Editorial Analysis | CPGNNews
SEPTEMBER 6, 2026
There comes a moment in every major international crisis when the question is no longer simply who is right, but something far more difficult: who still possesses enough power to alter the calculations of the person who holds the ultimate decision? The war in Ukraine appears to have reached such a moment. Over the course of just a few days, international diplomacy has produced a sequence that is particularly revealing. On August 31, 2026, in Bishkek, Vladimir Putin met Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. The following day, September 1, the organisation’s heads of state gathered in the Kyrgyz capital for the summit itself. A few days later, on September 5, in Moscow, the Russian president received Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, sent by Donald Trump in a renewed American attempt to reopen discussions over the war. After more than three hours of talks, no decisive breakthrough was announced. On September 6, the two American envoys arrived in Kyiv to meet Volodymyr Zelensky. This Bishkek, Moscow, Kyiv sequence is not yet a road to peace. It does, however, reveal that the central question is no longer simply how to stop the war, but who actually possesses the means to influence the Kremlin’s strategic calculations.
In Bishkek, Narendra Modi brought a particular dimension to this equation. His meeting with Vladimir Putin was not an improvised encounter triggered by events in the preceding days. It was part of a series of bilateral contacts organised on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, a diplomatic setting in which leaders use major multilateral gatherings to conduct their own discussions. On August 31, Modi explicitly stated that the war in Ukraine must end and that India would continue to support peace efforts. The choice of words matters. New Delhi did not present itself as an arbitrator with a mandate to impose a solution, but as a power capable of speaking directly to Moscow while preserving its own relationship with Russia. India has maintained longstanding ties with Russia in defence, energy, trade and diplomacy. That proximity gives Modi a form of relational influence that many Western capitals have found much harder to preserve since the beginning of the war. But this influence has a fundamental limit: being able to speak to Putin does not mean being able to decide for Putin. India can shape the political environment surrounding the Russian decision; it cannot substitute itself for the Kremlin.
Xi Jinping’s presence in Bishkek introduced another dimension, one that is considerably more structural. The Chinese president met Vladimir Putin on August 31 on the sidelines of the same Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, after arriving in Bishkek to participate in the organisation’s proceedings. The meeting was particularly significant because it followed Putin’s visit to China in May and took place within a bilateral relationship that Beijing and Moscow continue to describe as one intended to deepen. Xi emphasised the strength of the foundations of the relationship between China and Russia and the continuation of cooperation across several fields. Yet the significance of the meeting should not be overstated. It did not constitute direct Chinese mediation between Moscow and Kyiv. Rather, it demonstrated that Russia continues to possess a major strategic partnership in Asia and that Beijing remains one of the external actors best positioned to shape the economic and strategic environment within which Moscow makes its decisions.
This is probably where the true nature of Chinese influence lies. Xi Jinping does not need to publicly ask Vladimir Putin to abandon his objectives in order to affect his calculations. China represents a major economic partner for Russia, an important energy market, a diplomatic power and a central actor in the transformation of the international order. Beijing therefore possesses a form of leverage that is different from New Delhi’s and equally distinct from Washington’s. It is slower, more structural and potentially deeper. A durable economic relationship, energy exchanges, industrial and technological cooperation, as well as diplomatic support in international forums, can gradually expand or narrow the strategic space within which Moscow makes its choices. But it would be equally imprudent to turn this reality into a claim of absolute Russian dependence on China. China pursues its own interests. It is not an automatic instrument of Russian strategy, nor does it operate in a relationship of obedience to the Kremlin.
The very nature of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation reinforces the need for caution. The Bishkek summit brought together powers whose interests converge on certain issues but diverge sharply on others. India and China remain strategic rivals on several fronts. Other members of the organisation also maintain their own relationships with Washington, Brussels, Moscow and Beijing. Presenting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a homogeneous bloc directed against the United States would therefore produce an excessively simplified reading of Eurasian geopolitics. The political value of Bishkek lies precisely in this complexity. Russia can demonstrate that it is not diplomatically isolated, China can strengthen its influence, and India can defend its strategic autonomy while maintaining direct dialogue with Moscow. Influence is built here less through commands than through the density of relationships.
