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CPGNNews GLOBAL STRATEGIC STUDY

FREETOWN: A SUMMIT THAT GOES BEYOND THE SUMMIT

On July 19, 2026, Lungi, on the outskirts of Freetown, hosted the 69th Ordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The meeting took place in circumstances that extended far beyond the framework of a routine institutional summit. Fifty one years after its creation, ECOWAS is confronting one of the most profound transformations in its history. The crisis of its integration model, the political realignments triggered by military takeovers, growing demands for national sovereignty, persistent insecurity and regional economic vulnerabilities have converged to raise a fundamental question: what kind of community does West Africa want to build for the decades ahead?

To understand the significance of Freetown, the summit must be placed within the longer trajectory of West African regionalism. Established in 1975 through the Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS was initially conceived as an instrument of economic integration designed to promote the free movement of people, goods and capital, as well as cooperation among states whose inherited borders had never eliminated their deep interdependence. Over the decades, the organization progressively expanded its mandate to include conflict prevention, collective security, the defense of constitutional order and democratic governance. This evolution helped make ECOWAS one of Africa’s most ambitious experiments in regional integration. It also generated a tension that now lies at the heart of its crisis: how far can a regional organization go in defending common norms without leading some of its members to believe that integration has become a constraint on national sovereignty?

That tension has become particularly visible following the rupture created by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, now united within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Their withdrawal from ECOWAS did not merely reduce the Community’s institutional reach. It exposed a deeper disagreement over the very meaning of West African regionalism. On one side stands a vision based on common rules, regional mobility, economic integration and the defense of certain political principles. On the other is an increasingly sovereignty centered conception of regional cooperation, emphasizing national strategic autonomy and the freedom of states to determine their own political and security choices. Yet institutional separation has not erased interdependence. Peoples, markets, trade routes, families, migration networks, economic corridors and security realities continue to bind these countries closely to their neighbors. This contradiction between political separation and structural interdependence is now one of the defining challenges of West Africa’s emerging geopolitical landscape.

The central question that the Freetown Summit could no longer avoid is therefore clear: can ECOWAS rebuild a credible regional project in a West Africa that is politically fragmented, economically interdependent and increasingly vulnerable to insecurity? The answer will determine far more than the administrative future of a regional organization. It will test the ability of African regionalism to adapt to changing relationships between the state, sovereignty, democracy and integration. It will also determine whether regional institutions can still generate enough confidence to persuade governments and citizens that collective cooperation offers a more effective response to contemporary challenges than isolation or fragmentation.

The stakes are also profoundly human. ECOWAS encompasses a region of nearly 400 million people whose economic and social trajectories are interconnected through population movements, trade, migration, labor markets, transport networks and production systems that largely transcend political borders. Free movement has long been one of the most visible achievements of West African integration. When relations between states deteriorate, when borders become instruments of confrontation or when regional mechanisms lose effectiveness, the consequences do not remain confined to diplomatic circles. They affect traders, transport workers, migrant laborers, students, cross border families and millions of citizens whose daily lives depend upon the continued fluidity of regional exchanges.

The current transformation therefore cannot be understood simply as an institutional crisis requiring the restoration of the previous order. The departure of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger represents a historic rupture, but it has also exposed a deeper reality: the ECOWAS model must now respond to expectations that its original design was never fully equipped to absorb. Terrorism, state fragility, unconstitutional changes of government, intensifying competition among external powers, economic pressures, climate change and the accelerating digital transformation of African societies are forcing the organization to reconsider its instruments, priorities and perhaps even its understanding of regional solidarity. The question is no longer simply how to preserve ECOWAS as it once existed, but how to ensure that it remains relevant in a strategic environment that has fundamentally changed.

It is in this context that the Freetown Summit acquires particular significance. West African leaders are being called upon simultaneously to address security imperatives, preserve the achievements of economic integration, restore political confidence and redefine the relationship between national sovereignty and regional commitments. The leadership of Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye opens a new political chapter whose significance will ultimately have to be measured by results rather than intentions. The essential question is no longer whether ECOWAS can articulate a common vision, but whether it can translate that vision into policies capable of producing measurable benefits for states and citizens alike.

This study examines that transformation from several complementary perspectives: the history and institutional foundations of ECOWAS, the current crisis of its political model, the geopolitical reconfiguration generated by the AES, the security imperative, the prospects for deeper economic integration, the place of citizens within the regional project, and the challenges posed by digital transformation and climate change. It also examines the changing conditions of regional leadership and the strategic choices that may determine the Community’s future. Particular attention will be given to the Caribbean experience, especially CARICOM, whose trajectory offers useful points of comparison for understanding both the possibilities and the limitations of regionalism across the Global South.

Ultimately, the debate over ECOWAS’s future goes beyond the survival of an institution. It concerns West Africa’s ability to transform interdependence into collective strength, vulnerability into mechanisms of solidarity and political disagreement into spaces for dialogue capable of preserving what matters most. The real challenge emerging from Freetown is therefore not the mechanical restoration of a regional order that has already changed, but whether a new architecture of cooperation can emerge from a crisis that has fundamentally altered relations among the states and peoples of West Africa.

West Africa may not need an ECOWAS that speaks more. It needs an ECOWAS that delivers more.

I. ECOWAS AT THE END OF AN ERA

From an economic community to a crisis of the regional model

1. 1975: THE FOUNDING AMBITION

On May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria, fifteen West African states signed the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States. Led by the political figures of the time, including Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon and Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the initiative reflected an ambition that was both economic and strategic: to create a sufficiently integrated regional space to expand national markets, promote development, pool resources and reduce the vulnerability of West African economies to external powers and global markets.

The composition of the fifteen founding states reflected the political diversity of postcolonial West Africa: Benin, then known as Dahomey, Burkina Faso, then Upper Volta, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. ECOWAS was therefore not born out of political or ideological uniformity. It rested instead on a pragmatic conviction: despite differences in political systems, languages, historical trajectories and levels of development, the states of the region shared sufficient interests to build a permanent framework for cooperation.

The context of 1975 was that of a young postcolonial Africa struggling to transform political independence into genuine economic autonomy. The new states had acquired international sovereignty, but their economies remained heavily dependent on external markets, commodity exports and commercial structures inherited from the colonial period. West African leaders increasingly understood that national sovereignty could not be fully consolidated without a collective capacity to produce, trade, invest and negotiate on a broader scale. Regional integration therefore appeared not as a renunciation of sovereignty, but as a means of giving sovereignty greater economic and strategic weight.

The Treaty of Lagos established the foundations for gradual integration based on economic cooperation, trade liberalization, the free movement of people and, ultimately, the creation of an economic and monetary union. The ambition was considerable, but its logic remained incremental. The objective was not to eliminate immediately the economic borders separating states with profoundly different productive structures and levels of development, but to progressively create the conditions for a more integrated regional market. This approach would become one of the defining characteristics of the Community’s institutional project.

2. THE ECONOMY AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

Economic integration has remained the historical foundation of the ECOWAS project. Among its most visible achievements is the free movement of people. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement, Residence and Establishment progressively gave concrete expression to the idea of a regional space in which citizens could cross borders with fewer restrictions. The ECOWAS passport, introduced from 2000 onward, subsequently reinforced this ambition and became one of the most recognizable symbols of the construction of a Community space extending beyond national frontiers.

Intra regional trade constitutes another indicator of this integration, although its level remains below the region’s economic potential. Trade among member states has increased over the decades, but continues to face limited productive diversification, inadequate infrastructure, high logistics costs, non tariff barriers and the persistent dominance of commercial relations with external markets. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme nevertheless created a framework intended to facilitate the movement of numerous products and encourage the emergence of a regional market. The progress of intra regional trade should therefore not be measured solely by volume. It must also be assessed through cross border economic networks, regional value chains and the millions of citizens whose livelihoods depend directly or indirectly on this circulation.

Infrastructure has constituted another essential instrument of regional interdependence. Road and rail corridors, electricity interconnections, telecommunications networks and major energy projects have progressively connected economies that, historically, were often more oriented toward former colonial powers and global markets than toward their immediate neighbors. The West African Power Pool illustrates this evolution: electricity is increasingly becoming a resource whose production, transmission and distribution can be conceived at the regional level. Major gas and cross border energy projects pursue the same logic by giving integration a material dimension that goes beyond political declarations.

This evolution reveals an essential characteristic of ECOWAS: its integration is not merely institutional. It is also geographic, economic and human. Roads, markets, electricity networks, migration patterns and commercial exchanges have created forms of interdependence that survive political crises. This is precisely why the current institutional fragmentation does not mean the disappearance of the West African economic space. On the contrary, it makes the question of how to preserve these interdependencies when political trust among states deteriorates even more urgent.

3. THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF ECOWAS

The deepest evolution of ECOWAS, however, lies in its gradual transition from a primarily economic organization into a major political and security actor. This transformation was not at the center of the original 1975 project. It emerged under the pressure of crises that profoundly reshaped West Africa: civil wars, unconstitutional changes of government, armed conflicts, political instability and, more recently, the expansion of terrorist groups across several states in the region.

The Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, adopted in 2001, represented a major turning point. By affirming that accession to power must take place through constitutional and democratic means, ECOWAS established a normative framework extending far beyond the traditional objectives of an economic organization. The defense of constitutional order thus gradually became part of the Community’s political project, giving ECOWAS an interventionist role that would fundamentally alter perceptions of its mandate.

This politicization was both a source of strength and a source of vulnerability. It enabled ECOWAS to play an important role in several regional crises and to contribute to mediation efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. It also helped establish the organization as a recognized actor in conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa. Yet the expansion of its mandate simultaneously exposed the Community to growing criticism over the consistency of its decisions, the proportionality of its interventions and perceptions of unequal treatment of political crises. As ECOWAS moved beyond its original economic role, it inevitably became more exposed to the controversies surrounding any institution required to arbitrate between national sovereignty and regional norms.

4. WHEN AN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION BECOMES A POLITICAL ACTOR

The turning point of the 1990s made this transformation particularly visible. The Liberian civil war, which began in 1989, compelled ECOWAS to intervene in an internal conflict within one of its member states. In 1990, the Community established ECOMOG, a military force intended to contribute to the restoration of peace and security. Its intervention in Liberia was controversial, particularly because of its operational limitations and the political disagreements among the states contributing to the force. Nevertheless, it established a major precedent: ECOWAS was no longer merely an organization designed to facilitate economic exchange. It was becoming capable of mobilizing political and military instruments in response to regional crises.

That experience was subsequently extended to Sierra Leone and other crisis situations. At the same time, the Community progressively developed a broader architecture for conflict prevention, mediation, early warning and collective security. The creation of a standby force was intended to give institutional form to this ambition. Yet this architecture was consistently confronted with a fundamental difficulty: collective decision making was not always matched by the financial, logistical and military resources required for implementation. Dependence on contributions from member states and external partners repeatedly limited the Community’s operational autonomy.

This contradiction between ambition and capacity would become one of ECOWAS’s structural problems. The broader the organization’s mandate became, the greater the expectations placed upon it. Yet its institutional instruments, financial resources and the political will of its member states did not always evolve at the same pace. ECOWAS therefore found itself in a paradoxical position: it was increasingly expected to guarantee security, democracy and stability while remaining heavily dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the same states whose national interests could at times diverge profoundly.

It is within this tension between regional ambition and national sovereignty that a central dimension of the current crisis can be found. ECOWAS began as a project of economic integration. It gradually became a political and security actor. But that transformation created new expectations without always producing the instruments necessary to meet them. The question now is no longer simply whether ECOWAS should continue its integration process, but whether its institutional model remains suited to the political, security and economic realities of a West Africa that has entered a new historical cycle.

5. COUPS AND THE CRISIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

From 2020 onward, West Africa experienced a succession of disruptions to constitutional order that placed the political architecture of ECOWAS under profound strain. Mali underwent two military takeovers, in August 2020 and May 2021, followed by Guinea in September 2021. Burkina Faso experienced two military seizures of power in 2022, while Niger underwent another constitutional rupture in July 2023. This sequence was followed on November 26, 2025, by a military takeover in Guinea Bissau, which led to the detention of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló as the country awaited the announcement of presidential election results. Together, these events gave the region’s democratic crisis a new depth. The issue was no longer a series of isolated political disruptions, but a broader challenge to the credibility of constitutional governance across parts of West Africa.

These developments cannot, however, be reduced to a simple “return of coups” or interpreted as evidence of a uniform democratic decline. They emerged from a combination of mutually reinforcing factors: the perceived inability of some governments to respond effectively to insecurity, widespread frustration with political elites accused of corruption or inefficiency, institutional fragility, disputes over electoral processes and rapidly changing geopolitical conditions. In several countries, the democratic promise has also been weakened by the gap between proclaimed principles and the daily experience of populations confronted with poverty, insecurity, unemployment and inadequate public services. The problem, therefore, is not merely the occurrence of military takeovers, but the gradual erosion of public trust that makes such ruptures politically possible.

ECOWAS responded primarily through its constitutional order mechanisms: suspensions, economic and financial sanctions, restrictions on movement and measures targeting officials of military regimes. This response was consistent with the norms the organization had progressively established since the adoption of the 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Yet the succession of coups exposed the limitations of this strategy. Sanctions enabled the Community to reaffirm the existence of shared regional norms, but they did not prevent further constitutional ruptures. In some cases, they contributed to strengthening the sovereignty centered rhetoric of military authorities and deepening the distance between those governments, their populations and the regional organization.

6. THE RISE OF POPULAR CONTESTATION

Alongside the institutional ruptures, popular contestation grew in several West African capitals. In Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, as well as in other political centers across the region, public mobilizations expressed rejection of established political elites, frustration over insecurity, criticism of certain relationships with France and opposition to sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. Social media amplified these movements, accelerating the circulation of sovereignty centered narratives and creating a new political arena in which regional institutions themselves became the object of direct public criticism.

This dynamic remains deeply ambivalent. On one hand, it reflects genuine aspirations for more effective governance, stronger national sovereignty, greater economic justice and a greater ability for states to define their own strategic priorities. On the other, it can be appropriated by political forces that transform popular dissatisfaction into a means of legitimizing military rule or restricting civil liberties. Popular support for some military governments therefore cannot automatically be equated with a rejection of democracy itself. It often reflects a more complex disenchantment with political systems that have failed to meet expectations in the areas of security, economic opportunity and social development. This distinction is essential to understanding ECOWAS’s legitimacy crisis: what is being challenged is not necessarily the principle of regional cooperation or even democracy itself, but the way those principles have been embodied by political institutions and elites.

ECOWAS has consequently faced a particularly difficult paradox. The organization built much of its legitimacy on the defense of constitutional stability, yet portions of the populations in affected countries came to perceive its interventions as the defense of a political order whose results they considered inadequate. The problem was therefore no longer simply one of enforcing Community rules. It became a question of their social legitimacy. A regional institution may possess a solid legal foundation and still lose political authority when citizens no longer clearly perceive the benefits of its action.

7. THE DEPARTURE OF BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER

The simultaneous withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger represents the most significant institutional rupture in the recent history of ECOWAS. The three states announced their decision to leave the organization in January 2024. After the expiration of the withdrawal period established under the revised 1993 Treaty, their departure officially took effect on January 29, 2025. During the transition period, the three governments consolidated their cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States, progressively giving institutional form to an alternative regional architecture.

This departure is not simply another episode of tension between governments and a regional organization. It resulted from several converging dynamics: the rejection by military authorities of what they regarded as external interference, a determination to reaffirm national sovereignty, the search for new strategic partnerships, particularly with Russia, and the conviction that the interests of Sahelian states could be better defended within a narrower and less restrictive framework of cooperation. The break with ECOWAS was therefore accompanied by a broader redefinition of the three countries’ diplomatic, military and economic partnerships.

For ECOWAS, the implications are considerable. The organization had already suspended Mali in 2020, Guinea in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023. But suspension is, by definition, potentially reversible. Withdrawal has a different significance: it permanently alters the institutional geography of West Africa. ECOWAS has lost three states whose territorial size, geographic position and strategic importance are considerable, while the Alliance of Sahel States has simultaneously asserted its own political and security identity. Yet institutional separation has not eliminated shared borders, trade routes, family networks, migration flows or economic interdependence. Political rupture therefore coexists with geographic and social interdependence that remains deeply intact.

8. A STRUCTURAL RUPTURE

ECOWAS can no longer simply seek to restore the world that existed before the crisis. The regional landscape has changed, and the coexistence of two political architectures, ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States, now raises questions the organization had never previously faced. How can freedom of movement and trade be preserved when institutional affiliation diverges? How can effective security cooperation be maintained when strategic doctrines are no longer aligned? How can cross border resources, regional infrastructure and economic corridors be managed when the states concerned belong to different political frameworks?

The rupture is structural because it first reveals a divergence over the very meaning of integration. ECOWAS has progressively developed around a set of shared norms and regional institutions that can, at least in principle, constrain member states when fundamental commitments are violated. The Alliance of Sahel States, by contrast, favors a more sovereignty centered conception of cooperation, in which coordination among states does not necessarily require acceptance of an equally constraining regional framework. The divergence therefore concerns more than current governments or temporary political circumstances. It reflects two different conceptions of the relationship between national sovereignty and regional solidarity.

The rupture also reflects a transformation in the geopolitical environment. Russia, China, Turkey, the Gulf powers and traditional Western partners are all seeking to preserve or expand their influence in West Africa and the Sahel. Regional states now have a wider range of external partnerships than in previous decades and are increasingly seeking to diversify their international relationships. This does not mean that external powers alone determine the choices of West African governments. Rather, it means that international competition provides states with new strategic room for maneuver and fundamentally changes the environment in which ECOWAS seeks to exercise influence.

Finally, the rupture exposes a crisis of confidence between member states and the regional organization itself. Sanctions, diplomatic confrontations and the inability to prevent the succession of coups have weakened the Community’s political authority. Yet this crisis does not mean that the idea of regional integration has become obsolete. It demonstrates instead that the previous balance between national sovereignty, regional norms and Community solidarity no longer functions as it once did.

CPGNNEWS ANALYSIS

The end of a cycle does not necessarily mean the end of integration. It means that the forms of integration must evolve. The ECOWAS of the 1970s and 1990s cannot simply be reproduced within the political, economic and security realities of the 2020s. Yet the underlying reasons that led West African states to establish the Community remain, and some have become even more pressing: trade interdependence, population mobility, cross border security threats, climate change, regional infrastructure and the need to exercise collective influence in an increasingly competitive international environment.

The real challenge is therefore not to choose between an unchanged ECOWAS and the permanent fragmentation of West Africa. It is to determine whether a new generation of regionalism can emerge from the crisis. A renewed ECOWAS would need to defend its principles without becoming disconnected from the political and social realities of its populations, protect constitutional order without reducing democracy to elections alone, uphold regional norms without losing its capacity for dialogue and, above all, demonstrate through tangible results why regional cooperation remains preferable to fragmentation. The present crisis could therefore become less the grave of the Community project than the moment of its renewal.

The question that now arises is no longer simply how to preserve ECOWAS, but what kind of ECOWAS West Africa wants to build for the next generation.

II. THE NEW LEADERSHIP AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY

Can Regional Authority Be Rebuilt?

1. BASSIROU DIOMAYE FAYE AND THE NEW POLITICAL MOMENT

The 69th ECOWAS Summit in Freetown brought Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye to the chairmanship of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, succeeding Sierra Leonean President Julius Maada Bio. At forty six, Faye represents a different political generation, shaped by demands for institutional renewal, greater accountability and a form of governance more closely connected to public expectations. His rise therefore carries a significance that extends beyond the normal rotation of the Community’s leadership.

Faye assumes the regional presidency at a particularly difficult moment. ECOWAS needs leadership capable of rebuilding confidence among its remaining member states, reopening credible channels of communication with the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States and restoring momentum to an integration process weakened by political fragmentation. His relatively young age also has symbolic importance in a region where a large majority of the population is young and where political institutions are increasingly judged according to their ability to respond to the aspirations of younger generations. Yet generational renewal alone cannot restore institutional authority. It becomes politically meaningful only when it produces a different method of governing and, ultimately, measurable results.

In his inaugural address, Faye referred to the «heavy legacy of fifty years of effort, solidarity and patient construction» carried forward by the vision and commitment of earlier generations and pledged to preserve that legacy. The reference to the founding generation is significant because it combines continuity with the possibility of renewal. By invoking the «ideal of integration», Faye appears to frame his mandate not simply as an institutional responsibility but as a political mission: to determine whether the Community can recover a sense of common purpose after one of the deepest crises in its history.

2. SENEGAL WITHIN THE REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Senegal’s prominent position within the current institutional configuration of ECOWAS has created additional expectations around Dakar. The country’s diplomatic tradition, the professional reputation of its armed forces and its long standing experience with constitutional politics give it a degree of credibility in a region where trust between governments has become increasingly fragile. These characteristics could prove particularly important in addressing the most sensitive issues on the Community’s agenda: relations with the Alliance of Sahel States, collective security, institutional reform and the future of regional integration.

The strategic importance of Senegal also derives from its geographical and political position. It occupies a space connecting the Atlantic dimension of West Africa with the broader Sahelian environment and maintains historical, economic and social links with several countries now outside the ECOWAS institutional framework. This gives Dakar potential advantages as an interlocutor, but it also imposes limits. A successful regional strategy cannot be built around Senegal alone, and the perception that the Community is being driven by the interests of one member state would undermine precisely the legitimacy that the new leadership seeks to restore.

The concentration of expectations around Senegal therefore carries a double risk. Success could strengthen the credibility of both Dakar and the Community. Failure, however, could reinforce the perception that ECOWAS lacks the political capacity to translate its decisions into collective action. Senegalese diplomacy will consequently have to maintain a difficult balance between national interests and Community priorities, between firmness on constitutional principles and openness to dialogue, and between the expectations of coastal member states and the concerns of countries whose political trajectories have increasingly diverged from the regional mainstream.

3. A DIFFERENT POLITICAL GENERATION

Bassirou Diomaye Faye belongs to a generation of African political leaders whose emergence has been closely associated with demands for greater inclusion, transparency, accountability and effectiveness. Unlike many of the political figures who dominated the region during previous decades, this generation has been shaped by a political environment in which social media, youth movements, public scrutiny and demands for institutional change have transformed the relationship between citizens and political authority.

This generational transition, however, should not be romanticized. Younger leadership does not automatically produce better governance, and political renewal can quickly lose its appeal when expectations exceed institutional capacity. The same populations that demand change can become rapidly disillusioned when promised reforms fail to improve security, employment, public services or economic opportunities. The legitimacy of a new generation of leaders will therefore be measured less by their age than by their capacity to deliver.

For ECOWAS, this distinction is crucial. The Community cannot restore confidence simply by changing the faces that represent it. It must demonstrate that institutional renewal produces a different form of regional governance. The organization must become more responsive, more transparent and more capable of explaining its decisions to citizens. Generational renewal can open the door to such a transformation, but only political substance can sustain it.

4. INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE FACE OF DISTRUST

The question of ECOWAS’s legitimacy lies at the center of the present crisis. The organization’s authority has been weakened by several converging factors: repeated difficulties in resolving political crises, sanctions perceived by some populations as disproportionate or unfair, accusations that regional decisions reflect the interests of the most powerful member states more than those of weaker countries and a widespread perception that the Community’s institutional machinery is expensive and complex relative to the results it produces.

Institutional authority can no longer be assumed. It has to be demonstrated. The first requirement is therefore effectiveness. ECOWAS must show that regional cooperation can produce tangible improvements in security, trade, infrastructure, mobility and crisis management. The second requirement is consistency. The Community must demonstrate that its rules apply according to principles that are coherent, predictable and equitable, rather than according to the political weight of individual states. The third requirement is participation. Civil society, young people, women, professional organizations and local communities must have meaningful channels through which their concerns can influence regional policy.

This is ultimately a question of the social contract between institutions and citizens. A regional organization can possess legal authority while losing political legitimacy. The difference lies in whether citizens perceive the institution as relevant to their lives. If ECOWAS is seen primarily as a body that issues communiqués, imposes sanctions and conducts diplomatic negotiations among governments, its legitimacy will remain fragile. If it becomes an institution capable of facilitating movement, protecting communities, expanding economic opportunity and helping states address problems that no country can solve alone, its authority can gradually be rebuilt.

