longer limited to the ability to project force or control territory. It also lies in the capacity to observe, understand, anticipate, protect and decide.
The events of July and September 2026 show above all that these dimensions can no longer be treated separately. Satellite information can become a security asset. A commercial company can find itself at the center of a strategic controversy. An orbital infrastructure can become a diplomatic issue. Publicly available data can contribute to reconstructing an operational environment. A digital weakness can become a national vulnerability. And an institutional capacity to preserve data, maintain essential services or correctly analyze a situation can, under certain circumstances, become as important as possession of physical infrastructure.
For major powers, this transformation expands the instruments of global competition. For small nations, it fundamentally changes the definition of resilience. A country that cannot compete through scale can strengthen its decision making capacity through the quality of its institutions, the education of its citizens, the reliability of its data, the diversification of its partnerships and the management of its dependencies.
This is particularly true for the Caribbean. The region cannot prevent major powers from pursuing their global strategies, but it can reduce its own vulnerabilities by strengthening regional cooperation, digital security, energy resilience, scientific education and the protection of critical infrastructure. The CARICOM call on June 20, 2026, to accelerate digital transformation and strengthen regional cooperation demonstrates that this awareness already exists at the institutional level.
For Haiti, this reflection takes on an even more fundamental dimension. The progress documented by the World Bank on March 24, 2026, shows that part of the infrastructure required for better information management and administrative continuity has already been developed. The challenge is therefore not to start from zero, but to transform these capabilities into a durable, protected and adaptable national architecture supported by Haitian expertise.
Openness to the world and sovereignty are therefore not necessarily contradictory. They become compatible when openness rests on institutions capable of negotiating, learning, analyzing and deciding. A small nation does not need to produce everything itself in order to retain sovereign capacity. It must, however, understand its dependencies, identify its vulnerabilities, diversify its partnerships and preserve the ability to choose as international power relations evolve.
Perhaps this is the most important lesson of the new geopolitics. Power is no longer measured solely by what a state possesses, but also by what it is capable of understanding. The actor that possesses information, controls the infrastructure through which it moves, has the means to analyze it and knows how to turn it into decisions possesses a capacity for action that traditional borders alone can no longer measure.
On September 21, 2026, as Beijing officially confirmed Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington from September 23 to 25, this contradiction became particularly visible: the two principal powers in the international system can negotiate, trade and cooperate on certain issues while simultaneously preparing for increasingly deep technological, economic, informational and strategic competition.
That is why the question raised by the Muwaffaq Salti episode extends far beyond Iran, China and the United States. It now concerns every state seeking to preserve a genuine capacity for decision making in a world where power relations are progressively moving toward networks, data, digital infrastructure, orbital systems and dual use technologies.
For small nations, the essential question is therefore not how to become great powers. It is how to remain masters of their own decisions in a world where an increasing share of strategic competition takes place above territories, behind screens, across networks, through satellites and within data systems.
Strategic sovereignty ultimately begins with a fundamental capacity: to understand the world before it decides for us.
MAIN SOURCES
The principal references consulted for this analysis include Reuters, Associated Press, The Wall Street Journal, the White House, the U.S. Department of State, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the World Bank, and CARICOM. Identifying these sources allows readers to trace the origin of the information presented and assess its significance within its broader context.
NATURE OF THE COVER IMAGE
The cover is a cinematic and geopolitical editorial composition, created to illustrate the issues examined in this analysis. It is not a documentary photograph, nor does it depict a real-life scene.
AI-generated editorial illustration │ CPGNNews
Editorial Desk │ CPGNNews
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