Then comes Washington, with a radically different form of leverage. Donald Trump possesses instruments that neither New Delhi nor Beijing combines in the same way: diplomatic capacity, financial weight, economic influence, a security relationship with Ukraine and the ability to affect the parameters of the relationship between Washington, Moscow and Kyiv. But the mission of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner also demonstrates the limits of that power. On September 5, the two envoys met Vladimir Putin in Moscow for more than three hours. According to the Kremlin, they presented several ideas concerning possible avenues toward a settlement. The talks were described as useful and constructive, but no concrete breakthrough was announced. The meeting should therefore be understood for what it was: an attempt to reopen and deepen the diplomatic channel between Washington and Moscow, not the conclusion of a peace agreement already negotiated.
This distinction is essential because major international negotiations are often distorted by confusion between contact, dialogue, negotiation and agreement. Contact creates an opening. Dialogue allows positions to be tested. Negotiation seeks to bring contradictory interests closer together. An agreement ultimately transforms those discussions into political commitments. Between these four stages lies an enormous space in which diplomatic processes can advance, stall or disappear. The Moscow meeting remains within that intermediate zone. The American representatives were able to present ideas and hear the Russian position. The Kremlin was able to assess Washington’s intentions. But no public evidence yet allows us to conclude that Moscow and Washington have crossed the threshold into compromise. Analytical caution therefore requires us to speak of a reopening of the diplomatic channel rather than a completed peace negotiation.
On September 6, the sequence moved to Kyiv. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner made their first official visit to Kyiv in their current roles as American envoys and met Volodymyr Zelensky after their stop in Moscow. This stage is fundamental because it recalls an obvious reality that is sometimes obscured by great power diplomacy: Ukraine is not simply the territory on which Russia and the West are confronting one another. It is a political actor whose agreement or refusal will shape any durable settlement. Zelensky must defend his country’s interests, particularly on territorial questions and security guarantees. Washington must therefore confront what it can obtain from Moscow with what Kyiv is prepared to accept. It is within this space, rather than solely within the relationship between Trump and Putin, that one of the central difficulties of the entire process lies.
The military situation simultaneously reminds us of the limits of diplomacy. On September 4, a Russian drone struck the headquarters of Ukraine’s Security Service in Kyiv, according to Ukrainian authorities, illustrating the continuation of hostilities even as Washington was preparing the deployment of its envoys. Attacks on the capital continued in the days preceding the visit. In this context, temporary measures taken around the movements of American negotiators may provide useful diplomatic signals, but they should not be confused with a general ceasefire. The military reality remains distinct from the diplomatic reality. The first continues to generate its own dynamics while the second is attempting precisely to contain them.
It is here that the original question acquires its full depth. Who can still influence Vladimir Putin? The most rigorous answer is: no one alone. Narendra Modi possesses exceptional relational capital. Xi Jinping possesses considerable economic and strategic leverage. Donald Trump possesses a unique combination of diplomatic, economic and geopolitical influence. Volodymyr Zelensky possesses a form of leverage that the other actors cannot replace: Ukraine’s ability to accept, reject or alter the terms of any potential settlement. Europe also possesses significant economic, military, financial and political capabilities that will affect the durability of any agreement. Even energy markets, sanctions, industrial capacity, military spending and reconstruction needs are gradually becoming variables within the negotiation.
The world must therefore move beyond an overly personalised understanding of power. The question is not simply who can persuade Vladimir Putin. It is what combination of factors can sufficiently alter the relationship between the cost of continuing the war and the strategic value of reaching a settlement. That is a fundamental distinction. A power can influence without controlling. It can change the conditions surrounding a decision without imposing the decision itself. It can open a door without possessing the key required to cross the threshold. In major international crises, real influence often becomes visible less through public declarations than through the gradual transformation of the options available to decision makers.