5. THE LIMITS OF THE PUNITIVE APPROACH

Sanctions, including suspensions, travel restrictions and asset freezes, have become one of ECOWAS’s principal instruments for responding to coups and violations of constitutional order. Their use is grounded in the Community’s legal framework and reflects the principle that membership carries obligations as well as benefits. Yet the experience of recent years has demonstrated the limits of relying too heavily on punitive measures. Sanctions have not prevented successive military takeovers, and in some cases they have contributed to the political isolation of targeted states while reinforcing anti ECOWAS narratives among parts of their populations.

The punitive approach rests on an assumption that deserves closer examination: that military regimes will respond primarily to economic and diplomatic pressure. In several Sahelian countries, however, sanctions have been transformed into political instruments by the targeted authorities themselves. Governments have presented them as evidence of external coercion and have used the resulting hardship to reinforce narratives of national resistance and sovereignty. This does not mean that sanctions are inherently ineffective. It means that their political consequences can differ significantly from their intended purpose, particularly when they affect ordinary citizens more visibly than the political elites they are designed to pressure.

The Community therefore needs a broader strategic repertoire. Dialogue, mediation, technical assistance, positive conditionality and graduated engagement should complement, rather than necessarily replace, targeted sanctions. The objective should be to create incentives for a return to constitutional order while preserving the credibility of regional norms. A policy that combines pressure on political decision makers with concrete pathways toward reintegration could prove more effective than a strategy based primarily on isolation.

The decision to extend the mandate of mediator Lansana Kouyaté through December 2026 in order to continue engagement with the Alliance of Sahel States may therefore represent an important shift. Its significance will depend not on the existence of another diplomatic mandate, but on whether the dialogue produces concrete progress. Mediation becomes credible when it creates a political pathway that all sides consider more advantageous than continued confrontation.

6. SANCTION, CONVINCE OR ACCOMPANY?

Relations with states undergoing constitutional transitions, particularly Guinea, illustrate the dilemma facing ECOWAS. Guinea was suspended after the 2021 coup, and tensions between the authorities and the Community remained high for several years. The broader regional environment has meanwhile become even more complicated, with repeated constitutional crises and growing public sensitivity to questions of sovereignty, foreign influence and regional intervention.

The crisis in Guinea Bissau has further demonstrated the difficulty of calibrating the Community’s response. At the time of the Freetown summit, the political situation remained highly sensitive following the detention of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and other political figures after the November 2025 military takeover. Civil society organizations called on ECOWAS to adopt a clear position in defense of constitutional order and to demand the release of detained political actors. Such situations place the Community before a difficult choice: it must defend constitutional principles while preserving the diplomatic channels necessary to negotiate an exit from the crisis.

A purely punitive response risks closing the very channels through which mediation could succeed. Excessive accommodation, however, risks undermining the credibility of the rules the organization claims to defend. The most difficult but potentially most sustainable approach is therefore a calibrated one: targeted pressure against those responsible for unconstitutional actions, combined with sustained political engagement and a clearly defined path toward constitutional normalization. Such a strategy requires patience, credibility and a willingness to distinguish between political accountability and collective punishment.

7. MEDIATION AS A STRATEGIC INSTRUMENT

Over the course of its history, ECOWAS has accumulated significant experience in political mediation. Its envoys have travelled throughout the region, met political actors, negotiated transition frameworks and attempted to prevent crises from escalating into wider conflicts. This accumulated experience constitutes an important institutional asset. Yet mediation is not a static skill. It must evolve with the political environment in which it operates.

The emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States has fundamentally altered that environment. ECOWAS mediators are no longer dealing exclusively with individual member states operating within a common institutional framework. They are increasingly engaging with a political grouping that defines itself partly through its distance from the Community. This requires a different diplomatic language, one capable of recognizing legitimate sovereignty concerns without abandoning the principles on which regional cooperation is built.

The presence of new external actors has further complicated the strategic landscape. Russia, China, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other international partners have developed expanding relationships across West Africa and the Sahel, each with its own economic, political or security interests. ECOWAS mediation must therefore operate within a much more competitive international environment. At the same time, West African populations are better informed, more politically vocal and more capable of influencing public debates through digital platforms. Negotiations conducted exclusively among governments are increasingly difficult to sustain when citizens can observe, criticize and challenge them in real time.

ECOWAS must therefore strengthen mediation as a strategic capability rather than treat it as an emergency diplomatic instrument. This requires trained personnel, stronger political and economic analysis, better coordination with African and international partners, sustained financing and, above all, political commitment from member states to allow mediation processes to reach meaningful conclusions. The objective should not simply be to manage crises after they erupt. It should be to identify the structural pressures that generate them and intervene before political confrontation becomes institutional rupture.

The future authority of ECOWAS may ultimately depend on this transformation. An organization that can only punish after a crisis has erupted will remain reactive. An organization capable of listening, mediating, anticipating and producing negotiated solutions can begin to recover the strategic relevance it has lost. The challenge for Bassirou Diomaye Faye and the current generation of regional leaders is therefore not merely to defend the existing Community, but to demonstrate that regional institutions can once again become instruments through which West African states solve problems that national governments cannot resolve alone.

8. RESTORING DIALOGUE WITH THE STATES THAT LEFT ECOWAS

The question of dialogue with the Alliance of Sahel States is arguably the most urgent and complex issue currently facing ECOWAS. The Freetown Summit reaffirmed the Community’s determination to continue discussions with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger within a unified dialogue framework, reflecting an effort to preserve institutional cohesion rather than allow a series of separate bilateral negotiations to emerge. This approach follows a clear institutional logic: ECOWAS member states should not negotiate separately with individual AES countries in ways that could create internal divisions and weaken the Community’s collective position.

There are clear advantages to this approach. Fragmented negotiations could generate rivalries among member states, weaken regional solidarity and give the AES authorities greater room to exploit differences among West African capitals. Maintaining a common framework, by contrast, allows ECOWAS to preserve collective negotiating capacity and prevents relations with the three countries from becoming a succession of separate arrangements. Yet institutional coherence also carries a political risk. If interpreted as rigidity or as an unwillingness to recognize the specific circumstances of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, it could turn dialogue into a procedural confrontation rather than a genuine process of rapprochement.

The central question, therefore, is not whether dialogue should take place, but under what conditions it can become politically productive. The AES is no longer merely a grouping of governments undergoing political transitions. It has progressively developed its own coordination mechanisms, established common positions and articulated a political discourse centered on sovereignty, strategic autonomy and the redefinition of external partnerships. ECOWAS must acknowledge this reality without abandoning its own principles. Dialogue can be credible only if it recognizes the transformations that have taken place since the political ruptures of 2024 while keeping the prospects for regional cooperation open.

The decision to retain Lansana Kouyaté as chief negotiator, with a renewed mandate through December 2026, represents an important signal of continuity. But diplomatic continuity alone will not be enough. The room for maneuver remains narrow because the AES has already undertaken efforts to harmonize its positions in order to approach negotiations with ECOWAS with «one voice». The window for dialogue remains open, but it is not unlimited. It could gradually close if institutional positions harden into incompatible red lines or if the two regional architectures cease to view their interdependence as a shared interest.

The real objective should therefore not be to compel the AES states to return to the former institutional framework at any cost, but to gradually rebuild the conditions for functional cooperation. The movement of people, trade, cross border infrastructure, security, energy and water resources do not disappear when institutional relationships are disrupted. Geography continues to generate interdependence where politics produces separation. It is precisely this reality that could provide the foundation for a new regional dialogue.

9. THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

ECOWAS’s legitimacy also depends on its capacity to defend democracy with consistency and coherence. The Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance establishes a fundamental principle: access to political power must take place through constitutional and democratic means, while violations of constitutional order may justify a collective response. This principle remains essential. But in order to retain its normative force, it must be applied in a predictable, equitable and politically impartial manner, regardless of the relative power of individual member states.

It is precisely on this ground that ECOWAS has faced one of its most serious legitimacy challenges. The organization has at times been accused of excessive firmness toward certain regimes while showing greater tolerance toward other governments whose democratic practices were also being questioned. Whether or not such perceptions are always objectively justified, they have real political consequences. They reinforce the idea of a double standard and weaken the Community’s ability to present its interventions as the expression of a common regional norm rather than the product of political power relations.

ECOWAS’s democratic credibility therefore requires consistent application of its own principles. Constitutional ruptures, restrictions on fundamental freedoms, disproportionate limitations on freedom of expression, violations of basic rights and interference with judicial independence should be assessed according to comparable standards, regardless of the country concerned. This does not mean that every crisis must receive exactly the same response. It means that differences in treatment must be explainable by objective differences in circumstances rather than by the political or economic weight of the states involved.

Defending democracy cannot, moreover, be reduced to punishing coups after they occur. A genuinely democratic regional organization must also help create the conditions under which constitutional institutions can function effectively. This requires support for electoral processes, technical assistance to public administrations, election observation, stronger judicial institutions, assistance with constitutional reforms and sustained engagement with civil society organizations. Democracy does not begin and end on election day; it depends on the resilience of institutions between elections.

Such an approach would allow ECOWAS to move beyond a largely defensive conception of democracy. Rather than appearing primarily as an institution that intervenes once constitutional order has already collapsed, it could become a permanent actor in democratic prevention and consolidation. Its ability to act before a crisis, rather than only after one has erupted, may ultimately prove essential to rebuilding its legitimacy.

10. TOWARD A NEW DOCTRINE OF REGIONAL GOVERNANCE?

The current crisis ultimately invites ECOWAS to rethink its doctrine of regional governance. The principle of «zero tolerance for coups» remains indispensable because accepting the seizure of political power by force would weaken the entire regional constitutional architecture. Yet this principle can no longer constitute a sufficient political doctrine. An organization simultaneously confronted with military transitions, terrorism, social fragmentation, geopolitical competition and declining public trust needs a much broader strategic framework.

The first dimension of such a doctrine should be prevention. ECOWAS must invest more heavily in early warning, democratic institution building, permanent political dialogue, prevention of social conflict and inclusive economic development. A coup is rarely an entirely unpredictable event. It is usually preceded by institutional tensions, declining public trust, economic difficulties, social conflict or a deterioration in the relationship between governments and citizens. An effective regional policy should therefore seek to intervene before these pressures reach the point of rupture.

The second dimension should be positive conditionality. Sanctions will probably remain part of the Community’s policy toolkit, but they should be complemented by mechanisms capable of rewarding progress. Preferential access to certain regional financing mechanisms, technical assistance, institutional support, strategic partnerships and reform programs could progressively be linked to verifiable indicators of governance, transparency and respect for constitutional order. The objective would be to transform regional integration into a system of incentives rather than merely a system of constraints.

The third dimension should be flexibility. The diversity of West Africa’s political, economic and security trajectories makes the application of a single model increasingly difficult. ECOWAS must be able to adapt its instruments to national circumstances while maintaining clearly defined common principles. Flexibility should not mean abandoning standards. It should mean developing different pathways toward shared objectives.

The fourth dimension should be citizen participation. Regional integration cannot remain an affair of heads of state, diplomats and technocrats. It must become a project understood and embraced by the populations it is intended to serve. Young people, women, civil society organizations, entrepreneurs, academics, local authorities and cross border communities should have greater opportunities to participate in defining regional priorities. An ECOWAS that speaks to citizens only when a crisis erupts will remain disconnected from the very societies whose interests it claims to represent.

Such a doctrine would imply a deeper redefinition of the Community’s role. The objective would no longer be simply to preserve an institutional order inherited from the past, but to build a form of regionalism capable of responding to the realities of the twenty first century. Security, democracy, mobility, energy, trade, climate, digital transformation and human development should increasingly be understood as interconnected dimensions of a single regional project.

CPGNNEWS STRATEGIC INSIGHT

Regional authority can no longer be proclaimed; it must be demonstrated. ECOWAS will not restore its credibility through institutional firmness alone, nor through a multiplication of summits and declarations. It will have to demonstrate, through coherent, equitable and effective action, that regional cooperation can concretely improve the lives of West African populations. The leadership of Bassirou Diomaye Faye and General Birame Diop will therefore be judged less by their ability to preserve existing institutional balances than by their capacity to transform a period of fragmentation into an opportunity for renewal. The real question is no longer simply how to save ECOWAS as it once existed, but how to build a Community capable of remaining indispensable to the West Africa of the future.

III. THE AES AND THE NEW POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF WEST AFRICA

The Sahel at the Heart of Regional Reconfiguration

1. THE SAHEL IS NOT A PERIPHERY

For decades, the Sahel was often viewed as a peripheral zone of West Africa: arid, sparsely populated, economically marginal and politically unstable. That perception is increasingly obsolete. The Sahel has become a strategic center of the region, an area in which the security, political and economic balances of West Africa as a whole are being reshaped.

The figures illustrate its importance. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger together account for tens of millions of inhabitants and occupy more than 2.8 million square kilometers, representing a substantial share of the territory of West Africa. Their natural resources include uranium, gold, oil and gas, while their geographical position gives them strategic importance for transport corridors, migration routes and commercial networks linking North Africa with sub Saharan Africa. The Sahel is therefore not merely a geographical transition zone between the Sahara and the southern regions of the continent. It is a space where strategic interests converge.

The destabilization of the Sahel has consequences far beyond the territories of the three AES countries. Armed groups operating across the region, including Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin and Islamic State affiliated organizations, have expanded the geographical reach of insecurity and placed increasing pressure on states farther south. The consequences extend beyond terrorism itself: commercial routes are disrupted, communities are displaced, illicit economies expand and coastal states face growing security pressures. The vulnerability of the Sahel has consequently become a regional vulnerability.

The economic performance of the three AES countries also complicates the narrative of a region defined exclusively by crisis. According to the annual report of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, their economies recorded combined growth of approximately 5.5% in 2025. Niger recorded growth of 6.9%, supported by increased production, crude oil exports and resilience in agriculture. Burkina Faso recorded approximately 5.0%, supported by services, agricultural production and renewed mining activity amid higher gold prices. Mali recorded approximately 4.9%, despite a moderate slowdown in economic activity. These figures do not erase the structural vulnerabilities of the three economies, but they demonstrate that the Sahel cannot be analyzed solely through the prism of insecurity and political instability.

2. BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER: THREE TRAJECTORIES, ONE NEW ALLIANCE

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger followed distinct political trajectories, yet they converged around a common rejection of the regional order that had prevailed for decades. Mali experienced military takeovers in 2020 and 2021, followed by Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023. The governments that emerged from these ruptures progressively distanced themselves from traditional alliances, particularly their historical relationship with France, while seeking new external partnerships, including closer ties with Russia.

The Alliance of Sahel States, created in September 2023, is therefore more than a temporary diplomatic arrangement. It represents an alternative conception of regional cooperation based on reaffirmed national sovereignty, functional cooperation rather than deep institutional integration, and diversification of external partnerships. The AES does not reject cooperation with neighboring countries as such. Rather, it asserts the right of its members to determine the nature, scope and conditions of that cooperation according to their own strategic priorities.

The alliance also serves an important political function for the military governments that created it. Facing international pressure and questions over their political legitimacy, the three governments have sought to strengthen their collective position. The AES provides a common diplomatic framework, facilitates coordination in areas such as security and gives greater political weight to claims centered on sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Its emergence therefore reflects both a geopolitical calculation and an effort by the three governments to consolidate their position within a rapidly changing regional environment.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURE

The AES has begun developing institutional mechanisms of its own, including a confederal framework, parliamentary structures and coordination arrangements. This architecture remains relatively young and its long term durability cannot yet be taken for granted. Its future will depend in large measure on whether the three countries can translate political solidarity into functioning institutions and demonstrate measurable progress in security, economic cooperation and development.

The emergence of this alternative architecture nonetheless represents a direct strategic challenge for ECOWAS. The issue is no longer simply how to manage political transitions within member states, but how two increasingly distinct regional frameworks can coexist within the same geographical space. The question is particularly important because the two blocs remain deeply interconnected through trade, migration, infrastructure, security and shared natural resources.

ECOWAS has acknowledged this new reality. The conclusions of the Freetown Summit emphasized the need to intensify dialogue with the AES countries with the objective of establishing a pragmatic mechanism for security cooperation, while maintaining a unified position in negotiations. This approach suggests that the organization is gradually moving from a logic centered primarily on restoring the previous institutional order toward a more complex effort to manage coexistence and preserve essential forms of regional cooperation.

4. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION

The tension between national sovereignty and regional integration lies at the heart of the political divide between ECOWAS and the AES. For ECOWAS, institutional integration is a means of strengthening prosperity and collective security. It allows states to pool resources, harmonize policies and establish common mechanisms capable of addressing challenges that exceed national borders. For the AES governments, however, deep institutional integration can be perceived as a constraint on national sovereignty, particularly when regional rules are interpreted as limiting the freedom of governments to determine their own political and security choices.

This tension is not new. Since the creation of ECOWAS, member states have repeatedly balanced the advantages of regional integration against the preservation of national prerogatives. What has changed is the political intensity of the debate. The Sahelian military governments have placed sovereignty at the center of their political discourse and have presented their break with ECOWAS as an assertion of national independence and strategic autonomy.

ECOWAS cannot answer this challenge simply by defending the institutional status quo. It must demonstrate that integration can also be an instrument of sovereignty rather than its negation. Collective sovereignty, exercised through institutions created and governed by African states themselves, can provide countries with bargaining power and strategic capacity that they would struggle to achieve individually. Shared infrastructure, coordinated security policies, integrated markets and collective diplomacy can expand national room for maneuver rather than necessarily diminish it.

The deeper challenge is therefore conceptual as much as institutional. ECOWAS must persuade governments and citizens that sovereignty and integration are not necessarily opposing principles. The real choice may not be between national sovereignty and regional integration, but between isolated sovereignty, which can leave states vulnerable to external pressures, and cooperative sovereignty, through which states pool part of their capacities in order to strengthen their collective influence. Whether West Africa can reconcile these two visions will be one of the defining questions of its regional future.

5. THE ROLE OF SECURITY IN THE AES’S NEW DOCTRINE

Security is one of the principal foundations of the AES. The three states share significant vulnerabilities to armed groups, a stated determination to regain control over their territories, and growing mistrust toward certain Western partners whose actions are increasingly portrayed as insufficient or, within Sahelian political discourse, as reflecting forms of continued dependency. This convergence has helped transform the AES from a framework of political solidarity into a broader mechanism of strategic cooperation.

The security doctrine emerging around the AES rests on several priorities: giving precedence to the fight against armed groups, strengthening national military capabilities, improving operational coordination among the three countries’ armed forces, diversifying external security partnerships and reinforcing border controls. At its core is a central proposition: Sahelian states should possess sufficient autonomous capacity to protect their security without relying exclusively on an external power. The diversification of partnerships, including with Russia, Türkiye, China and other emerging actors, forms part of this broader pursuit of strategic autonomy.

This approach nevertheless carries significant regional implications. For ECOWAS, the weakening of security coordination with the AES countries could complicate efforts to confront armed groups whose activities disregard institutional boundaries. It also raises questions about the nature of foreign military involvement in the Sahel, the terms of new defense partnerships and their long term consequences for West Africa’s strategic balance. The challenge is therefore to prevent institutional fragmentation from becoming security fragmentation.

6. THE NEW EXTERNAL ALLIANCES

The growing rapprochement between the AES states and Russia is among the most visible geopolitical developments of recent years. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, security cooperation with Russian actors has progressively acquired greater importance in the defense strategies of the governments in power. The presence of Russian linked structures, particularly following the gradual withdrawal of French forces and other Western partners, has contributed to changing military and diplomatic balances across the region.

This development should not, however, be reduced to a simple replacement of Western powers by Russia. Sahelian governments are also seeking to diversify their partnerships in order to expand their strategic room for maneuver. External cooperation has consequently become an instrument of strategic bargaining: obtaining equipment, strengthening military capabilities, accessing financing, developing infrastructure or securing diplomatic support while attempting to avoid exclusive dependence on any single partner.

This diversification extends well beyond Russia. China, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also developed or expanded their relations with several states across the region, each according to different interests and instruments. Beijing has emphasized infrastructure, resources and markets; Ankara combines diplomacy, trade, defense cooperation and cultural influence; while Gulf powers possess substantial financial resources and are expanding their economic and diplomatic presence.

The pluralization of external partnerships provides Sahelian states with new negotiating opportunities. It also carries risks. A growing number of external actors can generate competing spheres of influence, conflicting strategic priorities and forms of mutual dependency. Genuine autonomy therefore does not necessarily result from the number of partners a country has, but from its ability to preserve decision making power while negotiating effectively with each of them.

7. RUSSIA, CHINA, TÜRKİYE, THE GULF POWERS AND WESTERN PARTNERS

West Africa has increasingly become a space of geopolitical competition among several powers, each seeking to preserve or expand its influence. Russia has strengthened its military and diplomatic presence in several Sahelian countries. China remains a major actor in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, trade and investment. Türkiye has developed an increasingly active diplomacy, accompanied by expanding commercial relations and defense cooperation. The Gulf powers, meanwhile, possess substantial financial resources and are expanding their influence through investment, infrastructure, trade and various forms of diplomacy.

At the same time, Western influence has declined in several Sahelian countries. France, which historically maintained a particularly significant political, military and economic presence, was compelled to withdraw its forces from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger as relations with the governments that emerged from the coups deteriorated. The United States has likewise been required to reassess its regional posture following political changes in the Sahel and the reconsideration of certain military cooperation agreements.

This shift does not mean that Western influence has disappeared from West Africa. European states, the United States and their partners continue to possess significant capacities in trade, development financing, technical cooperation, maritime security and investment. The regional landscape is therefore less a matter of one power replacing another than of a much more open competition among several centers of influence.

This competition carries potential risks of instability, but it can also create opportunities for West African states. The ability to choose among multiple partners can strengthen their negotiating position and allow them to secure more favorable conditions for certain projects. Yet such diversification must be embedded in coherent national strategies; otherwise, external competition may simply produce new forms of dependency.

8. THE TRANSFORMATION OF RELATIONS WITH FORMER PARTNER POWERS

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS forms part of a broader transformation in relations between several Sahelian states and their former partners, particularly France. For the AES governments, the reduction or termination of the French military presence has become a symbol of regained sovereignty and an effort to redefine relations with former colonial powers. The termination of certain military cooperation agreements, the withdrawal of French forces and increasingly open criticism of French policies have therefore acquired a powerful political dimension.

ECOWAS is directly affected by this transformation. Its member states do not share the same interpretation of their relations with France, the European Union, the United States or emerging external powers. Some seek to preserve close partnerships with Western powers; others advocate much greater diversification. This diversity of strategic preferences complicates the formulation of a common regional policy and periodically exposes ECOWAS to accusations of excessive proximity to particular external partners.

The organization must therefore avoid becoming an instrument of rivalry among external powers. Its strategic interest lies instead in maintaining working relations with all available partners, Western and non Western alike, while defending West Africa’s own interests. The objective should be to preserve the region’s decision making sovereignty, attract useful investment and expertise, strengthen local capabilities and ensure that external partnerships respond first and foremost to priorities defined by West African societies.

9. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COASTAL STATES

The withdrawal of the Sahelian states from ECOWAS has direct consequences for the coastal states that remain within the organization. Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo now operate in a security environment in which the traditional distinction between the Sahel and the coastal zone is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Armed groups have already expanded their activities toward northern areas of Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire, demonstrating that the geographical boundary between the two spaces no longer constitutes an adequate security barrier.

Coastal states must also manage important economic and social consequences: population displacement caused by violence, increasing pressure on local resources, disruption of certain trade corridors and risks associated with the expansion of cross border criminal networks. Security therefore cannot be separated from questions of development, local governance, employment and the resilience of communities living in border areas.

In this context, ECOWAS remains essential as a framework for coordination. Border security, intelligence sharing, counter trafficking efforts and the protection of strategic infrastructure require capabilities that exceed those of most individual states. Yet the organization itself has been weakened by the departure of the three Sahelian countries: it has lost part of its strategic depth, potential military capacity and mechanisms for coordinating with territories directly exposed to the threat.

10. THE GULF OF GUINEA AND THE PRESSURES OF SAHELIAN INSTABILITY

The Gulf of Guinea is one of West Africa’s principal demographic, economic and commercial centers. The major ports of Abidjan, Lagos, Lomé and Cotonou play essential roles in regional trade and in connecting West Africa to global markets. The region also possesses substantial energy resources and accounts for a significant share of West Africa’s industrial and commercial activity.

Sahelian instability is placing growing pressure on this strategic space. The expansion of armed groups toward the northern areas of coastal states represents the most visible threat, but it is not the only one. Drug, arms and human trafficking networks exploit weaknesses in cross border control systems. Maritime piracy, which constituted a major threat during the 2010s, has declined substantially as a result of regional and international cooperation, but it has not disappeared entirely.

ECOWAS has developed mechanisms for maritime security cooperation, yet the scale of the challenges exceeds the current capacities of many states. More importantly, the security of the Gulf of Guinea cannot be sustainably separated from the security of the Sahel. The two spaces are connected by trade routes, populations, economic networks and the movements of armed groups. The institutional rupture between ECOWAS and the AES complicates this interdependence without eliminating it.

11. TRADE, BORDERS AND MOBILITY: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEPARATION

The withdrawal of the Sahelian states from ECOWAS cannot erase the economic and human flows that cross West Africa. Trade routes, transport corridors, mobility networks and exchanges among communities do not stop at institutional borders. The interdependence between Sahelian and coastal states is a geographical, economic and social reality that predates the regional organizations themselves.

Trade between the Sahel and coastal areas is vital to both sides. Sahelian countries depend on southern ports for a significant share of their imports and exports, while coastal economies benefit from demand in Sahelian markets. Human mobility is equally important: workers, traders, transport operators and families have moved between the two spaces for decades, creating social and economic networks that cannot be eliminated by institutional separation.

ECOWAS therefore has a strong interest in preserving these flows despite the AES withdrawal. The objective of safeguarding regional mobility, economic exchanges and relations among the peoples of West Africa remains fundamental. Yet implementation becomes more difficult in the absence of a common institutional framework. The risk is a multiplication of controls, rising transaction costs and a gradual weakening of the commercial fluidity that has been one of the most important achievements of West African regionalism.

12. Youth, Employment and Economic Transformation

Youth represents one of West Africa’s greatest demographic and economic assets, but also one of its most significant structural challenges. Approximately 60% of the region’s population is under the age of twenty five. This generation is generally better educated, more deeply connected to digital networks and more exposed to the transformations of the global economy, yet it continues to face a labour market marked by limited formal employment, the predominance of the informal sector and precarious incomes. Youth employment therefore cannot be separated from the broader question of productive transformation across the region.

This transformation requires sustained investment in education, vocational training, infrastructure and access to technology, alongside reforms capable of improving the business environment, supporting entrepreneurship and expanding access to finance. ECOWAS has launched several initiatives in these areas, including training programmes, entrepreneurship support mechanisms and measures designed to facilitate professional mobility. Their impact, however, remains constrained by insufficient resources and limited coordination. In a region experiencing strong demographic growth, creating productive employment opportunities for young people must therefore be regarded not only as an economic priority, but also as an essential condition for social and political stability.

13. ECOWAS and the AES: Confrontation or Coexistence?

The relationship between ECOWAS and the AES cannot be separated from this broader economic and human reality. Institutional rupture has neither eliminated trade flows, nor transport corridors, nor population movements, nor the energy and financial interdependencies linking the Sahelian states to the coastal economies. The fundamental question is therefore no longer simply whether the two blocs can avoid confrontation, but whether they can establish a pragmatic coexistence within a regional space whose economic realities extend beyond institutional boundaries.

Confrontation may appear, in the short term, to be the simpler path. ECOWAS may regard the AES as a direct challenge to its integration project, while Sahelian governments may continue to portray the Community as an institution dominated by the interests of coastal states or influenced by external powers. Such a logic, however, risks deepening regional fragmentation over the long term. Sahelian economies depend on coastal ports and transport corridors to access international markets, while coastal economies have a strong interest in maintaining trade with Sahelian markets. Economic geography therefore imposes constraints that political rupture cannot erase.

Coexistence is consequently more complex, but also more realistic. It requires ECOWAS and the AES to acknowledge their respective institutional realities, accept their political differences and seek mechanisms of cooperation in areas where their interests remain aligned. Cross border security, trade, human mobility, counter trafficking efforts, regional infrastructure, the management of shared resources and selected diplomatic issues are all areas in which functional cooperation remains possible. ECOWAS has reaffirmed its willingness to maintain dialogue with the AES states and to explore a pragmatic mechanism for security cooperation. This does not resolve the underlying political disagreements, but it creates the possibility of a relationship based less on institutional confrontation and more on the management of shared interdependencies.

14. From Market Size to Economic Power

Economic integration offers West African states the opportunity to move beyond the simple logic of market size and build genuine regional economic power. Pooling markets, resources, infrastructure and expertise can give the region the critical mass needed to increase its influence in international negotiations, attract greater investment and strengthen its bargaining position vis à vis major economic powers.

ECOWAS possesses considerable potential: nearly 400 million consumers, significant natural resources and a strategic geographical position linking the Atlantic, the Sahel and major African markets. Yet this potential remains largely unrealized as long as national economies remain insufficiently integrated. The central question is therefore no longer simply the number of consumers or the combined volume of regional resources, but the capacity to transform these dispersed assets into a coherent economic force.

Achieving this transformation requires deeper integration, greater harmonization of economic and trade policies and regional institutions capable of ensuring the effective implementation of common decisions. It is as much a matter of political will as of economic rationality. Without sustained commitment from member states, market size will remain merely a statistical figure; with effective integration, it can become a genuine instrument of power.

15. Integration as an Instrument of Collective Sovereignty

Economic integration can also be understood as an instrument of collective sovereignty. In an international environment dominated by large economic blocs and highly unequal power relations, states acting individually often possess limited bargaining capacity. By contrast, a region capable of coordinating its policies, pooling selected resources and speaking with a common voice can better defend its interests and negotiate with external partners on more balanced terms.

This perspective makes it possible to move beyond the conventional opposition between integration and sovereignty. Pooling certain powers does not necessarily mean surrendering them; it can instead enable states to collectively strengthen capacities that they would struggle to exercise individually. The challenge is to convince governments and citizens that collective sovereignty generates tangible and measurable benefits.

ECOWAS must therefore present integration as a means rather than an institutional end in itself. Its relevance will ultimately be measured by its capacity to improve living conditions, facilitate trade, create employment, develop infrastructure and contribute to regional stability. When integration produces concrete results, it becomes a source of sovereignty and prosperity; when it remains primarily institutional, it risks gradually losing its power to convince.

CPGNNews Strategic Insight

An integration process that fails to produce tangible prosperity will ultimately lose its legitimacy. ECOWAS’s economic credibility will therefore depend less on the multiplication of institutional mechanisms than on its ability to deliver visible results in the daily lives of West African populations: functional infrastructure, employment opportunities, smoother movement of goods and people, broader access to energy and the development of new regional value chains. The fundamental question is no longer simply whether West Africa can integrate, but whether integration can generate prosperity tangible enough to become a shared political project once again.

VI. THE CITIZEN IMPERATIVE: FROM ECOWAS OF STATES TO ECOWAS OF PEOPLE

The Next Battle Will Be About Trust

1. What Does Regional Integration Mean for an Ordinary Citizen?

Regional integration is often presented through the language of treaties, institutions and public policies. For West African citizens, however, its meaning is measured through far more tangible realities: the ability to cross a border without disproportionate obstacles, find employment, trade, access affordable goods and services, move freely and live in a secure environment. ECOWAS was created to serve these populations, yet it is still often perceived as an organization driven primarily by heads of state and government administrations. Summits, decisions and institutional mechanisms can appear distant from everyday life, creating a deficit of understanding that inevitably weakens public support for the regional project.

The question is therefore no longer simply whether ECOWAS produces decisions, but whether people understand their purpose and can assess their impact. The organization must strengthen transparency, explain its policies more clearly and report on their results. It must also create meaningful spaces through which citizens, civil society organizations and economic actors can express their expectations. Sustainable integration cannot be administered solely by states; it must gradually become a project understood, embraced and defended by West African societies themselves.

2. Mobility and Free Movement

The free movement of people remains one of the most visible achievements of West African integration. Millions of citizens can cross regional borders, settle in another country, work, study, trade or reunite with family members. For a large part of the population, this mobility is one of the most tangible manifestations of a shared regional space.

Yet this freedom also generates tensions. In some countries, the arrival of foreign workers or traders may be perceived as competition in the labour market or as additional pressure on public services. Mobility can also raise security concerns when states seek to prevent criminal or terrorist groups from moving across borders. The central challenge for ECOWAS is therefore to preserve freedom of movement while strengthening mechanisms capable of addressing the social, economic and security tensions that mobility can generate. Free movement will remain sustainable only if it is accompanied by policies capable of protecting both migrants’ rights and the interests of host communities.

3. Employment and Opportunity

Employment remains one of the central concerns of West African populations, particularly among young people. ECOWAS can help expand opportunities by facilitating labour mobility, supporting regional businesses and strengthening training programmes. But the real challenge is now one of visible and measurable results. A regional employment policy cannot be reduced to multiplying programmes; it must enable citizens to see a genuine improvement in their professional prospects.

The recognition of professional qualifications is an essential instrument in this regard. A professional trained in one member state should be able to use those qualifications in another without facing excessively lengthy or costly procedures. Progress has been made, but implementation remains uneven. The same applies to entrepreneurship. Young entrepreneurs need an environment in which access to finance, administrative simplification, technical support and access to regional markets become practical realities. Economic integration will acquire its full meaning only when a young person can regard West Africa not as a succession of national markets, but as a genuine space of opportunity.

4. Prices, Food and Purchasing Power

For households, regional integration is also judged through the cost of living. The prices of food, energy and essential services directly determine purchasing power and, consequently, perceptions of economic stability. More efficient movement of goods, larger markets and coordinated agricultural policies can help reduce certain costs and strengthen the availability of essential products.

ECOWAS already has mechanisms designed to respond to food crises and support regional production. Yet prices remain vulnerable to fluctuations in international markets, climate shocks and weaknesses in production and distribution systems. Food stability is therefore both an economic and a political issue. Episodes of sharp price increases have repeatedly demonstrated their potential to generate social tensions. A credible regional organization must be able to anticipate such crises, monitor markets, strengthen food reserves and coordinate rapid responses when populations are directly exposed.

5. Electricity and Essential Services

Access to electricity, water, healthcare and education is among the most fundamental dimensions of human well being. In many parts of West Africa, particularly rural areas, access remains inadequate. Regional integration can help reduce these disparities by enabling states to pool certain investments and coordinate public policies.

Electricity interconnections illustrate this logic in concrete terms. They allow states with greater generation capacity to supply countries facing shortages, while regional transport corridors facilitate the movement of goods and people toward economic centres and essential services. Yet infrastructure can deliver its full benefits only when it responds to genuine public needs and is accompanied by transparent mechanisms for financing, monitoring and evaluation. Integration must therefore be measured not only by the number of projects announced, but by their ability to transform living conditions in tangible ways.

6. Security and Dignity

Security is a fundamental condition of human dignity. A population that cannot move freely, work, trade, send its children to school or access essential services cannot fully benefit from the promises of integration. ECOWAS must therefore regard security as a regional responsibility extending beyond the fight against terrorism alone.

Security has several dimensions. It is physical when citizens are protected from violence; economic when people have the opportunity to work and provide for themselves; food related when sufficient nourishment is available; and health related when people can access medical care. A credible regional approach must incorporate these different dimensions. Dignity also means that citizens are treated with respect by their governments and by regional institutions, that they can be heard and that mechanisms exist through which they can challenge decisions affecting their rights and interests. ECOWAS will not restore its legitimacy without making this relationship of respect with its populations a practical principle of governance.

7. West Africa’s Youth

Young people represent one of West Africa’s greatest demographic, economic and political forces. They are also among those most exposed to unemployment, precariousness and a lack of opportunities. This makes youth policy far more than a matter of social policy; it is directly connected to political stability and the future of the regional project.

ECOWAS must therefore make employment, skills development and civic participation among young people strategic priorities. But such policies cannot be designed without young people themselves. Their participation in debates and decisions concerning their future has become a question of institutional legitimacy. An institution that fails to engage with the generation expected to shape the region’s future risks widening the gap between regional structures and the societies they are meant to serve.

8. A Connected Generation

West African youth are also a deeply connected generation. Social networks, digital platforms and mobile applications have transformed the ways people communicate, obtain information and mobilize. This transformation represents a major opportunity for bringing institutions closer to citizens, but it also exposes societies to misinformation, manipulation and extremist narratives.

ECOWAS should therefore regard digital technology as an instrument of regional governance. It can use digital platforms to explain its policies, gather citizens’ views and create new spaces for dialogue. The transformation also has an economic dimension: young people can build digital businesses, develop innovative services and reach markets far beyond national borders. For this potential to develop, the regional organization must help create a favourable digital environment based on accessible infrastructure, coherent regulations and improved access to finance.

9. Social Media and the Perception of Regional Politics

Social media now plays a central role in shaping political opinion. An increasing share of citizens obtain information, debate issues and mobilize through digital platforms where verified information, personal opinions, rumours and manipulated content circulate simultaneously. The perception of an institution such as ECOWAS is therefore increasingly shaped within this digital environment.

The organization cannot ignore this transformation. Institutional communication limited to official statements and summit communiqués is no longer sufficient for a connected population. ECOWAS needs a more direct, accessible and responsive digital presence capable of explaining decisions, answering questions and rapidly correcting demonstrably false information. Such communication must nevertheless avoid becoming institutional propaganda. Its credibility will depend above all on its ability to acknowledge legitimate criticism, present its results transparently and establish genuine dialogue with citizens.

10. The Battle of Narratives

The crisis of confidence surrounding ECOWAS also has a narrative dimension. The organization now faces competing narratives that portray it variously as an institution dominated by the interests of coastal states, as a distant bureaucracy disconnected from social realities, or as an extension of former external powers. These perceptions do not always rest on a comprehensive assessment of its record, but they have real political consequences because they shape how populations interpret its decisions.

The response cannot simply be another communication campaign. ECOWAS must build a credible narrative based on tangible results: mobility, security, infrastructure, trade, employment and the protection of populations. It must demonstrate that regional integration can produce visible added value and strengthen the collective capacity of West African societies. The battle of narratives will therefore not be won through words alone, but through the consistency between the organization’s promises and the realities experienced by citizens.

11. The Gap Between Institutions and Populations

One of the principal challenges facing ECOWAS is the distance separating its institutions from the populations they are intended to serve. Many citizens have limited knowledge of its powers, mechanisms and achievements. This distance reinforces the perception of an organization that is remote, predominantly administrative and political, and disconnected from everyday concerns.

Reducing this gap is both a democratic requirement and a condition for effective governance. A regional policy designed without taking account of realities on the ground risks remaining theoretical or encountering resistance during implementation. Civic participation must therefore be understood not as a decorative feature of regional governance, but as an instrument for improving the relevance of public policy. The more populations are involved in defining priorities, the more integration can be perceived as their own project.

12. Rebuilding Trust

Trust is ultimately the most valuable political capital of any regional organization. Yet political crises, sanctions, tensions with the Sahelian states and institutional delays have contributed to weakening confidence in ECOWAS among parts of the population. Reversing this erosion cannot be achieved through a single political declaration. It requires a gradual transformation of the relationship between the organization, member states and citizens.

Rebuilding trust begins with concrete results, greater transparency and a genuine obligation to account for decisions and outcomes. It also requires sustained dialogue with civil society, trade unions, professional organizations, academics, the media and citizens. Such dialogue cannot be occasional or limited to moments of crisis; it must become a permanent component of regional governance.

The fundamental question is therefore no longer simply whether ECOWAS can preserve its institutions, but whether it can rebuild a relationship of trust with the societies it represents. The organization still possesses considerable assets: a significant economic space, decades of institutional experience, mobility mechanisms and a regional architecture that remains indispensable in many areas. But these achievements will not be sufficient if populations no longer see ECOWAS as an instrument capable of addressing their concerns and protecting their interests.

CPGNNews Thesis

ECOWAS can no longer be merely an affair of heads of state. It must become an affair of citizens. This evolution requires a profound change in institutional culture. It does not mean replacing states with populations, but moving regional integration from a predominantly intergovernmental project toward one increasingly carried by societies themselves. Transparency, participation, mobility, employment, security, dignity and accountability must therefore become the criteria by which citizens judge the relevance of regional integration. The next battle for ECOWAS will not be solely institutional or diplomatic. It will be a battle for trust.

VII. THE NEW FRONTIER: DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, AI AND CLIMATE

Regional Integration Confronting Challenges the Old Treaties Never Anticipated

1. West Africa’s Digital Transformation

West Africa is undergoing a profound digital transformation. Mobile phone penetration has reached high levels, fiber optic networks are expanding, and data centers are beginning to emerge across the region. This transformation represents a major opportunity for economic development, public service delivery, and civic participation.

Yet digital transformation also creates new vulnerabilities. Dependence on imported technologies can expose states to risks of technological sovereignty. The digital divide between urban and rural areas, as well as between generations, can deepen existing inequalities. Cyber threats, including hacking, disinformation, and online crime, can also destabilize societies.

ECOWAS therefore needs to develop a regional digital strategy capable of maximizing these opportunities while reducing associated risks. Such a strategy should encompass investment in infrastructure, the development of digital skills, data protection, and the regulation of digital platforms.

2. Infrastructure and Digital Sovereignty

Digital infrastructure, including submarine cables, terrestrial networks, and data centers, constitutes the backbone of the digital economy. West Africa remains heavily dependent on infrastructure owned or operated by foreign companies. This dependence creates vulnerabilities: a cable failure or a unilateral decision by an operator can disrupt connectivity across large parts of the region.

Digital sovereignty has consequently become a strategic issue for ECOWAS. The organization should encourage the development of regional infrastructure, the establishment of local data centers, and the emergence of regional digital champions. It should also engage foreign operators to ensure that networks remain secure, resilient, and reliable.

Digital sovereignty does not mean technological autarky. It means ensuring that decisions concerning infrastructure and data are increasingly made within West Africa and in the interests of West African populations, rather than being determined primarily by external powers.

3. Data and Technological Dependence

Data has become a strategic resource. Digital platforms collect, process, and monetize enormous quantities of user information, while West African states retain limited control over these flows, which are frequently processed in data centers located outside the region.

Technological dependence is equally significant. Software, applications, and operating systems used across West Africa are largely developed by foreign companies. This dependence constrains local innovation capacity and exposes states and societies to forms of technological vulnerability.

ECOWAS should therefore promote the development of a local digital industry. This requires investment in research, the training of engineers and software developers, and support for startups. It also requires local content policies capable of encouraging the development of technological solutions adapted to the specific needs and realities of the region.

4. Artificial Intelligence and Economic Transformation

Artificial intelligence is a technology capable of profoundly transforming West African economies and societies. AI can improve productivity across a wide range of sectors, including agriculture, healthcare, education, transportation, and logistics. It can also contribute to addressing complex challenges such as epidemic forecasting and water resource management.

Yet AI also carries significant risks. Algorithms can reproduce existing biases, while automation can transform or eliminate certain forms of employment. ECOWAS must therefore pursue a balanced approach to AI, maximizing its potential benefits while establishing safeguards against its risks.

AI is also a question of sovereignty. Many of the world’s leading AI models are developed by foreign companies and trained on datasets that do not necessarily reflect West African realities. ECOWAS should therefore encourage the development of regional AI capabilities based on locally relevant data and adapted to West African contexts.

5. AI, Security and Governance

AI has growing applications in the field of security, including intelligence analysis, border surveillance, and conflict prevention. Properly deployed, it can improve the efficiency of security operations and contribute to the anticipation of emerging threats.

At the same time, AI raises serious ethical and legal questions. Mass surveillance, the use of personal data for security purposes, and automated decision making, including in areas such as visa administration, are particularly sensitive issues. ECOWAS should therefore establish standards and regulatory frameworks governing the use of AI in security and public administration.

AI governance is consequently becoming a regional issue. ECOWAS should coordinate the positions of its member states on AI regulation in order to prevent regulatory fragmentation and ensure that emerging technologies are deployed in the service of the public interest.

6. Disinformation and Democracy

Disinformation represents a growing challenge for West African democracies. False information, rumors, and deliberate manipulation can destabilize societies, influence elections, and undermine public confidence in institutions. Social media platforms are often the principal channels through which such information spreads.

ECOWAS should address disinformation by promoting media literacy, quality journalism, and responsible platform governance. It should also support mechanisms capable of identifying and correcting demonstrably false information.

This task is particularly delicate because efforts to combat disinformation can come into tension with freedom of expression. ECOWAS must therefore strike a careful balance between protecting democratic societies from information manipulation and preserving fundamental freedoms.

7. Climate as a Crisis Multiplier

Climate change is increasingly acting as a multiplier of existing crises across West Africa. Droughts, floods, and storms are becoming more frequent and intense, threatening agriculture, livestock, infrastructure, and public health. These pressures can intensify social tensions, forced migration, and competition over natural resources.

ECOWAS has adopted regional policies addressing climate change, including measures for both adaptation and mitigation. Yet the resources devoted to these efforts remain insufficient, while coordination among member states is often limited.

Climate change represents an existential challenge for West Africa. The region is particularly vulnerable and must adapt rapidly and collectively. ECOWAS should therefore make climate resilience and climate action a strategic priority within its regional agenda.

8. Water, Agriculture and Natural Resources

Water is indispensable to agriculture, human consumption, and industry. Climate change is altering patterns of water availability across West African states, raising the possibility that competition over water resources could intensify in the coming years.

Agriculture, which depends heavily on water availability, is also increasingly exposed to climate pressures. Declining agricultural yields could threaten the region’s food security. ECOWAS should therefore develop integrated strategies for water resource management and agricultural adaptation.

Natural resource management is another area in which regional cooperation is indispensable. Shared river basins, including the Niger Basin, require coordination among the states that depend upon them. ECOWAS should strengthen mechanisms for the joint and sustainable management of these shared resources.

9. Population Displacement

Population displacement is one of the major consequences associated with climate change. Communities living in vulnerable areas, including arid regions and low lying coastal zones, may be forced to move toward safer areas. Such internal and cross border movements can generate social tensions, conflicts, and humanitarian challenges.

ECOWAS has established mechanisms for addressing population displacement, but their resources remain limited. The region needs a comprehensive strategy for managing climate related displacement, including the identification of vulnerable areas, displacement planning, protection of displaced populations, and mechanisms for managing social tensions.

Population displacement is also a matter of regional solidarity. The most vulnerable states will require support from their neighbors if climate related mobility is not to develop into broader humanitarian crises.

10. Urbanization and Vulnerability

Rapid urbanization is one of the defining trends shaping contemporary West Africa. Cities are expanding rapidly, often without adequate planning. This growth creates vulnerabilities, including informal settlements, inadequate public services, pollution, and insecurity.

West African cities are also increasingly exposed to climate risks. Flooding, heat waves, and storms can cause extensive damage in densely populated urban areas. ECOWAS should therefore integrate the urban dimension more systematically into its sustainable development policies.

Urbanization, however, is not solely a vulnerability. Cities are also engines of economic growth, employment, and innovation. ECOWAS should support urban policies capable of maximizing these opportunities while reducing the risks associated with uncontrolled or poorly planned expansion.

11. Energy and the Transition

The energy transition is becoming a major strategic issue for West Africa. The region remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, particularly oil and gas, while renewable sources such as solar, wind, and hydropower offer significant opportunities for more sustainable development.

The energy transition is also a matter of security. Reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels can strengthen the region’s energy security and resilience. ECOWAS should therefore encourage investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency.