Russia is therefore not isolated in the absolute sense of the word. It is, however, operating in an environment in which each of its major partners has its own interests, limits and calculations. This is particularly true of China and India. Moscow needs strong economic, diplomatic and energy relationships with the major Asian powers. But those partners are not unconditional allies. They pursue their own national strategies. The strategic autonomy of Beijing and New Delhi is precisely what gives them potential influence. Their strength does not lie in an ability to coerce Moscow through force, but in their ability to make certain choices more or less advantageous for Russia.
Time then becomes a geopolitical actor in its own right. A prolonged war transforms budgets, societies, industries, military capabilities, demographic balances and economic relationships. As long as the Kremlin believes that continuing the conflict can improve its future position, negotiations will remain difficult. But if cumulative costs begin to alter that perception, the value of compromise may gradually increase. This is why diplomacy is not taking place only in meeting rooms. It is also taking place within national economies, production capacities, energy markets, sanctions regimes, supply chains, public spending and the ability of societies to withstand the duration of the conflict.
The real diplomatic battle is therefore one of strategic calculation. Modi can create a space for trust. Xi can alter Moscow’s economic and political environment. Trump can create a direct channel and deploy the leverage of Washington. Zelensky can determine whether a proposal is politically acceptable to Ukraine. Europe can influence the future security of the continent and the financing of reconstruction. None of these actors possesses the solution alone. But each holds a part of the mechanism that could make a solution possible.
This is why the Bishkek, Moscow, Kyiv sequence deserves more attention than the spectacular declarations that often surround diplomatic efforts. In Bishkek, on August 31, Russia demonstrated that its relationships with China and India remained essential components of its international strategy. On the same day, Modi publicly called for an end to the war, while Xi reaffirmed the depth of the relationship between China and Russia. In Moscow, on September 5, the United States demonstrated that a direct channel of communication with Putin remained possible. In Kyiv, on September 6, Washington is now confronting Russian positions with Ukrainian demands. The process is not yet peace. But it is a real world test of whether major powers can transform influence into negotiation.
The question, “Who can still influence Putin?”, therefore receives an answer that goes far beyond the personality of the Russian president. The actor who ultimately changes the course of the war will probably not be the one who speaks the loudest, but the one who succeeds in altering the relationship between the costs of war and the political benefits expected from continuing it. That is where the real battle lies. Diplomatic influence is not a command. It is a change in the calculation. And peace may not emerge from the victory of a single actor, but from the gradual convergence of several constraints and several interests around a solution that Moscow and Kyiv can ultimately regard as politically sustainable.
For CPGNNews, this sequence reveals an even deeper transformation in global diplomacy. The centre of gravity of negotiation no longer lies exclusively in Western capitals. It moves between Moscow, Washington, Beijing, New Delhi and Kyiv, while middle powers, markets, international institutions and national societies also contribute to the construction of the balance of power. The Caribbean, from which CPGNNews observes this transformation, is not outside this evolution. It belongs to a world in which decisions taken in Eurasia affect markets, energy, food security, trade networks, diplomatic balances and the future position of middle sized states. Understanding the war in Ukraine is therefore not simply about understanding Eastern Europe. It is about understanding one part of the emerging global geography of power.
Current diplomacy has not yet delivered peace. It has only managed to reopen a door. But that door matters because it recalls a fundamental truth of international relations: wars do not always begin to end when one of the protagonists abandons its objectives. They can also begin to end when the cost of continuing them gradually becomes greater than the political advantage that a protagonist expects to gain. The American mission in Moscow, followed by the mission in Kyiv, should be assessed against that standard. Modi, Xi, Trump, Zelensky and the other actors do not possess a single key. They possess fragments of the same equation. The historical question will be whether those fragments can eventually be brought together.
CPGNNews EDITORIAL VIEW
The world should not expect a single man to bring peace to Ukraine. It should instead observe how power relationships, economic interests, military constraints and diplomatic channels can gradually create the conditions for a political decision. Vladimir Putin retains substantial decision making power. But that power does not mean that he operates beyond influence. It means that influence must now be understood differently: not as the ability to command, but as the ability to alter the conditions under which a decision becomes possible. It is probably within this space, between power, interest and necessity, that the next stage of the war in Ukraine will be decided.
CaribPulse Global News Network, CPGNNews.
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