The transition also requires regional cooperation. Electricity interconnections can help balance energy production and consumption among member states. ECOWAS should strengthen regional interconnection networks and coordinate national energy transition policies.

12. A New Regional Doctrine for the Twenty First Century

The challenges posed by digital transformation, artificial intelligence, and climate change require a new regional doctrine for ECOWAS. This doctrine should integrate these emerging dimensions into the organization’s policies and should be developed in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, young people, and women.

The new doctrine must be flexible and adaptive. Technologies evolve rapidly, while climate related shocks are difficult to predict. ECOWAS therefore needs mechanisms capable of regularly adjusting and revising its policies in response to changing circumstances.

The doctrine must also be inclusive. Populations, young people, women, and local actors should participate in defining and implementing regional policies. Regional integration cannot be designed exclusively within institutional offices without meaningful participation from the citizens it is intended to serve.

Guiding Idea

An organization created in the twentieth century must now govern transformations of the twenty first century.

ECOWAS was established to address the defining challenges of its time: economic integration, trade liberalization, and the construction of a regional space of peace. Those objectives remain relevant, but they now coexist with a new generation of challenges: digital transformation, artificial intelligence, and climate change. ECOWAS must adapt to this changing environment if it is to remain a relevant and effective instrument of regional integration.

VIII. THE CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE: A LESSON FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH

What West Africa Also Says About the Caribbean

1. Why Look at West Africa from the Caribbean?

A Caribbean perspective on West Africa is not merely an academic exercise. It rests on deep historical, cultural and geopolitical parallels. Both regions emerged from interconnected historical processes shaped by the transatlantic slave trade, colonial rule and the struggles for independence. They share languages, including English, French, Portuguese and Spanish, as well as cultural connections and a number of structural challenges involving economic development, security, regional integration and sovereignty.

The parallels, however, are not exclusively historical. They are also political and institutional. CARICOM, like ECOWAS, represents a regional integration project confronted with many of the same fundamental tensions: the relationship between national sovereignty and regional institutions, the difficulty of coordinating states with divergent interests, and the pressure exerted by globalization on relatively vulnerable economies and political systems.

To look at West Africa from the Caribbean is therefore also to look at the Caribbean itself, at its own choices, limitations and possibilities. The experience of ECOWAS offers lessons for CARICOM, while the experience of CARICOM can likewise provide perspectives relevant to West Africa. The comparison is not about reproducing one model in another region. It is about understanding how different societies within the Global South attempt to reconcile sovereignty, cooperation and collective power.

2. ECOWAS and CARICOM: Similarities and Differences

ECOWAS and CARICOM share several fundamental characteristics. Both are regional integration organizations created in the 1970s, with economic and political objectives, and both have struggled with coordination among member states, uneven implementation of regional decisions and questions concerning institutional legitimacy.

Their differences, however, are equally important. ECOWAS encompasses a large and highly diverse region, including states with major differences in population, economic weight, language, political systems and levels of development. Nigeria alone represents a scale of economic and demographic power very different from that of smaller member states such as Cabo Verde or The Gambia. CARICOM operates within a much smaller regional space, composed largely of small states and economies, with a predominantly English speaking institutional environment and, in several respects, greater structural similarities among its members.

These differences shape the nature of integration. ECOWAS must contend with major asymmetries of power, competition among influential states and substantial development gaps. CARICOM faces the particular vulnerabilities of small states, limited domestic markets and strong external economic dependence. Yet both organizations confront the same underlying question: how can states transform geographical proximity and shared interests into meaningful collective capacity?

3. The Permanent Question of Sovereignty

Sovereignty remains central to the institutional choices of both organizations. Member states remain attached to their national prerogatives and are often reluctant to transfer significant authority to regional institutions. This hesitation can limit the depth of integration and slow institutional reform.

In both organizations, the question is fundamentally similar: how can regional integration be advanced without undermining the political authority and identity of individual states? The answer varies according to national circumstances. Some governments are more receptive to regional coordination, while others remain cautious whenever integration appears to constrain their freedom of action.

ECOWAS has historically developed stronger institutional mechanisms in certain areas, including sanctions, peace and security instruments and regional policy frameworks. CARICOM has generally pursued a more flexible model, relying heavily on consultation and consensus. Neither approach is without limitations. Stronger regional mechanisms can increase collective capacity but may provoke resistance from governments determined to preserve national autonomy, while a more consensual system can protect sovereignty but make decisive collective action more difficult.

4. Integration Without Erasing States

Regional integration does not require the disappearance of states. Regional organizations are instruments of cooperation among sovereign states, not necessarily embryonic superstates. This principle remains fundamental to both ECOWAS and CARICOM.

Member states retain primary authority over core sovereign functions such as national defense, internal security and justice. Integration has generally advanced more readily in economic and political fields where cooperation offers identifiable collective benefits. This approach is pragmatic because it recognizes the political realities of sovereignty while allowing states to cooperate where their interests converge.

Its limitation is equally clear. In areas where collective action is most necessary, particularly security and crisis management, national sovereignty can become a source of institutional paralysis. The challenge for regionalism is therefore not to abolish sovereignty but to determine where sovereign interests are better protected through coordinated action.

5. Small and Medium Sized Economies Facing External Powers

CARICOM states are, for the most part, small or medium sized economies that depend heavily on external trade, foreign investment, tourism and international financial flows. ECOWAS presents a more varied picture, ranging from major economies such as Nigeria to much smaller states such as Cabo Verde and The Gambia.

This external dependence raises a broader question of economic sovereignty. Free trade agreements, foreign investment and development assistance can create opportunities, but they can also generate forms of dependency that restrict national policy space. Regional integration can therefore serve as an instrument for strengthening collective bargaining power when negotiating with larger external powers.

For smaller economies in particular, regional organization provides a way to compensate for limited individual weight. Neither the smallest states of the Caribbean nor the smaller economies of West Africa can easily influence major international negotiations on their own. Collective representation can therefore become a form of strategic protection and an expression of shared sovereignty.

6. Collective Security and Regional Vulnerability

Security is a challenge for both regions, although its manifestations differ considerably. The Caribbean faces transnational crime, drug trafficking, irregular migration and the recurrent impact of natural disasters. West Africa faces many of these same challenges, alongside terrorism, armed conflict and severe instability in parts of the Sahel.

Collective security is consequently relevant to both regions. Individual states cannot effectively address transnational threats in isolation. ECOWAS and CARICOM have developed mechanisms for security cooperation, including information sharing, coordinated action and assistance during crises.

Both regions are also vulnerable to the influence of external powers. The United States, the European Union, China, Russia and other actors have strategic, economic or political interests in their respective environments. Regional integration can provide a framework through which these external relationships are managed collectively, allowing states to engage with major powers without abandoning their own strategic interests.

7. Population Mobility

Population mobility is an important issue in both regions. CARICOM has developed arrangements intended to facilitate the movement of citizens within the Community, while ECOWAS has established one of the most significant free movement frameworks in Africa. In both cases, mobility can create opportunities for employment, trade, education and cultural exchange.

Yet mobility can also generate tensions. Competition in labor markets, pressure on public services and concerns about social cohesion can create political resistance to greater freedom of movement. These tensions cannot simply be dismissed; they require institutional responses capable of protecting both the benefits of mobility and the interests of host communities.

Both organizations therefore face the challenge of combining freedom of movement with security, social cohesion, recognition of professional qualifications and appropriate social protections. The credibility of regional integration is partly measured by whether citizens can experience mobility as an opportunity rather than as a source of insecurity.

8. Trade and External Dependencies

Intra regional trade is an important indicator of the depth of economic integration. In both regions, however, trade with external markets remains substantially more important than trade among neighboring states. This reflects the historical orientation of their economies toward international markets and, in several cases, continued dependence on primary commodities.

Economic diversification is therefore a shared objective. Both regions seek to reduce their dependence on raw materials and develop stronger domestic and regional productive capacities. Regional integration can contribute to this objective by combining national markets and creating a larger economic space capable of supporting local industries.

External dependence is also a matter of security. States that rely heavily on imported energy, food or essential goods are vulnerable to international price shocks and disruptions in global supply chains. Stronger regional production and trade can reduce some of these vulnerabilities and create greater resilience.

9. Energy and Food Security

Energy and food are matters of security for both regions. Caribbean economies remain highly dependent on imported fossil fuels, while West Africa presents a more complex picture, with major producers such as Nigeria existing alongside states that remain dependent on imported energy. Both regions are nevertheless exposed to fluctuations in international prices.

Food security presents a similar challenge. Both regions import significant portions of their food supplies, leaving them vulnerable to international crises, climate shocks and disruptions in global markets. Regional integration can contribute to greater food security by strengthening local production, improving regional supply chains and developing collective reserves.

Renewable energy also offers significant opportunities. The Caribbean possesses substantial solar and wind potential, while West Africa has considerable solar, wind and hydropower resources. The energy transition therefore represents not only an environmental imperative but also a promising field for regional cooperation, investment and greater strategic autonomy.

10. Diasporas and the Circulation of Capital

Diasporas play an important role in the economies of both regions. Remittances from migrants represent a significant source of foreign exchange and household income for several CARICOM and ECOWAS states. These financial flows can provide social protection, support consumption and contribute to investment.

The circulation of capital within the regions remains more limited, but significant opportunities exist. Diaspora communities can become channels for investment by directing savings toward productive projects, businesses and infrastructure in their countries and regions of origin.

Diasporas are also political actors. They maintain social, economic and cultural relationships with their countries of origin and can influence public debates and policy choices both in origin countries and in destination societies. Regional organizations should therefore recognize the diaspora not merely as a source of remittances but as a broader strategic component of regional development.

11. Institutional Integration and the Trust Deficit

A deficit of public trust affects both regions. Citizens frequently perceive regional institutions as distant, bureaucratic and insufficiently effective. When populations cannot clearly identify the benefits generated by regional integration, institutional legitimacy becomes increasingly fragile.

The causes are multiple: limited transparency, insufficiently visible results, weak communication and the perception that important decisions are taken without meaningful public consultation. Regional organizations must therefore improve their transparency, communication and capacity to demonstrate tangible outcomes.

Trust is not restored through declarations alone. It is built gradually through credible action, consistent communication and closer relationships with citizens. For both ECOWAS and CARICOM, the challenge is to demonstrate that regional institutions are not distant administrative structures but practical instruments capable of improving the collective position of their populations.

12. West Africa as a Laboratory of Regionalism

West Africa represents an important laboratory of regionalism within the Global South. ECOWAS has accumulated substantial experience in economic integration, political cooperation, peace and security and the management of regional crises. Its successes and failures therefore offer lessons that extend beyond West Africa itself.

The organization has been particularly ambitious in areas such as the free movement of people, regional security cooperation and the defense of constitutional order. These experiences demonstrate both the potential of regional institutions and the limits imposed by political divisions among member states.

ECOWAS has also confronted challenges that other regional organizations may encounter: military coups, political crises, institutional fragmentation and disagreements over the limits of regional authority. The manner in which these challenges are addressed therefore has significance beyond the immediate West African context.

13. What the Caribbean Can Learn from ECOWAS

The Caribbean can draw several lessons from the ECOWAS experience.

The importance of credible enforcement mechanisms. ECOWAS has developed instruments intended to respond to coups and violations of constitutional order. Although these mechanisms have produced mixed results, they demonstrate the value of establishing regional principles backed by credible institutional responses.

The need for regional security capacity. ECOWAS has developed mechanisms for collective security and military deployment that have been used in different crises. The experience illustrates both the value of regional capacity and the political, financial and operational difficulties involved in maintaining it.

The importance of economic integration. ECOWAS has promoted intra regional trade, regional infrastructure and cross border economic activity. These efforts demonstrate that integration can provide a broader economic platform for states whose individual markets are often too small to generate sufficient scale.

The importance of vigilance over governance. ECOWAS has established regional principles concerning democracy and good governance. Its experience shows that regional integration cannot be separated entirely from questions of political legitimacy, constitutional order and institutional accountability.

14. What the Caribbean Can Also Avoid

The Caribbean can also draw lessons from the difficulties experienced by ECOWAS.

Excessive bureaucratization. ECOWAS has sometimes been perceived as a heavy institutional structure characterized by complex and lengthy procedures. CARICOM can seek to preserve institutional efficiency by ensuring that regional mechanisms remain proportionate to their objectives.

The politicization of institutions. Regional institutions can lose credibility when they are perceived as instruments of national political interests. CARICOM therefore has an interest in protecting the independence, neutrality and credibility of its institutions.

The excessive concentration of decision making. When regional decisions are dominated by heads of government, public participation can remain limited. CARICOM can strengthen its legitimacy by expanding the role of civil society, professional organizations, young people and other stakeholders in regional decision making.

CPGNNews Perspective

Regional integration is not the disappearance of sovereignty. It is the capacity to make sovereignty more effective when it is exercised collectively.

This perspective offers a foundation for a pragmatic form of regionalism capable of reconciling integration with diversity, national identities and political autonomy. For both the Caribbean and West Africa, the central question is no longer whether sovereignty should exist, but how sovereign states can use regional cooperation to increase their collective capacity in a world where individual states, particularly smaller ones, increasingly face challenges that they cannot manage alone.

IX. WHAT KIND OF ECOWAS FOR THE NEXT DECADE?

Three Possible Futures for West Africa

The future of ECOWAS can no longer be approached through a single trajectory. The rupture with the member states of the Alliance of Sahel States has profoundly altered the political architecture of West Africa and opened a period of uncertainty whose consequences will likely extend beyond the institutional framework of the organization itself. Over the next decade, several scenarios can be envisaged, ranging from the gradual weakening of ECOWAS to its comprehensive renewal, through partial restoration or a lasting coexistence with the AES. None of these scenarios is predetermined. Their realization will depend on political developments within the member states, the evolution of the security environment, the economic capacity of regional institutions and, above all, their ability to rebuild legitimacy among the populations they are intended to serve.

Scenario 0 — Collapse

Why it remains possible

The collapse of ECOWAS remains an extreme scenario, but it cannot be entirely dismissed. A worsening of political fragmentation, a prolonged deterioration of the security environment, the organization’s inability to respond effectively to crises and a sustained loss of confidence could gradually hollow out the institution. In such a situation, ECOWAS could retain its legal existence while losing much of its political, economic and security capacity, eventually becoming little more than a forum for consultation without genuine regional influence.

The history of regionalism shows that an organization does not necessarily disappear through a dramatic institutional rupture. It can also weaken progressively when its members cease to regard its mechanisms as indispensable. The real danger, therefore, may be less a formal disappearance than a process of functional disintegration, characterized by the multiplication of parallel arrangements, the reduction of common commitments and the gradual transfer of regional functions to alternative frameworks.

Why it remains unlikely

Despite these risks, a full collapse remains unlikely. West African states continue to face challenges that none of them can manage alone: cross border security, trade, population mobility, infrastructure, energy, climate change and crisis management. ECOWAS also possesses five decades of institutional experience, legal mechanisms, administrative networks and an economic architecture that continue to generate concrete interdependencies.

The cost of an effective disappearance of the organization would also be substantial. Fragmentation would not eliminate common problems; it would instead reduce the collective capacity available to address them. Collapse would therefore require states to accept significant economic, political and security costs in exchange for greater institutional autonomy. That equation remains difficult to justify in a region where interdependence remains deep.

The economic and human cost of disintegration

A lasting disintegration would have consequences extending far beyond regional institutions. The multiplication of barriers to trade could disrupt supply chains and increase transportation costs; political uncertainty could discourage investment; and regional projects in infrastructure, energy and mobility could be delayed or abandoned. Politically, the disappearance of a common framework for mediation would reduce the region’s capacity to manage crises collectively.

The human cost could be even greater. In a region characterized by extensive cross border mobility, commercial exchanges and shared security threats, excessive institutional fragmentation could directly affect populations, particularly border communities, mobile workers and economic actors dependent on regional corridors. The collapse of ECOWAS would therefore not simply mean the disappearance of an organization; it could produce a more fragmented, more expensive and more vulnerable regional environment.

Scenario 1: Restoration

A gradual return to the former model

Restoration would involve a gradual return toward an architecture broadly resembling the one that existed before the current crisis. The AES states could re establish relations with ECOWAS following political negotiations, changing circumstances or a reassessment of their security and economic priorities. Such a development would make it possible to progressively restore institutional mechanisms, normalize relations and revive selected common policies.

This scenario would not necessarily mean a simple return to the status quo ante. The current crisis has exposed deep tensions concerning regional governance, sanctions, sovereignty and perceptions of ECOWAS. Any lasting restoration would therefore have to incorporate at least some of the lessons of the rupture.

Necessary political conditions

Restoration would require several developments to converge: changes in the political positions of the AES states, greater flexibility on the part of ECOWAS in managing political crises and a sufficiently improved security environment to permit renewed institutional dialogue. It would also require a political willingness on both sides to move beyond the increasingly entrenched narratives of confrontation.

The issue of sanctions would be particularly important. While sanctions have served as an instrument of pressure intended to defend constitutional order, their perception in parts of the region has contributed to the view that ECOWAS represents a confrontation between regional institutions and national sovereignty. A credible restoration would therefore need to find a new balance between defending shared principles and recognizing national political realities.

Obstacles and limitations

The obstacles remain substantial. The AES states have created their own mechanisms of cooperation and developed a shared political identity that would not necessarily disappear even if relations with ECOWAS improved. ECOWAS, for its part, would have to acknowledge that the crisis has also exposed weaknesses within its own institutional model.

Restoration would therefore be possible, but it would not be sustainable if it merely reinstated previous mechanisms without addressing the underlying causes of the rupture. Its probability can be regarded as low to moderate in the medium term, with its prospects heavily dependent on political and security developments across the region.

Scenario 2: Coexistence

ECOWAS and the AES as separate blocs

Coexistence represents another trajectory, and perhaps a more realistic one than a complete return to the previous regional order. Under this configuration, ECOWAS and the AES would retain their respective structures, political orientations and institutional frameworks while avoiding permanent confrontation. The rupture would become a durable reality, but it would not necessarily evolve into systematic hostility.

Such coexistence would recognize a fundamental reality: institutional boundaries do not correspond to economic, social or geographical boundaries. Populations would continue to move, goods would still need to travel through the same corridors and shared resources would continue to require coordination.

Sectoral cooperation

Cooperation could therefore develop in areas where common interests are strong enough to transcend political differences. Cross border security, trade, transportation, energy, natural resource management, counter trafficking efforts and selected diplomatic issues could become areas of functional cooperation.

Such an approach would not seek to restore full institutional integration. It would instead prioritize pragmatic mechanisms negotiated on a case by case basis, capable of addressing the concrete needs of populations and economies. Cooperation would become less ideological and more operational.

Mobility, trade and security

Preserving mobility and trade would be one of the principal tests of coexistence. Millions of people depend on cross border exchanges for their livelihoods, while the landlocked economies of the Sahel remain structurally connected to the ports and corridors of coastal states. A complete disruption of these flows would therefore be costly for the entire region.

Security would constitute another imperative. Armed groups, criminal networks and trafficking operations do not stop at institutional boundaries. Even if politically separated, ECOWAS and the AES would have strong incentives to maintain forms of operational coordination. This very necessity could push both spaces toward a form of functional regionalism in which cooperation is determined less by political affinity than by interdependence.

A new form of pragmatic regionalism

Coexistence could therefore give rise to a new form of West African regionalism, less centralized and less institutionally ambitious, but more strongly oriented toward practical results. It would not eliminate political differences between the two blocs; rather, it would seek to prevent those differences from destroying the mechanisms essential to the region’s economic and social life.

This scenario could prove durable precisely because it would accept the plurality of political trajectories while maintaining a minimum level of functional interdependence.

Scenario 3: Renewal

A more flexible ECOWAS

Renewal would be the most ambitious scenario. It would require not merely repairing existing mechanisms but fundamentally reconsidering the very conception of regional integration. ECOWAS would become more flexible, more adaptive and more strongly focused on results. Sanctions mechanisms could be reassessed, procedures simplified and member states granted greater room for maneuver in selected areas without abandoning the organization’s fundamental objectives.

Such reform would begin from a simple observation: sustainable integration cannot be built solely on treaties and institutions; it must also generate visible and credible benefits for states and their populations.

Integration centered on results

The new ECOWAS would therefore place concrete achievements above institutional declarations. Regional infrastructure, trade facilitation, energy, mobility, employment, agricultural transformation and digital development would become central indicators of integration performance.

This approach would bring the organization closer to its original purpose: making integration an instrument of development rather than an institutional architecture detached from everyday realities.

A new security architecture

Renewal would also require a new security architecture. This could strengthen intelligence sharing, regional response capabilities and coordination among states while seeking pragmatic forms of cooperation with AES countries. Security could no longer be understood solely as an institutional issue; it would have to be linked to development, governance, counter trafficking efforts and conflict prevention.

A new economic architecture

Economically, renewal would seek to deepen integration around trade, infrastructure, energy, industrialization and digital transformation. The objective would be to gradually convert the size of the regional market into genuine economic power while developing mechanisms capable of distributing the benefits of integration more evenly among member states.

This redistributive dimension would be essential. An integration process perceived as benefiting primarily the most powerful economies or major urban centers risks generating new frustrations. Regional cohesion therefore also depends on the ability to make the benefits of integration visible in communities and households.

The place of citizens

Renewal would finally place citizens at the center of the regional project. Participation, transparency, accountability and access to information could no longer be treated as secondary considerations. Permanent consultation mechanisms would allow civil society organizations, professional associations, young people and other social actors to participate more directly in shaping regional policies.

The legitimacy of the next ECOWAS will depend less on the sophistication of its institutions than on the ability of ordinary people to understand their purpose and recognize their results.

Digital transformation and climate

A renewed ECOWAS would also need to fully integrate the transformations already reshaping economies and societies: digitalization, artificial intelligence, the energy transition and climate change. These issues can no longer be treated as peripheral policy areas. They directly affect economic competitiveness, security, employment, sovereignty and societal resilience across West Africa.

Regional cooperation could allow states to pool certain investments, harmonize regulations and strengthen their collective capacity to respond to major technological and environmental transformations.

Relations with the AES

Under a renewal scenario, relations with the AES would not necessarily have to be framed in terms of return or exclusion. A more flexible architecture could allow different levels of participation and cooperation depending on the sector and the interests involved. The principle would be to preserve as many essential areas of cooperation as possible, even where full institutional integration remains impossible.

This approach would acknowledge a fundamental reality: the region can be politically fragmented without becoming economically, socially or geographically disintegrated.

The Most Plausible Scenario?

A fourth possibility: hybridization

Given current dynamics, the most plausible scenario may ultimately correspond to none of the three preceding models in pure form. It could take the form of hybridization, combining elements of restoration, coexistence and renewal. ECOWAS could remain the principal regional architecture while becoming more flexible, while the AES would retain its own political and institutional framework.

This hybridization could take the form of an ECOWAS based on variable geometry, in which groups of states move at different speeds in selected areas; enhanced cooperation, allowing groups of states to pursue deeper collaboration in particular sectors; or strategic partnerships, including arrangements with the AES and other regional organizations.

The value of such a model would lie precisely in its refusal to impose institutional uniformity on a region that has become politically more diverse. It would preserve essential interdependencies while recognizing the plurality of political choices. It would be less ambitious than a model of comprehensive integration, but potentially more resilient because it would begin from existing realities rather than seek to deny them.

The next decade may therefore be neither the decade of ECOWAS’s disappearance nor that of a simple return to the past. It may instead become a period of gradual transformation in West African regionalism, moving from a model based primarily on institutional uniformity toward one built more strongly around flexibility, functionality and measurable results. The real question, then, may no longer be simply whether ECOWAS will survive, but what form of regionalism West Africa will be capable of creating in order to remain politically diverse without becoming economically and humanly divided.

CPGNNews Strategic Outlook

BEYOND RESTORATION: THE CASE FOR STRATEGIC RENEWAL

The central question is no longer whether ECOWAS can restore the regional order that existed before the current crisis, but what kind of regional architecture West Africa can build in light of the realities now confronting it. The rupture with the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, the institutional weaknesses exposed by successive political crises, persistent security threats, economic interdependence, and the rapid transformation of West African societies have profoundly altered the environment in which the organization must operate. The challenge is therefore not merely institutional. It is strategic. It concerns the region’s capacity to preserve spaces for cooperation, provide regional public goods, and maintain a degree of cohesion despite increasingly divergent political trajectories.

The ECOWAS that emerges from this period is unlikely to be either a simple continuation of the previous model or a rejection of the achievements accumulated since 1975. It will instead have to find a new balance between integration and sovereignty, between common principles and political diversity, and between institutional ambition and operational effectiveness. Its ability to adapt will be one of the decisive factors shaping the organization’s future.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

DOES ECOWAS NEED TO REINVENT ITSELF?

1. A Crisis That Goes Beyond the Institutional Question

Since its creation in 1975, ECOWAS has progressively expanded its scope, evolving from a primarily economic project into a regional architecture also involved in governance, security, free movement and political stability. This evolution is one of the major achievements of West African regionalism. It demonstrates the ability of an organization created under very different historical circumstances to adapt its instruments to changes in its environment.

The current crisis nevertheless exposes the limits of that trajectory. The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has made visible a political divide that cannot be reduced to a simple institutional dispute. It reflects divergent perceptions of sovereignty, security, governance and the role of regional organizations in shaping national choices. It also comes at a time when the region is simultaneously facing escalating armed violence, economic vulnerabilities, demographic transformation, climate pressures and growing public demand for tangible results.

From this perspective, the ECOWAS crisis can be understood as a transitional phase. It does not necessarily signal the disappearance of the regional project, but it does require its foundations, methods and priorities to be reconsidered. The issue is therefore not whether an institutional structure can be preserved for its own sake, but whether that structure remains capable of addressing the strategic needs of contemporary West Africa.

2. What the Freetown Sequence Reveals

The political sequence surrounding the Freetown summit illustrates the search for a new equilibrium. The renewal of the organization’s political leadership, the emphasis placed on security concerns and the continued willingness to preserve a channel of dialogue with the AES countries point to a growing recognition that the regional environment has changed. These developments suggest that the response to the crisis can no longer rely exclusively on traditional mechanisms of institutional pressure.

They do not, however, resolve the organization’s structural difficulties. The question of trust remains central, both among governments and between regional institutions and the populations they are intended to serve. Security remains decisive, while economic integration must still demonstrate its capacity to deliver benefits sufficiently visible to reinforce public support. The legitimacy crisis therefore cannot be overcome through changes of personnel or isolated decisions. It requires a deeper transformation in the way ECOWAS defines its priorities, exercises its responsibilities and accounts for its actions.

3. The Conditions for Strategic Survival

The first condition is trust. A regional organization cannot exercise durable authority without a minimum level of political confidence among its members and sufficient legitimacy among its populations. Such confidence requires predictable rules, consistent application of principles, greater transparency and the institutional capacity to acknowledge the limits of its own instruments.

The second condition is collective security. The multiplication of transnational threats demonstrates that no single state can sustainably address the region’s security challenges alone. Intelligence cooperation, border management, counter trafficking efforts, conflict prevention and the protection of economic corridors will remain indispensable, including within a more fragmented institutional environment. In this respect, the search for functional cooperation with the AES countries could become more important than the immediate pursuit of full political convergence.

The third condition is economic. Integration will retain its legitimacy only if it improves living conditions in tangible ways. Regional trade, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, industrial transformation, professional mobility and digitalization are the areas in which ECOWAS can most directly demonstrate its relevance. A regional organization is strongest when its populations can identify the benefits of its existence in their everyday lives.

The fourth condition is civic ownership. The future of ECOWAS cannot be built indefinitely around heads of state summits and intergovernmental mechanisms alone. Young people, businesses, universities, professional organizations, the media and civil society must have greater opportunities to participate in shaping the regional project. Engagement with populations is no longer merely a democratic addition. It has become a condition of legitimacy and effectiveness.

4. Toward a More Pragmatic West African Regionalism

The evolution of the regional system points toward a form of regionalism that will probably be more complex than the model envisioned when ECOWAS was established. The organization may remain one of West Africa’s principal frameworks for cooperation while operating in an environment in which several levels of organization, alliances and cooperation mechanisms coexist.

This development should not necessarily be interpreted as a failure of regionalism. It may also represent a form of variable geometry regionalism, in which states cooperate more closely in certain sectors while retaining greater freedom of action in others. Security, trade, energy, infrastructure, mobility and the management of shared resources could become areas of pragmatic cooperation regardless of deeper political disagreements.

The central challenge will be preventing this diversification of cooperation frameworks from becoming permanent fragmentation. Institutional pluralism can coexist with regional interdependence, provided that channels of dialogue remain open, minimum common rules are preserved and sufficiently strong shared interests continue to hold the West African space together.

5. A Lesson That Extends Beyond West Africa

The ECOWAS experience now extends beyond the West African context. It represents an instructive case for the Global South because it demonstrates that regional integration never advances in a straight line. It progresses when institutions succeed in transforming interdependence into common interests, but retreats when populations or governments conclude that the costs of integration outweigh its benefits.

It also demonstrates that sovereignty and integration are not necessarily contradictory. In an international environment shaped by economic competition, technological transformation, climate risks and new forms of conflict, certain dimensions of sovereignty can be exercised effectively only through cooperation. The real question is therefore not whether to choose between national sovereignty and regional integration, but in which areas the collective exercise of certain capacities enables states to strengthen rather than diminish their autonomy.

Finally, the West African experience reminds us that regional power cannot be measured solely by the size of a market, the number of member states or the existence of common institutions. It depends on the capacity to translate these assets into concrete outcomes: security, prosperity, mobility and public confidence. It is precisely on this terrain that the next phase of West African regionalism will be decided.

THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE: DELIVERING RESULTS

The future of ECOWAS will probably be determined neither by a simple restoration of the previous model nor by the multiplication of new institutions. It will depend above all on its ability to demonstrate its relevance in a profoundly transformed environment. A regional organization retains its value when it enables its members to achieve together what would be more difficult to accomplish separately, when it protects shared interests and when it produces benefits that populations can actually perceive.

West Africa is therefore entering a period in which the institutional question will gradually give way to a more fundamental one: what can regional integration still deliver in a space that is politically fragmented but economically, socially, geographically and environmentally interdependent? The answer will shape not only the future of ECOWAS, but also the form of African regionalism over the coming decade.

CPGNNews Strategic Outlook

The future of ECOWAS will not be determined by nostalgia for its past model, but by its capacity to transform West Africa’s interdependence into a renewed collective capacity for action. Its credibility will depend less on the force of its declarations than on the quality of its results; less on the centrality of its institutions than on their usefulness; and less on restoring an old order than on building a regional order adapted to the realities of the twenty first century.

ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE 1: THE FIFTEEN FOUNDING FATHERS OF ECOWAS (1975)

Founding State	Head of State in 1975	Status
Benin	Mathieu Kérékou	Military
Burkina Faso	Sangoulé Lamizana	Military
Côte d’Ivoire	Félix Houphouët-Boigny	Civilian
The Gambia	Dawda Kairaba Jawara	Civilian
Ghana	Ignatius Kutu Acheampong	Military
Guinea	Ahmed Sékou Touré	Civilian
Guinea-Bissau	Luís Cabral	Civilian
Liberia	William Tolbert	Civilian
Mali	Moussa Traoré	Military
Mauritania	Moktar Ould Daddah	Civilian
Niger	Seyni Kountché	Military
Nigeria	Yakubu Gowon	Military
Senegal	Léopold Sédar Senghor	Civilian
Sierra Leone	Siaka Stevens	Military
Togo	Gnassingbé Eyadéma	Military

Source: ECOWAS official website

ENCLOSURE 2: ECOWAS: TIMELINE (1975–2026)

• 1975: Treaty of Lagos signed; ECOWAS established with 15 member states.
• 1977: Cape Verde joins ECOWAS, bringing membership to 16 states.
• 1978: Protocol on Non-Aggression adopted.
• 1990: ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) established and deployed in Liberia.

• 1993: Treaty of Lagos revised; regional institutions strengthened.
• 1997: ECOWAS intervenes in Liberia.
• 1998: ECOWAS forces deployed in Sierra Leone.
• 2000: Mauritania withdraws from ECOWAS, reducing membership to 15 states.
• 2001: Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted.
• 2011: ECOWAS Commission established.
• 2013: Integrated Maritime Security Strategy adopted.
• 2020: Military coup in Mali.
• 2021: Military coup in Guinea.
• 2022: Military coups in Burkina Faso.
• 2023: Military coup in Niger; Alliance of Sahel States (AES) established.
• 2024: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announce their intention to withdraw from ECOWAS.

• 2025: Withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger takes effect on 29 January; attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau on 26 November.

• 2026: 69th ECOWAS Summit held in Freetown on 19 July; Bassirou Diomaye Faye elected Chair of the Authority of Heads of State and Government; General Birame Diop appointed President of the Commission.

Source: SWI / ECOWAS

ENCLOSURE 3: CURRENT COMPOSITION OF ECOWAS (2026)

Member State	Year of Accession
Benin	1975
Cape Verde	1977
Côte d’Ivoire	1975
The Gambia	1975
Ghana	1975
Guinea	1975
Guinea-Bissau	1975
Liberia	1975
Nigeria	1975
Senegal	1975
Sierra Leone	1975
Togo	1975

Source: ECOWAS / SWI

ENCLOSURE 4: WITHDRAWING STATES: BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER

Indicator	Value
Population of the three states (2025)	≈ 68 million
Share of ECOWAS population before withdrawal	16%
Share of ECOWAS economy	7%
People facing food insecurity (2025)	7.5 million

Source: ECOWAS Club / Afrique Diplomatique

ENCLOSURE 5: AES GROWTH INDICATORS (2025)

State	2025 Growth Rate	Main Factors
Niger	+6.9%	Crude oil, agriculture, production
Burkina Faso	+5.0%	Services, agriculture, gold
Mali	+4.9%	Moderate slowdown
AES overall	+5.5%	—

Source: BIDC Annual Report 2025

ENCLOSURE 6- BIDC: FINANCIAL INDICATORS AND MEMBER-STATE DISCIPLINE (2025)

Indicator	Change
Operating income	+17.12%
Profit	+13.28%
Total assets	+21.15%

Repayment Position

Status	States Concerned
No capital arrears	Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana
With arrears	Twelve other member states

Source: Cauris / BIDC Activity Report 2025

ENCLOSURE 7: ECOWAS PARLIAMENT BUDGET

Fiscal Year	Amount in UA	Execution Rate (30/06/2024)
2024 (approved)	23,215,994	Revenue: 37%; Expenditure: 27%
2025 (draft)	23,371,350	+0.67% compared with 2024
2025–2027 cycle	Budget envelope maintained	No increase

Source: ATOP

ENCLOSURE 8:  REGIONAL PROJECTS AND INVESTMENT

Indicator	Value
Companies benefiting from the Trade Liberalisation Scheme	+15,000
Products circulating with tariff advantages	+50,000
Regional projects identified	201
Estimated cost of projects	€131 billion
Countries involved in energy interconnection	14
Intra-community trade as a share of total trade	12–15%

Source: Africa24 TV / ECOWAS REPORT

ENCLOSURE 9: ECOWAS AND CARICOM

Similarities and Differences

• Similarities: Both are regional integration organizations created in the 1970s, facing challenges related to coordination among member states, policy implementation, and legitimacy among their populations.

• Differences: ECOWAS is larger, more linguistically diverse, and characterized by greater disparities in levels of development.

ENCLOSURE 10: THE THREE FUTURES OF ECOWAS

• Restoration: A gradual return to the previous model, including the possible reintegration of the AES states.

• Coexistence: Functional separation between ECOWAS and the AES, combined with sector-specific cooperation.

• Refoundation: A profound reform of ECOWAS, with greater flexibility, tangible results, and a central role for citizens.

• Hybridization: A combination of these scenarios, resulting in a variable-geometry ECOWAS.

DOCUMENTATION AND METHODOLOGY

This dossier was developed as a Global Strategic Study, in accordance with the methodology used in established strategic research and policy analysis. Its documentation combines institutional, academic and journalistic sources, with particular emphasis on data verification, source comparison and analytical rigor.

Institutional sources: ECOWAS, African Union, member states, CARICOM, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank and United Nations.

Security sources: Specialized datasets and reports, with a systematic distinction between verified information and estimates.

Economic sources: National and regional statistics covering trade, energy, infrastructure and investment.

Academic sources: Scholarly research on African regionalism, coups, Sahelian security and economic integration.

Journalistic sources: Used to document events, developments and official statements, but never treated as the sole basis for strategic analysis.

CPGNNews Editorial Principle: When a figure is disputed or varies significantly between sources, we identify the discrepancy rather than arbitrarily selecting the figure that best serves our argument.

CPGNNews Global Strategic Study — August 2026

© CPGNNews — All Rights Reserved.

Any reproduction, adaptation, translation, distribution or use, in whole or in part, of this study, in any form whatsoever, is subject to the prior authorization of CPGNNews, except where otherwise permitted by applicable law.WEST AFRICA: ECOWAS AT THE CROSSROADS OF ITS OWN TRANSFORMATION

After the 69th Freetown Summit, the regional organization seeks a new balance between security, economic integration, national sovereignty and democratic stability

CPGNNews GLOBAL STRATEGIC STUDY

FREETOWN: A SUMMIT THAT GOES BEYOND THE SUMMIT

On July 19, 2026, Lungi, on the outskirts of Freetown, hosted the 69th Ordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The meeting took place in circumstances that extended far beyond the framework of a routine institutional summit. Fifty one years after its creation, ECOWAS is confronting one of the most profound transformations in its history. The crisis of its integration model, the political realignments triggered by military takeovers, growing demands for national sovereignty, persistent insecurity and regional economic vulnerabilities have converged to raise a fundamental question: what kind of community does West Africa want to build for the decades ahead?

To understand the significance of Freetown, the summit must be placed within the longer trajectory of West African regionalism. Established in 1975 through the Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS was initially conceived as an instrument of economic integration designed to promote the free movement of people, goods and capital, as well as cooperation among states whose inherited borders had never eliminated their deep interdependence. Over the decades, the organization progressively expanded its mandate to include conflict prevention, collective security, the defense of constitutional order and democratic governance. This evolution helped make ECOWAS one of Africa’s most ambitious experiments in regional integration. It also generated a tension that now lies at the heart of its crisis: how far can a regional organization go in defending common norms without leading some of its members to believe that integration has become a constraint on national sovereignty?

That tension has become particularly visible following the rupture created by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, now united within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Their withdrawal from ECOWAS did not merely reduce the Community’s institutional reach. It exposed a deeper disagreement over the very meaning of West African regionalism. On one side stands a vision based on common rules, regional mobility, economic integration and the defense of certain political principles. On the other is an increasingly sovereignty centered conception of regional cooperation, emphasizing national strategic autonomy and the freedom of states to determine their own political and security choices. Yet institutional separation has not erased interdependence. Peoples, markets, trade routes, families, migration networks, economic corridors and security realities continue to bind these countries closely to their neighbors. This contradiction between political separation and structural interdependence is now one of the defining challenges of West Africa’s emerging geopolitical landscape.

The central question that the Freetown Summit could no longer avoid is therefore clear: can ECOWAS rebuild a credible regional project in a West Africa that is politically fragmented, economically interdependent and increasingly vulnerable to insecurity? The answer will determine far more than the administrative future of a regional organization. It will test the ability of African regionalism to adapt to changing relationships between the state, sovereignty, democracy and integration. It will also determine whether regional institutions can still generate enough confidence to persuade governments and citizens that collective cooperation offers a more effective response to contemporary challenges than isolation or fragmentation.

The stakes are also profoundly human. ECOWAS encompasses a region of nearly 400 million people whose economic and social trajectories are interconnected through population movements, trade, migration, labor markets, transport networks and production systems that largely transcend political borders. Free movement has long been one of the most visible achievements of West African integration. When relations between states deteriorate, when borders become instruments of confrontation or when regional mechanisms lose effectiveness, the consequences do not remain confined to diplomatic circles. They affect traders, transport workers, migrant laborers, students, cross border families and millions of citizens whose daily lives depend upon the continued fluidity of regional exchanges.

The current transformation therefore cannot be understood simply as an institutional crisis requiring the restoration of the previous order. The departure of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger represents a historic rupture, but it has also exposed a deeper reality: the ECOWAS model must now respond to expectations that its original design was never fully equipped to absorb. Terrorism, state fragility, unconstitutional changes of government, intensifying competition among external powers, economic pressures, climate change and the accelerating digital transformation of African societies are forcing the organization to reconsider its instruments, priorities and perhaps even its understanding of regional solidarity. The question is no longer simply how to preserve ECOWAS as it once existed, but how to ensure that it remains relevant in a strategic environment that has fundamentally changed.

It is in this context that the Freetown Summit acquires particular significance. West African leaders are being called upon simultaneously to address security imperatives, preserve the achievements of economic integration, restore political confidence and redefine the relationship between national sovereignty and regional commitments. The leadership of Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye opens a new political chapter whose significance will ultimately have to be measured by results rather than intentions. The essential question is no longer whether ECOWAS can articulate a common vision, but whether it can translate that vision into policies capable of producing measurable benefits for states and citizens alike.

This study examines that transformation from several complementary perspectives: the history and institutional foundations of ECOWAS, the current crisis of its political model, the geopolitical reconfiguration generated by the AES, the security imperative, the prospects for deeper economic integration, the place of citizens within the regional project, and the challenges posed by digital transformation and climate change. It also examines the changing conditions of regional leadership and the strategic choices that may determine the Community’s future. Particular attention will be given to the Caribbean experience, especially CARICOM, whose trajectory offers useful points of comparison for understanding both the possibilities and the limitations of regionalism across the Global South.

Ultimately, the debate over ECOWAS’s future goes beyond the survival of an institution. It concerns West Africa’s ability to transform interdependence into collective strength, vulnerability into mechanisms of solidarity and political disagreement into spaces for dialogue capable of preserving what matters most. The real challenge emerging from Freetown is therefore not the mechanical restoration of a regional order that has already changed, but whether a new architecture of cooperation can emerge from a crisis that has fundamentally altered relations among the states and peoples of West Africa.

West Africa may not need an ECOWAS that speaks more. It needs an ECOWAS that delivers more.

I. ECOWAS AT THE END OF AN ERA

From an economic community to a crisis of the regional model

1. 1975: THE FOUNDING AMBITION

On May 28, 1975, in Lagos, Nigeria, fifteen West African states signed the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States. Led by the political figures of the time, including Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon and Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the initiative reflected an ambition that was both economic and strategic: to create a sufficiently integrated regional space to expand national markets, promote development, pool resources and reduce the vulnerability of West African economies to external powers and global markets.

The composition of the fifteen founding states reflected the political diversity of postcolonial West Africa: Benin, then known as Dahomey, Burkina Faso, then Upper Volta, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. ECOWAS was therefore not born out of political or ideological uniformity. It rested instead on a pragmatic conviction: despite differences in political systems, languages, historical trajectories and levels of development, the states of the region shared sufficient interests to build a permanent framework for cooperation.

The context of 1975 was that of a young postcolonial Africa struggling to transform political independence into genuine economic autonomy. The new states had acquired international sovereignty, but their economies remained heavily dependent on external markets, commodity exports and commercial structures inherited from the colonial period. West African leaders increasingly understood that national sovereignty could not be fully consolidated without a collective capacity to produce, trade, invest and negotiate on a broader scale. Regional integration therefore appeared not as a renunciation of sovereignty, but as a means of giving sovereignty greater economic and strategic weight.

The Treaty of Lagos established the foundations for gradual integration based on economic cooperation, trade liberalization, the free movement of people and, ultimately, the creation of an economic and monetary union. The ambition was considerable, but its logic remained incremental. The objective was not to eliminate immediately the economic borders separating states with profoundly different productive structures and levels of development, but to progressively create the conditions for a more integrated regional market. This approach would become one of the defining characteristics of the Community’s institutional project.

2. THE ECONOMY AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

Economic integration has remained the historical foundation of the ECOWAS project. Among its most visible achievements is the free movement of people. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement, Residence and Establishment progressively gave concrete expression to the idea of a regional space in which citizens could cross borders with fewer restrictions. The ECOWAS passport, introduced from 2000 onward, subsequently reinforced this ambition and became one of the most recognizable symbols of the construction of a Community space extending beyond national frontiers.

Intra regional trade constitutes another indicator of this integration, although its level remains below the region’s economic potential. Trade among member states has increased over the decades, but continues to face limited productive diversification, inadequate infrastructure, high logistics costs, non tariff barriers and the persistent dominance of commercial relations with external markets. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme nevertheless created a framework intended to facilitate the movement of numerous products and encourage the emergence of a regional market. The progress of intra regional trade should therefore not be measured solely by volume. It must also be assessed through cross border economic networks, regional value chains and the millions of citizens whose livelihoods depend directly or indirectly on this circulation.

Infrastructure has constituted another essential instrument of regional interdependence. Road and rail corridors, electricity interconnections, telecommunications networks and major energy projects have progressively connected economies that, historically, were often more oriented toward former colonial powers and global markets than toward their immediate neighbors. The West African Power Pool illustrates this evolution: electricity is increasingly becoming a resource whose production, transmission and distribution can be conceived at the regional level. Major gas and cross border energy projects pursue the same logic by giving integration a material dimension that goes beyond political declarations.

This evolution reveals an essential characteristic of ECOWAS: its integration is not merely institutional. It is also geographic, economic and human. Roads, markets, electricity networks, migration patterns and commercial exchanges have created forms of interdependence that survive political crises. This is precisely why the current institutional fragmentation does not mean the disappearance of the West African economic space. On the contrary, it makes the question of how to preserve these interdependencies when political trust among states deteriorates even more urgent.

3. THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF ECOWAS

The deepest evolution of ECOWAS, however, lies in its gradual transition from a primarily economic organization into a major political and security actor. This transformation was not at the center of the original 1975 project. It emerged under the pressure of crises that profoundly reshaped West Africa: civil wars, unconstitutional changes of government, armed conflicts, political instability and, more recently, the expansion of terrorist groups across several states in the region.

The Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, adopted in 2001, represented a major turning point. By affirming that accession to power must take place through constitutional and democratic means, ECOWAS established a normative framework extending far beyond the traditional objectives of an economic organization. The defense of constitutional order thus gradually became part of the Community’s political project, giving ECOWAS an interventionist role that would fundamentally alter perceptions of its mandate.

This politicization was both a source of strength and a source of vulnerability. It enabled ECOWAS to play an important role in several regional crises and to contribute to mediation efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. It also helped establish the organization as a recognized actor in conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa. Yet the expansion of its mandate simultaneously exposed the Community to growing criticism over the consistency of its decisions, the proportionality of its interventions and perceptions of unequal treatment of political crises. As ECOWAS moved beyond its original economic role, it inevitably became more exposed to the controversies surrounding any institution required to arbitrate between national sovereignty and regional norms.

4. WHEN AN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION BECOMES A POLITICAL ACTOR

The turning point of the 1990s made this transformation particularly visible. The Liberian civil war, which began in 1989, compelled ECOWAS to intervene in an internal conflict within one of its member states. In 1990, the Community established ECOMOG, a military force intended to contribute to the restoration of peace and security. Its intervention in Liberia was controversial, particularly because of its operational limitations and the political disagreements among the states contributing to the force. Nevertheless, it established a major precedent: ECOWAS was no longer merely an organization designed to facilitate economic exchange. It was becoming capable of mobilizing political and military instruments in response to regional crises.

That experience was subsequently extended to Sierra Leone and other crisis situations. At the same time, the Community progressively developed a broader architecture for conflict prevention, mediation, early warning and collective security. The creation of a standby force was intended to give institutional form to this ambition. Yet this architecture was consistently confronted with a fundamental difficulty: collective decision making was not always matched by the financial, logistical and military resources required for implementation. Dependence on contributions from member states and external partners repeatedly limited the Community’s operational autonomy.

This contradiction between ambition and capacity would become one of ECOWAS’s structural problems. The broader the organization’s mandate became, the greater the expectations placed upon it. Yet its institutional instruments, financial resources and the political will of its member states did not always evolve at the same pace. ECOWAS therefore found itself in a paradoxical position: it was increasingly expected to guarantee security, democracy and stability while remaining heavily dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the same states whose national interests could at times diverge profoundly.

It is within this tension between regional ambition and national sovereignty that a central dimension of the current crisis can be found. ECOWAS began as a project of economic integration. It gradually became a political and security actor. But that transformation created new expectations without always producing the instruments necessary to meet them. The question now is no longer simply whether ECOWAS should continue its integration process, but whether its institutional model remains suited to the political, security and economic realities of a West Africa that has entered a new historical cycle.

5. COUPS AND THE CRISIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

From 2020 onward, West Africa experienced a succession of disruptions to constitutional order that placed the political architecture of ECOWAS under profound strain. Mali underwent two military takeovers, in August 2020 and May 2021, followed by Guinea in September 2021. Burkina Faso experienced two military seizures of power in 2022, while Niger underwent another constitutional rupture in July 2023. This sequence was followed on November 26, 2025, by a military takeover in Guinea Bissau, which led to the detention of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló as the country awaited the announcement of presidential election results. Together, these events gave the region’s democratic crisis a new depth. The issue was no longer a series of isolated political disruptions, but a broader challenge to the credibility of constitutional governance across parts of West Africa.

These developments cannot, however, be reduced to a simple “return of coups” or interpreted as evidence of a uniform democratic decline. They emerged from a combination of mutually reinforcing factors: the perceived inability of some governments to respond effectively to insecurity, widespread frustration with political elites accused of corruption or inefficiency, institutional fragility, disputes over electoral processes and rapidly changing geopolitical conditions. In several countries, the democratic promise has also been weakened by the gap between proclaimed principles and the daily experience of populations confronted with poverty, insecurity, unemployment and inadequate public services. The problem, therefore, is not merely the occurrence of military takeovers, but the gradual erosion of public trust that makes such ruptures politically possible.

ECOWAS responded primarily through its constitutional order mechanisms: suspensions, economic and financial sanctions, restrictions on movement and measures targeting officials of military regimes. This response was consistent with the norms the organization had progressively established since the adoption of the 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Yet the succession of coups exposed the limitations of this strategy. Sanctions enabled the Community to reaffirm the existence of shared regional norms, but they did not prevent further constitutional ruptures. In some cases, they contributed to strengthening the sovereignty centered rhetoric of military authorities and deepening the distance between those governments, their populations and the regional organization.

6. THE RISE OF POPULAR CONTESTATION

Alongside the institutional ruptures, popular contestation grew in several West African capitals. In Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, as well as in other political centers across the region, public mobilizations expressed rejection of established political elites, frustration over insecurity, criticism of certain relationships with France and opposition to sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. Social media amplified these movements, accelerating the circulation of sovereignty centered narratives and creating a new political arena in which regional institutions themselves became the object of direct public criticism.

This dynamic remains deeply ambivalent. On one hand, it reflects genuine aspirations for more effective governance, stronger national sovereignty, greater economic justice and a greater ability for states to define their own strategic priorities. On the other, it can be appropriated by political forces that transform popular dissatisfaction into a means of legitimizing military rule or restricting civil liberties. Popular support for some military governments therefore cannot automatically be equated with a rejection of democracy itself. It often reflects a more complex disenchantment with political systems that have failed to meet expectations in the areas of security, economic opportunity and social development. This distinction is essential to understanding ECOWAS’s legitimacy crisis: what is being challenged is not necessarily the principle of regional cooperation or even democracy itself, but the way those principles have been embodied by political institutions and elites.

ECOWAS has consequently faced a particularly difficult paradox. The organization built much of its legitimacy on the defense of constitutional stability, yet portions of the populations in affected countries came to perceive its interventions as the defense of a political order whose results they considered inadequate. The problem was therefore no longer simply one of enforcing Community rules. It became a question of their social legitimacy. A regional institution may possess a solid legal foundation and still lose political authority when citizens no longer clearly perceive the benefits of its action.

7. THE DEPARTURE OF BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER

The simultaneous withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger represents the most significant institutional rupture in the recent history of ECOWAS. The three states announced their decision to leave the organization in January 2024. After the expiration of the withdrawal period established under the revised 1993 Treaty, their departure officially took effect on January 29, 2025. During the transition period, the three governments consolidated their cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States, progressively giving institutional form to an alternative regional architecture.

This departure is not simply another episode of tension between governments and a regional organization. It resulted from several converging dynamics: the rejection by military authorities of what they regarded as external interference, a determination to reaffirm national sovereignty, the search for new strategic partnerships, particularly with Russia, and the conviction that the interests of Sahelian states could be better defended within a narrower and less restrictive framework of cooperation. The break with ECOWAS was therefore accompanied by a broader redefinition of the three countries’ diplomatic, military and economic partnerships.

For ECOWAS, the implications are considerable. The organization had already suspended Mali in 2020, Guinea in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023. But suspension is, by definition, potentially reversible. Withdrawal has a different significance: it permanently alters the institutional geography of West Africa. ECOWAS has lost three states whose territorial size, geographic position and strategic importance are considerable, while the Alliance of Sahel States has simultaneously asserted its own political and security identity. Yet institutional separation has not eliminated shared borders, trade routes, family networks, migration flows or economic interdependence. Political rupture therefore coexists with geographic and social interdependence that remains deeply intact.

8. A STRUCTURAL RUPTURE

ECOWAS can no longer simply seek to restore the world that existed before the crisis. The regional landscape has changed, and the coexistence of two political architectures, ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States, now raises questions the organization had never previously faced. How can freedom of movement and trade be preserved when institutional affiliation diverges? How can effective security cooperation be maintained when strategic doctrines are no longer aligned? How can cross border resources, regional infrastructure and economic corridors be managed when the states concerned belong to different political frameworks?

The rupture is structural because it first reveals a divergence over the very meaning of integration. ECOWAS has progressively developed around a set of shared norms and regional institutions that can, at least in principle, constrain member states when fundamental commitments are violated. The Alliance of Sahel States, by contrast, favors a more sovereignty centered conception of cooperation, in which coordination among states does not necessarily require acceptance of an equally constraining regional framework. The divergence therefore concerns more than current governments or temporary political circumstances. It reflects two different conceptions of the relationship between national sovereignty and regional solidarity.

The rupture also reflects a transformation in the geopolitical environment. Russia, China, Turkey, the Gulf powers and traditional Western partners are all seeking to preserve or expand their influence in West Africa and the Sahel. Regional states now have a wider range of external partnerships than in previous decades and are increasingly seeking to diversify their international relationships. This does not mean that external powers alone determine the choices of West African governments. Rather, it means that international competition provides states with new strategic room for maneuver and fundamentally changes the environment in which ECOWAS seeks to exercise influence.

Finally, the rupture exposes a crisis of confidence between member states and the regional organization itself. Sanctions, diplomatic confrontations and the inability to prevent the succession of coups have weakened the Community’s political authority. Yet this crisis does not mean that the idea of regional integration has become obsolete. It demonstrates instead that the previous balance between national sovereignty, regional norms and Community solidarity no longer functions as it once did.

CPGNNEWS ANALYSIS

The end of a cycle does not necessarily mean the end of integration. It means that the forms of integration must evolve. The ECOWAS of the 1970s and 1990s cannot simply be reproduced within the political, economic and security realities of the 2020s. Yet the underlying reasons that led West African states to establish the Community remain, and some have become even more pressing: trade interdependence, population mobility, cross border security threats, climate change, regional infrastructure and the need to exercise collective influence in an increasingly competitive international environment.

The real challenge is therefore not to choose between an unchanged ECOWAS and the permanent fragmentation of West Africa. It is to determine whether a new generation of regionalism can emerge from the crisis. A renewed ECOWAS would need to defend its principles without becoming disconnected from the political and social realities of its populations, protect constitutional order without reducing democracy to elections alone, uphold regional norms without losing its capacity for dialogue and, above all, demonstrate through tangible results why regional cooperation remains preferable to fragmentation. The present crisis could therefore become less the grave of the Community project than the moment of its renewal.

The question that now arises is no longer simply how to preserve ECOWAS, but what kind of ECOWAS West Africa wants to build for the next generation.

II. THE NEW LEADERSHIP AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY

Can Regional Authority Be Rebuilt?

1. BASSIROU DIOMAYE FAYE AND THE NEW POLITICAL MOMENT

The 69th ECOWAS Summit in Freetown brought Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye to the chairmanship of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, succeeding Sierra Leonean President Julius Maada Bio. At forty six, Faye represents a different political generation, shaped by demands for institutional renewal, greater accountability and a form of governance more closely connected to public expectations. His rise therefore carries a significance that extends beyond the normal rotation of the Community’s leadership.

Faye assumes the regional presidency at a particularly difficult moment. ECOWAS needs leadership capable of rebuilding confidence among its remaining member states, reopening credible channels of communication with the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States and restoring momentum to an integration process weakened by political fragmentation. His relatively young age also has symbolic importance in a region where a large majority of the population is young and where political institutions are increasingly judged according to their ability to respond to the aspirations of younger generations. Yet generational renewal alone cannot restore institutional authority. It becomes politically meaningful only when it produces a different method of governing and, ultimately, measurable results.

In his inaugural address, Faye referred to the «heavy legacy of fifty years of effort, solidarity and patient construction» carried forward by the vision and commitment of earlier generations and pledged to preserve that legacy. The reference to the founding generation is significant because it combines continuity with the possibility of renewal. By invoking the «ideal of integration», Faye appears to frame his mandate not simply as an institutional responsibility but as a political mission: to determine whether the Community can recover a sense of common purpose after one of the deepest crises in its history.

2. SENEGAL WITHIN THE REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Senegal’s prominent position within the current institutional configuration of ECOWAS has created additional expectations around Dakar. The country’s diplomatic tradition, the professional reputation of its armed forces and its long standing experience with constitutional politics give it a degree of credibility in a region where trust between governments has become increasingly fragile. These characteristics could prove particularly important in addressing the most sensitive issues on the Community’s agenda: relations with the Alliance of Sahel States, collective security, institutional reform and the future of regional integration.

The strategic importance of Senegal also derives from its geographical and political position. It occupies a space connecting the Atlantic dimension of West Africa with the broader Sahelian environment and maintains historical, economic and social links with several countries now outside the ECOWAS institutional framework. This gives Dakar potential advantages as an interlocutor, but it also imposes limits. A successful regional strategy cannot be built around Senegal alone, and the perception that the Community is being driven by the interests of one member state would undermine precisely the legitimacy that the new leadership seeks to restore.

The concentration of expectations around Senegal therefore carries a double risk. Success could strengthen the credibility of both Dakar and the Community. Failure, however, could reinforce the perception that ECOWAS lacks the political capacity to translate its decisions into collective action. Senegalese diplomacy will consequently have to maintain a difficult balance between national interests and Community priorities, between firmness on constitutional principles and openness to dialogue, and between the expectations of coastal member states and the concerns of countries whose political trajectories have increasingly diverged from the regional mainstream.

3. A DIFFERENT POLITICAL GENERATION

Bassirou Diomaye Faye belongs to a generation of African political leaders whose emergence has been closely associated with demands for greater inclusion, transparency, accountability and effectiveness. Unlike many of the political figures who dominated the region during previous decades, this generation has been shaped by a political environment in which social media, youth movements, public scrutiny and demands for institutional change have transformed the relationship between citizens and political authority.

This generational transition, however, should not be romanticized. Younger leadership does not automatically produce better governance, and political renewal can quickly lose its appeal when expectations exceed institutional capacity. The same populations that demand change can become rapidly disillusioned when promised reforms fail to improve security, employment, public services or economic opportunities. The legitimacy of a new generation of leaders will therefore be measured less by their age than by their capacity to deliver.

For ECOWAS, this distinction is crucial. The Community cannot restore confidence simply by changing the faces that represent it. It must demonstrate that institutional renewal produces a different form of regional governance. The organization must become more responsive, more transparent and more capable of explaining its decisions to citizens. Generational renewal can open the door to such a transformation, but only political substance can sustain it.

4. INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN THE FACE OF DISTRUST

The question of ECOWAS’s legitimacy lies at the center of the present crisis. The organization’s authority has been weakened by several converging factors: repeated difficulties in resolving political crises, sanctions perceived by some populations as disproportionate or unfair, accusations that regional decisions reflect the interests of the most powerful member states more than those of weaker countries and a widespread perception that the Community’s institutional machinery is expensive and complex relative to the results it produces.

Institutional authority can no longer be assumed. It has to be demonstrated. The first requirement is therefore effectiveness. ECOWAS must show that regional cooperation can produce tangible improvements in security, trade, infrastructure, mobility and crisis management. The second requirement is consistency. The Community must demonstrate that its rules apply according to principles that are coherent, predictable and equitable, rather than according to the political weight of individual states. The third requirement is participation. Civil society, young people, women, professional organizations and local communities must have meaningful channels through which their concerns can influence regional policy.

This is ultimately a question of the social contract between institutions and citizens. A regional organization can possess legal authority while losing political legitimacy. The difference lies in whether citizens perceive the institution as relevant to their lives. If ECOWAS is seen primarily as a body that issues communiqués, imposes sanctions and conducts diplomatic negotiations among governments, its legitimacy will remain fragile. If it becomes an institution capable of facilitating movement, protecting communities, expanding economic opportunity and helping states address problems that no country can solve alone, its authority can gradually be rebuilt.

5. THE LIMITS OF THE PUNITIVE APPROACH

Sanctions, including suspensions, travel restrictions and asset freezes, have become one of ECOWAS’s principal instruments for responding to coups and violations of constitutional order. Their use is grounded in the Community’s legal framework and reflects the principle that membership carries obligations as well as benefits. Yet the experience of recent years has demonstrated the limits of relying too heavily on punitive measures. Sanctions have not prevented successive military takeovers, and in some cases they have contributed to the political isolation of targeted states while reinforcing anti ECOWAS narratives among parts of their populations.

The punitive approach rests on an assumption that deserves closer examination: that military regimes will respond primarily to economic and diplomatic pressure. In several Sahelian countries, however, sanctions have been transformed into political instruments by the targeted authorities themselves. Governments have presented them as evidence of external coercion and have used the resulting hardship to reinforce narratives of national resistance and sovereignty. This does not mean that sanctions are inherently ineffective. It means that their political consequences can differ significantly from their intended purpose, particularly when they affect ordinary citizens more visibly than the political elites they are designed to pressure.

The Community therefore needs a broader strategic repertoire. Dialogue, mediation, technical assistance, positive conditionality and graduated engagement should complement, rather than necessarily replace, targeted sanctions. The objective should be to create incentives for a return to constitutional order while preserving the credibility of regional norms. A policy that combines pressure on political decision makers with concrete pathways toward reintegration could prove more effective than a strategy based primarily on isolation.

The decision to extend the mandate of mediator Lansana Kouyaté through December 2026 in order to continue engagement with the Alliance of Sahel States may therefore represent an important shift. Its significance will depend not on the existence of another diplomatic mandate, but on whether the dialogue produces concrete progress. Mediation becomes credible when it creates a political pathway that all sides consider more advantageous than continued confrontation.

6. SANCTION, CONVINCE OR ACCOMPANY?

Relations with states undergoing constitutional transitions, particularly Guinea, illustrate the dilemma facing ECOWAS. Guinea was suspended after the 2021 coup, and tensions between the authorities and the Community remained high for several years. The broader regional environment has meanwhile become even more complicated, with repeated constitutional crises and growing public sensitivity to questions of sovereignty, foreign influence and regional intervention.

The crisis in Guinea Bissau has further demonstrated the difficulty of calibrating the Community’s response. At the time of the Freetown summit, the political situation remained highly sensitive following the detention of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and other political figures after the November 2025 military takeover. Civil society organizations called on ECOWAS to adopt a clear position in defense of constitutional order and to demand the release of detained political actors. Such situations place the Community before a difficult choice: it must defend constitutional principles while preserving the diplomatic channels necessary to negotiate an exit from the crisis.

A purely punitive response risks closing the very channels through which mediation could succeed. Excessive accommodation, however, risks undermining the credibility of the rules the organization claims to defend. The most difficult but potentially most sustainable approach is therefore a calibrated one: targeted pressure against those responsible for unconstitutional actions, combined with sustained political engagement and a clearly defined path toward constitutional normalization. Such a strategy requires patience, credibility and a willingness to distinguish between political accountability and collective punishment.

7. MEDIATION AS A STRATEGIC INSTRUMENT

Over the course of its history, ECOWAS has accumulated significant experience in political mediation. Its envoys have travelled throughout the region, met political actors, negotiated transition frameworks and attempted to prevent crises from escalating into wider conflicts. This accumulated experience constitutes an important institutional asset. Yet mediation is not a static skill. It must evolve with the political environment in which it operates.

The emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States has fundamentally altered that environment. ECOWAS mediators are no longer dealing exclusively with individual member states operating within a common institutional framework. They are increasingly engaging with a political grouping that defines itself partly through its distance from the Community. This requires a different diplomatic language, one capable of recognizing legitimate sovereignty concerns without abandoning the principles on which regional cooperation is built.

The presence of new external actors has further complicated the strategic landscape. Russia, China, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other international partners have developed expanding relationships across West Africa and the Sahel, each with its own economic, political or security interests. ECOWAS mediation must therefore operate within a much more competitive international environment. At the same time, West African populations are better informed, more politically vocal and more capable of influencing public debates through digital platforms. Negotiations conducted exclusively among governments are increasingly difficult to sustain when citizens can observe, criticize and challenge them in real time.

ECOWAS must therefore strengthen mediation as a strategic capability rather than treat it as an emergency diplomatic instrument. This requires trained personnel, stronger political and economic analysis, better coordination with African and international partners, sustained financing and, above all, political commitment from member states to allow mediation processes to reach meaningful conclusions. The objective should not simply be to manage crises after they erupt. It should be to identify the structural pressures that generate them and intervene before political confrontation becomes institutional rupture.

The future authority of ECOWAS may ultimately depend on this transformation. An organization that can only punish after a crisis has erupted will remain reactive. An organization capable of listening, mediating, anticipating and producing negotiated solutions can begin to recover the strategic relevance it has lost. The challenge for Bassirou Diomaye Faye and the current generation of regional leaders is therefore not merely to defend the existing Community, but to demonstrate that regional institutions can once again become instruments through which West African states solve problems that national governments cannot resolve alone.

8. RESTORING DIALOGUE WITH THE STATES THAT LEFT ECOWAS

The question of dialogue with the Alliance of Sahel States is arguably the most urgent and complex issue currently facing ECOWAS. The Freetown Summit reaffirmed the Community’s determination to continue discussions with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger within a unified dialogue framework, reflecting an effort to preserve institutional cohesion rather than allow a series of separate bilateral negotiations to emerge. This approach follows a clear institutional logic: ECOWAS member states should not negotiate separately with individual AES countries in ways that could create internal divisions and weaken the Community’s collective position.

There are clear advantages to this approach. Fragmented negotiations could generate rivalries among member states, weaken regional solidarity and give the AES authorities greater room to exploit differences among West African capitals. Maintaining a common framework, by contrast, allows ECOWAS to preserve collective negotiating capacity and prevents relations with the three countries from becoming a succession of separate arrangements. Yet institutional coherence also carries a political risk. If interpreted as rigidity or as an unwillingness to recognize the specific circumstances of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, it could turn dialogue into a procedural confrontation rather than a genuine process of rapprochement.

The central question, therefore, is not whether dialogue should take place, but under what conditions it can become politically productive. The AES is no longer merely a grouping of governments undergoing political transitions. It has progressively developed its own coordination mechanisms, established common positions and articulated a political discourse centered on sovereignty, strategic autonomy and the redefinition of external partnerships. ECOWAS must acknowledge this reality without abandoning its own principles. Dialogue can be credible only if it recognizes the transformations that have taken place since the political ruptures of 2024 while keeping the prospects for regional cooperation open.

The decision to retain Lansana Kouyaté as chief negotiator, with a renewed mandate through December 2026, represents an important signal of continuity. But diplomatic continuity alone will not be enough. The room for maneuver remains narrow because the AES has already undertaken efforts to harmonize its positions in order to approach negotiations with ECOWAS with «one voice». The window for dialogue remains open, but it is not unlimited. It could gradually close if institutional positions harden into incompatible red lines or if the two regional architectures cease to view their interdependence as a shared interest.

The real objective should therefore not be to compel the AES states to return to the former institutional framework at any cost, but to gradually rebuild the conditions for functional cooperation. The movement of people, trade, cross border infrastructure, security, energy and water resources do not disappear when institutional relationships are disrupted. Geography continues to generate interdependence where politics produces separation. It is precisely this reality that could provide the foundation for a new regional dialogue.

9. THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

ECOWAS’s legitimacy also depends on its capacity to defend democracy with consistency and coherence. The Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance establishes a fundamental principle: access to political power must take place through constitutional and democratic means, while violations of constitutional order may justify a collective response. This principle remains essential. But in order to retain its normative force, it must be applied in a predictable, equitable and politically impartial manner, regardless of the relative power of individual member states.

It is precisely on this ground that ECOWAS has faced one of its most serious legitimacy challenges. The organization has at times been accused of excessive firmness toward certain regimes while showing greater tolerance toward other governments whose democratic practices were also being questioned. Whether or not such perceptions are always objectively justified, they have real political consequences. They reinforce the idea of a double standard and weaken the Community’s ability to present its interventions as the expression of a common regional norm rather than the product of political power relations.

ECOWAS’s democratic credibility therefore requires consistent application of its own principles. Constitutional ruptures, restrictions on fundamental freedoms, disproportionate limitations on freedom of expression, violations of basic rights and interference with judicial independence should be assessed according to comparable standards, regardless of the country concerned. This does not mean that every crisis must receive exactly the same response. It means that differences in treatment must be explainable by objective differences in circumstances rather than by the political or economic weight of the states involved.

Defending democracy cannot, moreover, be reduced to punishing coups after they occur. A genuinely democratic regional organization must also help create the conditions under which constitutional institutions can function effectively. This requires support for electoral processes, technical assistance to public administrations, election observation, stronger judicial institutions, assistance with constitutional reforms and sustained engagement with civil society organizations. Democracy does not begin and end on election day; it depends on the resilience of institutions between elections.

Such an approach would allow ECOWAS to move beyond a largely defensive conception of democracy. Rather than appearing primarily as an institution that intervenes once constitutional order has already collapsed, it could become a permanent actor in democratic prevention and consolidation. Its ability to act before a crisis, rather than only after one has erupted, may ultimately prove essential to rebuilding its legitimacy.

10. TOWARD A NEW DOCTRINE OF REGIONAL GOVERNANCE?

The current crisis ultimately invites ECOWAS to rethink its doctrine of regional governance. The principle of «zero tolerance for coups» remains indispensable because accepting the seizure of political power by force would weaken the entire regional constitutional architecture. Yet this principle can no longer constitute a sufficient political doctrine. An organization simultaneously confronted with military transitions, terrorism, social fragmentation, geopolitical competition and declining public trust needs a much broader strategic framework.

The first dimension of such a doctrine should be prevention. ECOWAS must invest more heavily in early warning, democratic institution building, permanent political dialogue, prevention of social conflict and inclusive economic development. A coup is rarely an entirely unpredictable event. It is usually preceded by institutional tensions, declining public trust, economic difficulties, social conflict or a deterioration in the relationship between governments and citizens. An effective regional policy should therefore seek to intervene before these pressures reach the point of rupture.

The second dimension should be positive conditionality. Sanctions will probably remain part of the Community’s policy toolkit, but they should be complemented by mechanisms capable of rewarding progress. Preferential access to certain regional financing mechanisms, technical assistance, institutional support, strategic partnerships and reform programs could progressively be linked to verifiable indicators of governance, transparency and respect for constitutional order. The objective would be to transform regional integration into a system of incentives rather than merely a system of constraints.

The third dimension should be flexibility. The diversity of West Africa’s political, economic and security trajectories makes the application of a single model increasingly difficult. ECOWAS must be able to adapt its instruments to national circumstances while maintaining clearly defined common principles. Flexibility should not mean abandoning standards. It should mean developing different pathways toward shared objectives.

The fourth dimension should be citizen participation. Regional integration cannot remain an affair of heads of state, diplomats and technocrats. It must become a project understood and embraced by the populations it is intended to serve. Young people, women, civil society organizations, entrepreneurs, academics, local authorities and cross border communities should have greater opportunities to participate in defining regional priorities. An ECOWAS that speaks to citizens only when a crisis erupts will remain disconnected from the very societies whose interests it claims to represent.

Such a doctrine would imply a deeper redefinition of the Community’s role. The objective would no longer be simply to preserve an institutional order inherited from the past, but to build a form of regionalism capable of responding to the realities of the twenty first century. Security, democracy, mobility, energy, trade, climate, digital transformation and human development should increasingly be understood as interconnected dimensions of a single regional project.

CPGNNEWS STRATEGIC INSIGHT

Regional authority can no longer be proclaimed; it must be demonstrated. ECOWAS will not restore its credibility through institutional firmness alone, nor through a multiplication of summits and declarations. It will have to demonstrate, through coherent, equitable and effective action, that regional cooperation can concretely improve the lives of West African populations. The leadership of Bassirou Diomaye Faye and General Birame Diop will therefore be judged less by their ability to preserve existing institutional balances than by their capacity to transform a period of fragmentation into an opportunity for renewal. The real question is no longer simply how to save ECOWAS as it once existed, but how to build a Community capable of remaining indispensable to the West Africa of the future.

III. THE AES AND THE NEW POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF WEST AFRICA

The Sahel at the Heart of Regional Reconfiguration

1. THE SAHEL IS NOT A PERIPHERY

For decades, the Sahel was often viewed as a peripheral zone of West Africa: arid, sparsely populated, economically marginal and politically unstable. That perception is increasingly obsolete. The Sahel has become a strategic center of the region, an area in which the security, political and economic balances of West Africa as a whole are being reshaped.

The figures illustrate its importance. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger together account for tens of millions of inhabitants and occupy more than 2.8 million square kilometers, representing a substantial share of the territory of West Africa. Their natural resources include uranium, gold, oil and gas, while their geographical position gives them strategic importance for transport corridors, migration routes and commercial networks linking North Africa with sub Saharan Africa. The Sahel is therefore not merely a geographical transition zone between the Sahara and the southern regions of the continent. It is a space where strategic interests converge.

The destabilization of the Sahel has consequences far beyond the territories of the three AES countries. Armed groups operating across the region, including Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin and Islamic State affiliated organizations, have expanded the geographical reach of insecurity and placed increasing pressure on states farther south. The consequences extend beyond terrorism itself: commercial routes are disrupted, communities are displaced, illicit economies expand and coastal states face growing security pressures. The vulnerability of the Sahel has consequently become a regional vulnerability.

The economic performance of the three AES countries also complicates the narrative of a region defined exclusively by crisis. According to the annual report of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, their economies recorded combined growth of approximately 5.5% in 2025. Niger recorded growth of 6.9%, supported by increased production, crude oil exports and resilience in agriculture. Burkina Faso recorded approximately 5.0%, supported by services, agricultural production and renewed mining activity amid higher gold prices. Mali recorded approximately 4.9%, despite a moderate slowdown in economic activity. These figures do not erase the structural vulnerabilities of the three economies, but they demonstrate that the Sahel cannot be analyzed solely through the prism of insecurity and political instability.

2. BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER: THREE TRAJECTORIES, ONE NEW ALLIANCE

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger followed distinct political trajectories, yet they converged around a common rejection of the regional order that had prevailed for decades. Mali experienced military takeovers in 2020 and 2021, followed by Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023. The governments that emerged from these ruptures progressively distanced themselves from traditional alliances, particularly their historical relationship with France, while seeking new external partnerships, including closer ties with Russia.

The Alliance of Sahel States, created in September 2023, is therefore more than a temporary diplomatic arrangement. It represents an alternative conception of regional cooperation based on reaffirmed national sovereignty, functional cooperation rather than deep institutional integration, and diversification of external partnerships. The AES does not reject cooperation with neighboring countries as such. Rather, it asserts the right of its members to determine the nature, scope and conditions of that cooperation according to their own strategic priorities.

The alliance also serves an important political function for the military governments that created it. Facing international pressure and questions over their political legitimacy, the three governments have sought to strengthen their collective position. The AES provides a common diplomatic framework, facilitates coordination in areas such as security and gives greater political weight to claims centered on sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Its emergence therefore reflects both a geopolitical calculation and an effort by the three governments to consolidate their position within a rapidly changing regional environment.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE ARCHITECTURE

The AES has begun developing institutional mechanisms of its own, including a confederal framework, parliamentary structures and coordination arrangements. This architecture remains relatively young and its long term durability cannot yet be taken for granted. Its future will depend in large measure on whether the three countries can translate political solidarity into functioning institutions and demonstrate measurable progress in security, economic cooperation and development.

The emergence of this alternative architecture nonetheless represents a direct strategic challenge for ECOWAS. The issue is no longer simply how to manage political transitions within member states, but how two increasingly distinct regional frameworks can coexist within the same geographical space. The question is particularly important because the two blocs remain deeply interconnected through trade, migration, infrastructure, security and shared natural resources.

ECOWAS has acknowledged this new reality. The conclusions of the Freetown Summit emphasized the need to intensify dialogue with the AES countries with the objective of establishing a pragmatic mechanism for security cooperation, while maintaining a unified position in negotiations. This approach suggests that the organization is gradually moving from a logic centered primarily on restoring the previous institutional order toward a more complex effort to manage coexistence and preserve essential forms of regional cooperation.

4. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION

The tension between national sovereignty and regional integration lies at the heart of the political divide between ECOWAS and the AES. For ECOWAS, institutional integration is a means of strengthening prosperity and collective security. It allows states to pool resources, harmonize policies and establish common mechanisms capable of addressing challenges that exceed national borders. For the AES governments, however, deep institutional integration can be perceived as a constraint on national sovereignty, particularly when regional rules are interpreted as limiting the freedom of governments to determine their own political and security choices.

This tension is not new. Since the creation of ECOWAS, member states have repeatedly balanced the advantages of regional integration against the preservation of national prerogatives. What has changed is the political intensity of the debate. The Sahelian military governments have placed sovereignty at the center of their political discourse and have presented their break with ECOWAS as an assertion of national independence and strategic autonomy.

ECOWAS cannot answer this challenge simply by defending the institutional status quo. It must demonstrate that integration can also be an instrument of sovereignty rather than its negation. Collective sovereignty, exercised through institutions created and governed by African states themselves, can provide countries with bargaining power and strategic capacity that they would struggle to achieve individually. Shared infrastructure, coordinated security policies, integrated markets and collective diplomacy can expand national room for maneuver rather than necessarily diminish it.

The deeper challenge is therefore conceptual as much as institutional. ECOWAS must persuade governments and citizens that sovereignty and integration are not necessarily opposing principles. The real choice may not be between national sovereignty and regional integration, but between isolated sovereignty, which can leave states vulnerable to external pressures, and cooperative sovereignty, through which states pool part of their capacities in order to strengthen their collective influence. Whether West Africa can reconcile these two visions will be one of the defining questions of its regional future.

5. THE ROLE OF SECURITY IN THE AES’S NEW DOCTRINE

Security is one of the principal foundations of the AES. The three states share significant vulnerabilities to armed groups, a stated determination to regain control over their territories, and growing mistrust toward certain Western partners whose actions are increasingly portrayed as insufficient or, within Sahelian political discourse, as reflecting forms of continued dependency. This convergence has helped transform the AES from a framework of political solidarity into a broader mechanism of strategic cooperation.

The security doctrine emerging around the AES rests on several priorities: giving precedence to the fight against armed groups, strengthening national military capabilities, improving operational coordination among the three countries’ armed forces, diversifying external security partnerships and reinforcing border controls. At its core is a central proposition: Sahelian states should possess sufficient autonomous capacity to protect their security without relying exclusively on an external power. The diversification of partnerships, including with Russia, Türkiye, China and other emerging actors, forms part of this broader pursuit of strategic autonomy.

This approach nevertheless carries significant regional implications. For ECOWAS, the weakening of security coordination with the AES countries could complicate efforts to confront armed groups whose activities disregard institutional boundaries. It also raises questions about the nature of foreign military involvement in the Sahel, the terms of new defense partnerships and their long term consequences for West Africa’s strategic balance. The challenge is therefore to prevent institutional fragmentation from becoming security fragmentation.

6. THE NEW EXTERNAL ALLIANCES

The growing rapprochement between the AES states and Russia is among the most visible geopolitical developments of recent years. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, security cooperation with Russian actors has progressively acquired greater importance in the defense strategies of the governments in power. The presence of Russian linked structures, particularly following the gradual withdrawal of French forces and other Western partners, has contributed to changing military and diplomatic balances across the region.

This development should not, however, be reduced to a simple replacement of Western powers by Russia. Sahelian governments are also seeking to diversify their partnerships in order to expand their strategic room for maneuver. External cooperation has consequently become an instrument of strategic bargaining: obtaining equipment, strengthening military capabilities, accessing financing, developing infrastructure or securing diplomatic support while attempting to avoid exclusive dependence on any single partner.

This diversification extends well beyond Russia. China, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also developed or expanded their relations with several states across the region, each according to different interests and instruments. Beijing has emphasized infrastructure, resources and markets; Ankara combines diplomacy, trade, defense cooperation and cultural influence; while Gulf powers possess substantial financial resources and are expanding their economic and diplomatic presence.

The pluralization of external partnerships provides Sahelian states with new negotiating opportunities. It also carries risks. A growing number of external actors can generate competing spheres of influence, conflicting strategic priorities and forms of mutual dependency. Genuine autonomy therefore does not necessarily result from the number of partners a country has, but from its ability to preserve decision making power while negotiating effectively with each of them.

7. RUSSIA, CHINA, TÜRKİYE, THE GULF POWERS AND WESTERN PARTNERS

West Africa has increasingly become a space of geopolitical competition among several powers, each seeking to preserve or expand its influence. Russia has strengthened its military and diplomatic presence in several Sahelian countries. China remains a major actor in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, trade and investment. Türkiye has developed an increasingly active diplomacy, accompanied by expanding commercial relations and defense cooperation. The Gulf powers, meanwhile, possess substantial financial resources and are expanding their influence through investment, infrastructure, trade and various forms of diplomacy.

At the same time, Western influence has declined in several Sahelian countries. France, which historically maintained a particularly significant political, military and economic presence, was compelled to withdraw its forces from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger as relations with the governments that emerged from the coups deteriorated. The United States has likewise been required to reassess its regional posture following political changes in the Sahel and the reconsideration of certain military cooperation agreements.

This shift does not mean that Western influence has disappeared from West Africa. European states, the United States and their partners continue to possess significant capacities in trade, development financing, technical cooperation, maritime security and investment. The regional landscape is therefore less a matter of one power replacing another than of a much more open competition among several centers of influence.

This competition carries potential risks of instability, but it can also create opportunities for West African states. The ability to choose among multiple partners can strengthen their negotiating position and allow them to secure more favorable conditions for certain projects. Yet such diversification must be embedded in coherent national strategies; otherwise, external competition may simply produce new forms of dependency.

8. THE TRANSFORMATION OF RELATIONS WITH FORMER PARTNER POWERS

The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS forms part of a broader transformation in relations between several Sahelian states and their former partners, particularly France. For the AES governments, the reduction or termination of the French military presence has become a symbol of regained sovereignty and an effort to redefine relations with former colonial powers. The termination of certain military cooperation agreements, the withdrawal of French forces and increasingly open criticism of French policies have therefore acquired a powerful political dimension.

ECOWAS is directly affected by this transformation. Its member states do not share the same interpretation of their relations with France, the European Union, the United States or emerging external powers. Some seek to preserve close partnerships with Western powers; others advocate much greater diversification. This diversity of strategic preferences complicates the formulation of a common regional policy and periodically exposes ECOWAS to accusations of excessive proximity to particular external partners.

The organization must therefore avoid becoming an instrument of rivalry among external powers. Its strategic interest lies instead in maintaining working relations with all available partners, Western and non Western alike, while defending West Africa’s own interests. The objective should be to preserve the region’s decision making sovereignty, attract useful investment and expertise, strengthen local capabilities and ensure that external partnerships respond first and foremost to priorities defined by West African societies.

9. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COASTAL STATES

The withdrawal of the Sahelian states from ECOWAS has direct consequences for the coastal states that remain within the organization. Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo now operate in a security environment in which the traditional distinction between the Sahel and the coastal zone is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Armed groups have already expanded their activities toward northern areas of Benin, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire, demonstrating that the geographical boundary between the two spaces no longer constitutes an adequate security barrier.

Coastal states must also manage important economic and social consequences: population displacement caused by violence, increasing pressure on local resources, disruption of certain trade corridors and risks associated with the expansion of cross border criminal networks. Security therefore cannot be separated from questions of development, local governance, employment and the resilience of communities living in border areas.

In this context, ECOWAS remains essential as a framework for coordination. Border security, intelligence sharing, counter trafficking efforts and the protection of strategic infrastructure require capabilities that exceed those of most individual states. Yet the organization itself has been weakened by the departure of the three Sahelian countries: it has lost part of its strategic depth, potential military capacity and mechanisms for coordinating with territories directly exposed to the threat.

10. THE GULF OF GUINEA AND THE PRESSURES OF SAHELIAN INSTABILITY

The Gulf of Guinea is one of West Africa’s principal demographic, economic and commercial centers. The major ports of Abidjan, Lagos, Lomé and Cotonou play essential roles in regional trade and in connecting West Africa to global markets. The region also possesses substantial energy resources and accounts for a significant share of West Africa’s industrial and commercial activity.

Sahelian instability is placing growing pressure on this strategic space. The expansion of armed groups toward the northern areas of coastal states represents the most visible threat, but it is not the only one. Drug, arms and human trafficking networks exploit weaknesses in cross border control systems. Maritime piracy, which constituted a major threat during the 2010s, has declined substantially as a result of regional and international cooperation, but it has not disappeared entirely.

ECOWAS has developed mechanisms for maritime security cooperation, yet the scale of the challenges exceeds the current capacities of many states. More importantly, the security of the Gulf of Guinea cannot be sustainably separated from the security of the Sahel. The two spaces are connected by trade routes, populations, economic networks and the movements of armed groups. The institutional rupture between ECOWAS and the AES complicates this interdependence without eliminating it.

11. TRADE, BORDERS AND MOBILITY: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEPARATION

The withdrawal of the Sahelian states from ECOWAS cannot erase the economic and human flows that cross West Africa. Trade routes, transport corridors, mobility networks and exchanges among communities do not stop at institutional borders. The interdependence between Sahelian and coastal states is a geographical, economic and social reality that predates the regional organizations themselves.

Trade between the Sahel and coastal areas is vital to both sides. Sahelian countries depend on southern ports for a significant share of their imports and exports, while coastal economies benefit from demand in Sahelian markets. Human mobility is equally important: workers, traders, transport operators and families have moved between the two spaces for decades, creating social and economic networks that cannot be eliminated by institutional separation.

ECOWAS therefore has a strong interest in preserving these flows despite the AES withdrawal. The objective of safeguarding regional mobility, economic exchanges and relations among the peoples of West Africa remains fundamental. Yet implementation becomes more difficult in the absence of a common institutional framework. The risk is a multiplication of controls, rising transaction costs and a gradual weakening of the commercial fluidity that has been one of the most important achievements of West African regionalism.

12. Youth, Employment and Economic Transformation

Youth represents one of West Africa’s greatest demographic and economic assets, but also one of its most significant structural challenges. Approximately 60% of the region’s population is under the age of twenty five. This generation is generally better educated, more deeply connected to digital networks and more exposed to the transformations of the global economy, yet it continues to face a labour market marked by limited formal employment, the predominance of the informal sector and precarious incomes. Youth employment therefore cannot be separated from the broader question of productive transformation across the region.

This transformation requires sustained investment in education, vocational training, infrastructure and access to technology, alongside reforms capable of improving the business environment, supporting entrepreneurship and expanding access to finance. ECOWAS has launched several initiatives in these areas, including training programmes, entrepreneurship support mechanisms and measures designed to facilitate professional mobility. Their impact, however, remains constrained by insufficient resources and limited coordination. In a region experiencing strong demographic growth, creating productive employment opportunities for young people must therefore be regarded not only as an economic priority, but also as an essential condition for social and political stability.

13. ECOWAS and the AES: Confrontation or Coexistence?

The relationship between ECOWAS and the AES cannot be separated from this broader economic and human reality. Institutional rupture has neither eliminated trade flows, nor transport corridors, nor population movements, nor the energy and financial interdependencies linking the Sahelian states to the coastal economies. The fundamental question is therefore no longer simply whether the two blocs can avoid confrontation, but whether they can establish a pragmatic coexistence within a regional space whose economic realities extend beyond institutional boundaries.

Confrontation may appear, in the short term, to be the simpler path. ECOWAS may regard the AES as a direct challenge to its integration project, while Sahelian governments may continue to portray the Community as an institution dominated by the interests of coastal states or influenced by external powers. Such a logic, however, risks deepening regional fragmentation over the long term. Sahelian economies depend on coastal ports and transport corridors to access international markets, while coastal economies have a strong interest in maintaining trade with Sahelian markets. Economic geography therefore imposes constraints that political rupture cannot erase.

Coexistence is consequently more complex, but also more realistic. It requires ECOWAS and the AES to acknowledge their respective institutional realities, accept their political differences and seek mechanisms of cooperation in areas where their interests remain aligned. Cross border security, trade, human mobility, counter trafficking efforts, regional infrastructure, the management of shared resources and selected diplomatic issues are all areas in which functional cooperation remains possible. ECOWAS has reaffirmed its willingness to maintain dialogue with the AES states and to explore a pragmatic mechanism for security cooperation. This does not resolve the underlying political disagreements, but it creates the possibility of a relationship based less on institutional confrontation and more on the management of shared interdependencies.

14. From Market Size to Economic Power

Economic integration offers West African states the opportunity to move beyond the simple logic of market size and build genuine regional economic power. Pooling markets, resources, infrastructure and expertise can give the region the critical mass needed to increase its influence in international negotiations, attract greater investment and strengthen its bargaining position vis à vis major economic powers.

ECOWAS possesses considerable potential: nearly 400 million consumers, significant natural resources and a strategic geographical position linking the Atlantic, the Sahel and major African markets. Yet this potential remains largely unrealized as long as national economies remain insufficiently integrated. The central question is therefore no longer simply the number of consumers or the combined volume of regional resources, but the capacity to transform these dispersed assets into a coherent economic force.

Achieving this transformation requires deeper integration, greater harmonization of economic and trade policies and regional institutions capable of ensuring the effective implementation of common decisions. It is as much a matter of political will as of economic rationality. Without sustained commitment from member states, market size will remain merely a statistical figure; with effective integration, it can become a genuine instrument of power.

15. Integration as an Instrument of Collective Sovereignty

Economic integration can also be understood as an instrument of collective sovereignty. In an international environment dominated by large economic blocs and highly unequal power relations, states acting individually often possess limited bargaining capacity. By contrast, a region capable of coordinating its policies, pooling selected resources and speaking with a common voice can better defend its interests and negotiate with external partners on more balanced terms.

This perspective makes it possible to move beyond the conventional opposition between integration and sovereignty. Pooling certain powers does not necessarily mean surrendering them; it can instead enable states to collectively strengthen capacities that they would struggle to exercise individually. The challenge is to convince governments and citizens that collective sovereignty generates tangible and measurable benefits.

ECOWAS must therefore present integration as a means rather than an institutional end in itself. Its relevance will ultimately be measured by its capacity to improve living conditions, facilitate trade, create employment, develop infrastructure and contribute to regional stability. When integration produces concrete results, it becomes a source of sovereignty and prosperity; when it remains primarily institutional, it risks gradually losing its power to convince.

CPGNNews Strategic Insight

An integration process that fails to produce tangible prosperity will ultimately lose its legitimacy. ECOWAS’s economic credibility will therefore depend less on the multiplication of institutional mechanisms than on its ability to deliver visible results in the daily lives of West African populations: functional infrastructure, employment opportunities, smoother movement of goods and people, broader access to energy and the development of new regional value chains. The fundamental question is no longer simply whether West Africa can integrate, but whether integration can generate prosperity tangible enough to become a shared political project once again.

VI. THE CITIZEN IMPERATIVE: FROM ECOWAS OF STATES TO ECOWAS OF PEOPLE

The Next Battle Will Be About Trust

1. What Does Regional Integration Mean for an Ordinary Citizen?

Regional integration is often presented through the language of treaties, institutions and public policies. For West African citizens, however, its meaning is measured through far more tangible realities: the ability to cross a border without disproportionate obstacles, find employment, trade, access affordable goods and services, move freely and live in a secure environment. ECOWAS was created to serve these populations, yet it is still often perceived as an organization driven primarily by heads of state and government administrations. Summits, decisions and institutional mechanisms can appear distant from everyday life, creating a deficit of understanding that inevitably weakens public support for the regional project.

The question is therefore no longer simply whether ECOWAS produces decisions, but whether people understand their purpose and can assess their impact. The organization must strengthen transparency, explain its policies more clearly and report on their results. It must also create meaningful spaces through which citizens, civil society organizations and economic actors can express their expectations. Sustainable integration cannot be administered solely by states; it must gradually become a project understood, embraced and defended by West African societies themselves.

2. Mobility and Free Movement

The free movement of people remains one of the most visible achievements of West African integration. Millions of citizens can cross regional borders, settle in another country, work, study, trade or reunite with family members. For a large part of the population, this mobility is one of the most tangible manifestations of a shared regional space.

Yet this freedom also generates tensions. In some countries, the arrival of foreign workers or traders may be perceived as competition in the labour market or as additional pressure on public services. Mobility can also raise security concerns when states seek to prevent criminal or terrorist groups from moving across borders. The central challenge for ECOWAS is therefore to preserve freedom of movement while strengthening mechanisms capable of addressing the social, economic and security tensions that mobility can generate. Free movement will remain sustainable only if it is accompanied by policies capable of protecting both migrants’ rights and the interests of host communities.

3. Employment and Opportunity

Employment remains one of the central concerns of West African populations, particularly among young people. ECOWAS can help expand opportunities by facilitating labour mobility, supporting regional businesses and strengthening training programmes. But the real challenge is now one of visible and measurable results. A regional employment policy cannot be reduced to multiplying programmes; it must enable citizens to see a genuine improvement in their professional prospects.

The recognition of professional qualifications is an essential instrument in this regard. A professional trained in one member state should be able to use those qualifications in another without facing excessively lengthy or costly procedures. Progress has been made, but implementation remains uneven. The same applies to entrepreneurship. Young entrepreneurs need an environment in which access to finance, administrative simplification, technical support and access to regional markets become practical realities. Economic integration will acquire its full meaning only when a young person can regard West Africa not as a succession of national markets, but as a genuine space of opportunity.

4. Prices, Food and Purchasing Power

For households, regional integration is also judged through the cost of living. The prices of food, energy and essential services directly determine purchasing power and, consequently, perceptions of economic stability. More efficient movement of goods, larger markets and coordinated agricultural policies can help reduce certain costs and strengthen the availability of essential products.

ECOWAS already has mechanisms designed to respond to food crises and support regional production. Yet prices remain vulnerable to fluctuations in international markets, climate shocks and weaknesses in production and distribution systems. Food stability is therefore both an economic and a political issue. Episodes of sharp price increases have repeatedly demonstrated their potential to generate social tensions. A credible regional organization must be able to anticipate such crises, monitor markets, strengthen food reserves and coordinate rapid responses when populations are directly exposed.

5. Electricity and Essential Services

Access to electricity, water, healthcare and education is among the most fundamental dimensions of human well being. In many parts of West Africa, particularly rural areas, access remains inadequate. Regional integration can help reduce these disparities by enabling states to pool certain investments and coordinate public policies.

Electricity interconnections illustrate this logic in concrete terms. They allow states with greater generation capacity to supply countries facing shortages, while regional transport corridors facilitate the movement of goods and people toward economic centres and essential services. Yet infrastructure can deliver its full benefits only when it responds to genuine public needs and is accompanied by transparent mechanisms for financing, monitoring and evaluation. Integration must therefore be measured not only by the number of projects announced, but by their ability to transform living conditions in tangible ways.

6. Security and Dignity

Security is a fundamental condition of human dignity. A population that cannot move freely, work, trade, send its children to school or access essential services cannot fully benefit from the promises of integration. ECOWAS must therefore regard security as a regional responsibility extending beyond the fight against terrorism alone.

Security has several dimensions. It is physical when citizens are protected from violence; economic when people have the opportunity to work and provide for themselves; food related when sufficient nourishment is available; and health related when people can access medical care. A credible regional approach must incorporate these different dimensions. Dignity also means that citizens are treated with respect by their governments and by regional institutions, that they can be heard and that mechanisms exist through which they can challenge decisions affecting their rights and interests. ECOWAS will not restore its legitimacy without making this relationship of respect with its populations a practical principle of governance.

7. West Africa’s Youth

Young people represent one of West Africa’s greatest demographic, economic and political forces. They are also among those most exposed to unemployment, precariousness and a lack of opportunities. This makes youth policy far more than a matter of social policy; it is directly connected to political stability and the future of the regional project.

ECOWAS must therefore make employment, skills development and civic participation among young people strategic priorities. But such policies cannot be designed without young people themselves. Their participation in debates and decisions concerning their future has become a question of institutional legitimacy. An institution that fails to engage with the generation expected to shape the region’s future risks widening the gap between regional structures and the societies they are meant to serve.

8. A Connected Generation

West African youth are also a deeply connected generation. Social networks, digital platforms and mobile applications have transformed the ways people communicate, obtain information and mobilize. This transformation represents a major opportunity for bringing institutions closer to citizens, but it also exposes societies to misinformation, manipulation and extremist narratives.

ECOWAS should therefore regard digital technology as an instrument of regional governance. It can use digital platforms to explain its policies, gather citizens’ views and create new spaces for dialogue. The transformation also has an economic dimension: young people can build digital businesses, develop innovative services and reach markets far beyond national borders. For this potential to develop, the regional organization must help create a favourable digital environment based on accessible infrastructure, coherent regulations and improved access to finance.

9. Social Media and the Perception of Regional Politics

Social media now plays a central role in shaping political opinion. An increasing share of citizens obtain information, debate issues and mobilize through digital platforms where verified information, personal opinions, rumours and manipulated content circulate simultaneously. The perception of an institution such as ECOWAS is therefore increasingly shaped within this digital environment.

The organization cannot ignore this transformation. Institutional communication limited to official statements and summit communiqués is no longer sufficient for a connected population. ECOWAS needs a more direct, accessible and responsive digital presence capable of explaining decisions, answering questions and rapidly correcting demonstrably false information. Such communication must nevertheless avoid becoming institutional propaganda. Its credibility will depend above all on its ability to acknowledge legitimate criticism, present its results transparently and establish genuine dialogue with citizens.

10. The Battle of Narratives

The crisis of confidence surrounding ECOWAS also has a narrative dimension. The organization now faces competing narratives that portray it variously as an institution dominated by the interests of coastal states, as a distant bureaucracy disconnected from social realities, or as an extension of former external powers. These perceptions do not always rest on a comprehensive assessment of its record, but they have real political consequences because they shape how populations interpret its decisions.

The response cannot simply be another communication campaign. ECOWAS must build a credible narrative based on tangible results: mobility, security, infrastructure, trade, employment and the protection of populations. It must demonstrate that regional integration can produce visible added value and strengthen the collective capacity of West African societies. The battle of narratives will therefore not be won through words alone, but through the consistency between the organization’s promises and the realities experienced by citizens.

11. The Gap Between Institutions and Populations

One of the principal challenges facing ECOWAS is the distance separating its institutions from the populations they are intended to serve. Many citizens have limited knowledge of its powers, mechanisms and achievements. This distance reinforces the perception of an organization that is remote, predominantly administrative and political, and disconnected from everyday concerns.

Reducing this gap is both a democratic requirement and a condition for effective governance. A regional policy designed without taking account of realities on the ground risks remaining theoretical or encountering resistance during implementation. Civic participation must therefore be understood not as a decorative feature of regional governance, but as an instrument for improving the relevance of public policy. The more populations are involved in defining priorities, the more integration can be perceived as their own project.

12. Rebuilding Trust

Trust is ultimately the most valuable political capital of any regional organization. Yet political crises, sanctions, tensions with the Sahelian states and institutional delays have contributed to weakening confidence in ECOWAS among parts of the population. Reversing this erosion cannot be achieved through a single political declaration. It requires a gradual transformation of the relationship between the organization, member states and citizens.

Rebuilding trust begins with concrete results, greater transparency and a genuine obligation to account for decisions and outcomes. It also requires sustained dialogue with civil society, trade unions, professional organizations, academics, the media and citizens. Such dialogue cannot be occasional or limited to moments of crisis; it must become a permanent component of regional governance.

The fundamental question is therefore no longer simply whether ECOWAS can preserve its institutions, but whether it can rebuild a relationship of trust with the societies it represents. The organization still possesses considerable assets: a significant economic space, decades of institutional experience, mobility mechanisms and a regional architecture that remains indispensable in many areas. But these achievements will not be sufficient if populations no longer see ECOWAS as an instrument capable of addressing their concerns and protecting their interests.

CPGNNews Thesis

ECOWAS can no longer be merely an affair of heads of state. It must become an affair of citizens. This evolution requires a profound change in institutional culture. It does not mean replacing states with populations, but moving regional integration from a predominantly intergovernmental project toward one increasingly carried by societies themselves. Transparency, participation, mobility, employment, security, dignity and accountability must therefore become the criteria by which citizens judge the relevance of regional integration. The next battle for ECOWAS will not be solely institutional or diplomatic. It will be a battle for trust.

VII. THE NEW FRONTIER: DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, AI AND CLIMATE

Regional Integration Confronting Challenges the Old Treaties Never Anticipated

1. West Africa’s Digital Transformation

West Africa is undergoing a profound digital transformation. Mobile phone penetration has reached high levels, fiber optic networks are expanding, and data centers are beginning to emerge across the region. This transformation represents a major opportunity for economic development, public service delivery, and civic participation.

Yet digital transformation also creates new vulnerabilities. Dependence on imported technologies can expose states to risks of technological sovereignty. The digital divide between urban and rural areas, as well as between generations, can deepen existing inequalities. Cyber threats, including hacking, disinformation, and online crime, can also destabilize societies.

ECOWAS therefore needs to develop a regional digital strategy capable of maximizing these opportunities while reducing associated risks. Such a strategy should encompass investment in infrastructure, the development of digital skills, data protection, and the regulation of digital platforms.

2. Infrastructure and Digital Sovereignty

Digital infrastructure, including submarine cables, terrestrial networks, and data centers, constitutes the backbone of the digital economy. West Africa remains heavily dependent on infrastructure owned or operated by foreign companies. This dependence creates vulnerabilities: a cable failure or a unilateral decision by an operator can disrupt connectivity across large parts of the region.

Digital sovereignty has consequently become a strategic issue for ECOWAS. The organization should encourage the development of regional infrastructure, the establishment of local data centers, and the emergence of regional digital champions. It should also engage foreign operators to ensure that networks remain secure, resilient, and reliable.

Digital sovereignty does not mean technological autarky. It means ensuring that decisions concerning infrastructure and data are increasingly made within West Africa and in the interests of West African populations, rather than being determined primarily by external powers.

3. Data and Technological Dependence

Data has become a strategic resource. Digital platforms collect, process, and monetize enormous quantities of user information, while West African states retain limited control over these flows, which are frequently processed in data centers located outside the region.

Technological dependence is equally significant. Software, applications, and operating systems used across West Africa are largely developed by foreign companies. This dependence constrains local innovation capacity and exposes states and societies to forms of technological vulnerability.

ECOWAS should therefore promote the development of a local digital industry. This requires investment in research, the training of engineers and software developers, and support for startups. It also requires local content policies capable of encouraging the development of technological solutions adapted to the specific needs and realities of the region.

4. Artificial Intelligence and Economic Transformation

Artificial intelligence is a technology capable of profoundly transforming West African economies and societies. AI can improve productivity across a wide range of sectors, including agriculture, healthcare, education, transportation, and logistics. It can also contribute to addressing complex challenges such as epidemic forecasting and water resource management.

Yet AI also carries significant risks. Algorithms can reproduce existing biases, while automation can transform or eliminate certain forms of employment. ECOWAS must therefore pursue a balanced approach to AI, maximizing its potential benefits while establishing safeguards against its risks.

AI is also a question of sovereignty. Many of the world’s leading AI models are developed by foreign companies and trained on datasets that do not necessarily reflect West African realities. ECOWAS should therefore encourage the development of regional AI capabilities based on locally relevant data and adapted to West African contexts.

5. AI, Security and Governance

AI has growing applications in the field of security, including intelligence analysis, border surveillance, and conflict prevention. Properly deployed, it can improve the efficiency of security operations and contribute to the anticipation of emerging threats.

At the same time, AI raises serious ethical and legal questions. Mass surveillance, the use of personal data for security purposes, and automated decision making, including in areas such as visa administration, are particularly sensitive issues. ECOWAS should therefore establish standards and regulatory frameworks governing the use of AI in security and public administration.

AI governance is consequently becoming a regional issue. ECOWAS should coordinate the positions of its member states on AI regulation in order to prevent regulatory fragmentation and ensure that emerging technologies are deployed in the service of the public interest.

6. Disinformation and Democracy

Disinformation represents a growing challenge for West African democracies. False information, rumors, and deliberate manipulation can destabilize societies, influence elections, and undermine public confidence in institutions. Social media platforms are often the principal channels through which such information spreads.

ECOWAS should address disinformation by promoting media literacy, quality journalism, and responsible platform governance. It should also support mechanisms capable of identifying and correcting demonstrably false information.

This task is particularly delicate because efforts to combat disinformation can come into tension with freedom of expression. ECOWAS must therefore strike a careful balance between protecting democratic societies from information manipulation and preserving fundamental freedoms.

7. Climate as a Crisis Multiplier

Climate change is increasingly acting as a multiplier of existing crises across West Africa. Droughts, floods, and storms are becoming more frequent and intense, threatening agriculture, livestock, infrastructure, and public health. These pressures can intensify social tensions, forced migration, and competition over natural resources.

ECOWAS has adopted regional policies addressing climate change, including measures for both adaptation and mitigation. Yet the resources devoted to these efforts remain insufficient, while coordination among member states is often limited.

Climate change represents an existential challenge for West Africa. The region is particularly vulnerable and must adapt rapidly and collectively. ECOWAS should therefore make climate resilience and climate action a strategic priority within its regional agenda.

8. Water, Agriculture and Natural Resources

Water is indispensable to agriculture, human consumption, and industry. Climate change is altering patterns of water availability across West African states, raising the possibility that competition over water resources could intensify in the coming years.

Agriculture, which depends heavily on water availability, is also increasingly exposed to climate pressures. Declining agricultural yields could threaten the region’s food security. ECOWAS should therefore develop integrated strategies for water resource management and agricultural adaptation.

Natural resource management is another area in which regional cooperation is indispensable. Shared river basins, including the Niger Basin, require coordination among the states that depend upon them. ECOWAS should strengthen mechanisms for the joint and sustainable management of these shared resources.

9. Population Displacement

Population displacement is one of the major consequences associated with climate change. Communities living in vulnerable areas, including arid regions and low lying coastal zones, may be forced to move toward safer areas. Such internal and cross border movements can generate social tensions, conflicts, and humanitarian challenges.

ECOWAS has established mechanisms for addressing population displacement, but their resources remain limited. The region needs a comprehensive strategy for managing climate related displacement, including the identification of vulnerable areas, displacement planning, protection of displaced populations, and mechanisms for managing social tensions.

Population displacement is also a matter of regional solidarity. The most vulnerable states will require support from their neighbors if climate related mobility is not to develop into broader humanitarian crises.

10. Urbanization and Vulnerability

Rapid urbanization is one of the defining trends shaping contemporary West Africa. Cities are expanding rapidly, often without adequate planning. This growth creates vulnerabilities, including informal settlements, inadequate public services, pollution, and insecurity.

West African cities are also increasingly exposed to climate risks. Flooding, heat waves, and storms can cause extensive damage in densely populated urban areas. ECOWAS should therefore integrate the urban dimension more systematically into its sustainable development policies.

Urbanization, however, is not solely a vulnerability. Cities are also engines of economic growth, employment, and innovation. ECOWAS should support urban policies capable of maximizing these opportunities while reducing the risks associated with uncontrolled or poorly planned expansion.

11. Energy and the Transition

The energy transition is becoming a major strategic issue for West Africa. The region remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, particularly oil and gas, while renewable sources such as solar, wind, and hydropower offer significant opportunities for more sustainable development.

The energy transition is also a matter of security. Reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels can strengthen the region’s energy security and resilience. ECOWAS should therefore encourage investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency.

The transition also requires regional cooperation. Electricity interconnections can help balance energy production and consumption among member states. ECOWAS should strengthen regional interconnection networks and coordinate national energy transition policies.

12. A New Regional Doctrine for the Twenty First Century

The challenges posed by digital transformation, artificial intelligence, and climate change require a new regional doctrine for ECOWAS. This doctrine should integrate these emerging dimensions into the organization’s policies and should be developed in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, young people, and women.

The new doctrine must be flexible and adaptive. Technologies evolve rapidly, while climate related shocks are difficult to predict. ECOWAS therefore needs mechanisms capable of regularly adjusting and revising its policies in response to changing circumstances.

The doctrine must also be inclusive. Populations, young people, women, and local actors should participate in defining and implementing regional policies. Regional integration cannot be designed exclusively within institutional offices without meaningful participation from the citizens it is intended to serve.

Guiding Idea

An organization created in the twentieth century must now govern transformations of the twenty first century.

ECOWAS was established to address the defining challenges of its time: economic integration, trade liberalization, and the construction of a regional space of peace. Those objectives remain relevant, but they now coexist with a new generation of challenges: digital transformation, artificial intelligence, and climate change. ECOWAS must adapt to this changing environment if it is to remain a relevant and effective instrument of regional integration.

VIII. THE CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE: A LESSON FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH

What West Africa Also Says About the Caribbean

1. Why Look at West Africa from the Caribbean?

A Caribbean perspective on West Africa is not merely an academic exercise. It rests on deep historical, cultural and geopolitical parallels. Both regions emerged from interconnected historical processes shaped by the transatlantic slave trade, colonial rule and the struggles for independence. They share languages, including English, French, Portuguese and Spanish, as well as cultural connections and a number of structural challenges involving economic development, security, regional integration and sovereignty.

The parallels, however, are not exclusively historical. They are also political and institutional. CARICOM, like ECOWAS, represents a regional integration project confronted with many of the same fundamental tensions: the relationship between national sovereignty and regional institutions, the difficulty of coordinating states with divergent interests, and the pressure exerted by globalization on relatively vulnerable economies and political systems.

To look at West Africa from the Caribbean is therefore also to look at the Caribbean itself, at its own choices, limitations and possibilities. The experience of ECOWAS offers lessons for CARICOM, while the experience of CARICOM can likewise provide perspectives relevant to West Africa. The comparison is not about reproducing one model in another region. It is about understanding how different societies within the Global South attempt to reconcile sovereignty, cooperation and collective power.

2. ECOWAS and CARICOM: Similarities and Differences

ECOWAS and CARICOM share several fundamental characteristics. Both are regional integration organizations created in the 1970s, with economic and political objectives, and both have struggled with coordination among member states, uneven implementation of regional decisions and questions concerning institutional legitimacy.

Their differences, however, are equally important. ECOWAS encompasses a large and highly diverse region, including states with major differences in population, economic weight, language, political systems and levels of development. Nigeria alone represents a scale of economic and demographic power very different from that of smaller member states such as Cabo Verde or The Gambia. CARICOM operates within a much smaller regional space, composed largely of small states and economies, with a predominantly English speaking institutional environment and, in several respects, greater structural similarities among its members.

These differences shape the nature of integration. ECOWAS must contend with major asymmetries of power, competition among influential states and substantial development gaps. CARICOM faces the particular vulnerabilities of small states, limited domestic markets and strong external economic dependence. Yet both organizations confront the same underlying question: how can states transform geographical proximity and shared interests into meaningful collective capacity?

3. The Permanent Question of Sovereignty

Sovereignty remains central to the institutional choices of both organizations. Member states remain attached to their national prerogatives and are often reluctant to transfer significant authority to regional institutions. This hesitation can limit the depth of integration and slow institutional reform.

In both organizations, the question is fundamentally similar: how can regional integration be advanced without undermining the political authority and identity of individual states? The answer varies according to national circumstances. Some governments are more receptive to regional coordination, while others remain cautious whenever integration appears to constrain their freedom of action.

ECOWAS has historically developed stronger institutional mechanisms in certain areas, including sanctions, peace and security instruments and regional policy frameworks. CARICOM has generally pursued a more flexible model, relying heavily on consultation and consensus. Neither approach is without limitations. Stronger regional mechanisms can increase collective capacity but may provoke resistance from governments determined to preserve national autonomy, while a more consensual system can protect sovereignty but make decisive collective action more difficult.

4. Integration Without Erasing States

Regional integration does not require the disappearance of states. Regional organizations are instruments of cooperation among sovereign states, not necessarily embryonic superstates. This principle remains fundamental to both ECOWAS and CARICOM.

Member states retain primary authority over core sovereign functions such as national defense, internal security and justice. Integration has generally advanced more readily in economic and political fields where cooperation offers identifiable collective benefits. This approach is pragmatic because it recognizes the political realities of sovereignty while allowing states to cooperate where their interests converge.

Its limitation is equally clear. In areas where collective action is most necessary, particularly security and crisis management, national sovereignty can become a source of institutional paralysis. The challenge for regionalism is therefore not to abolish sovereignty but to determine where sovereign interests are better protected through coordinated action.

5. Small and Medium Sized Economies Facing External Powers

CARICOM states are, for the most part, small or medium sized economies that depend heavily on external trade, foreign investment, tourism and international financial flows. ECOWAS presents a more varied picture, ranging from major economies such as Nigeria to much smaller states such as Cabo Verde and The Gambia.

This external dependence raises a broader question of economic sovereignty. Free trade agreements, foreign investment and development assistance can create opportunities, but they can also generate forms of dependency that restrict national policy space. Regional integration can therefore serve as an instrument for strengthening collective bargaining power when negotiating with larger external powers.

For smaller economies in particular, regional organization provides a way to compensate for limited individual weight. Neither the smallest states of the Caribbean nor the smaller economies of West Africa can easily influence major international negotiations on their own. Collective representation can therefore become a form of strategic protection and an expression of shared sovereignty.

6. Collective Security and Regional Vulnerability

Security is a challenge for both regions, although its manifestations differ considerably. The Caribbean faces transnational crime, drug trafficking, irregular migration and the recurrent impact of natural disasters. West Africa faces many of these same challenges, alongside terrorism, armed conflict and severe instability in parts of the Sahel.

Collective security is consequently relevant to both regions. Individual states cannot effectively address transnational threats in isolation. ECOWAS and CARICOM have developed mechanisms for security cooperation, including information sharing, coordinated action and assistance during crises.

Both regions are also vulnerable to the influence of external powers. The United States, the European Union, China, Russia and other actors have strategic, economic or political interests in their respective environments. Regional integration can provide a framework through which these external relationships are managed collectively, allowing states to engage with major powers without abandoning their own strategic interests.

7. Population Mobility

Population mobility is an important issue in both regions. CARICOM has developed arrangements intended to facilitate the movement of citizens within the Community, while ECOWAS has established one of the most significant free movement frameworks in Africa. In both cases, mobility can create opportunities for employment, trade, education and cultural exchange.

Yet mobility can also generate tensions. Competition in labor markets, pressure on public services and concerns about social cohesion can create political resistance to greater freedom of movement. These tensions cannot simply be dismissed; they require institutional responses capable of protecting both the benefits of mobility and the interests of host communities.

Both organizations therefore face the challenge of combining freedom of movement with security, social cohesion, recognition of professional qualifications and appropriate social protections. The credibility of regional integration is partly measured by whether citizens can experience mobility as an opportunity rather than as a source of insecurity.

8. Trade and External Dependencies

Intra regional trade is an important indicator of the depth of economic integration. In both regions, however, trade with external markets remains substantially more important than trade among neighboring states. This reflects the historical orientation of their economies toward international markets and, in several cases, continued dependence on primary commodities.

Economic diversification is therefore a shared objective. Both regions seek to reduce their dependence on raw materials and develop stronger domestic and regional productive capacities. Regional integration can contribute to this objective by combining national markets and creating a larger economic space capable of supporting local industries.

External dependence is also a matter of security. States that rely heavily on imported energy, food or essential goods are vulnerable to international price shocks and disruptions in global supply chains. Stronger regional production and trade can reduce some of these vulnerabilities and create greater resilience.

9. Energy and Food Security

Energy and food are matters of security for both regions. Caribbean economies remain highly dependent on imported fossil fuels, while West Africa presents a more complex picture, with major producers such as Nigeria existing alongside states that remain dependent on imported energy. Both regions are nevertheless exposed to fluctuations in international prices.

Food security presents a similar challenge. Both regions import significant portions of their food supplies, leaving them vulnerable to international crises, climate shocks and disruptions in global markets. Regional integration can contribute to greater food security by strengthening local production, improving regional supply chains and developing collective reserves.

Renewable energy also offers significant opportunities. The Caribbean possesses substantial solar and wind potential, while West Africa has considerable solar, wind and hydropower resources. The energy transition therefore represents not only an environmental imperative but also a promising field for regional cooperation, investment and greater strategic autonomy.

10. Diasporas and the Circulation of Capital

Diasporas play an important role in the economies of both regions. Remittances from migrants represent a significant source of foreign exchange and household income for several CARICOM and ECOWAS states. These financial flows can provide social protection, support consumption and contribute to investment.

The circulation of capital within the regions remains more limited, but significant opportunities exist. Diaspora communities can become channels for investment by directing savings toward productive projects, businesses and infrastructure in their countries and regions of origin.

Diasporas are also political actors. They maintain social, economic and cultural relationships with their countries of origin and can influence public debates and policy choices both in origin countries and in destination societies. Regional organizations should therefore recognize the diaspora not merely as a source of remittances but as a broader strategic component of regional development.

11. Institutional Integration and the Trust Deficit

A deficit of public trust affects both regions. Citizens frequently perceive regional institutions as distant, bureaucratic and insufficiently effective. When populations cannot clearly identify the benefits generated by regional integration, institutional legitimacy becomes increasingly fragile.

The causes are multiple: limited transparency, insufficiently visible results, weak communication and the perception that important decisions are taken without meaningful public consultation. Regional organizations must therefore improve their transparency, communication and capacity to demonstrate tangible outcomes.

Trust is not restored through declarations alone. It is built gradually through credible action, consistent communication and closer relationships with citizens. For both ECOWAS and CARICOM, the challenge is to demonstrate that regional institutions are not distant administrative structures but practical instruments capable of improving the collective position of their populations.

12. West Africa as a Laboratory of Regionalism

West Africa represents an important laboratory of regionalism within the Global South. ECOWAS has accumulated substantial experience in economic integration, political cooperation, peace and security and the management of regional crises. Its successes and failures therefore offer lessons that extend beyond West Africa itself.

The organization has been particularly ambitious in areas such as the free movement of people, regional security cooperation and the defense of constitutional order. These experiences demonstrate both the potential of regional institutions and the limits imposed by political divisions among member states.

ECOWAS has also confronted challenges that other regional organizations may encounter: military coups, political crises, institutional fragmentation and disagreements over the limits of regional authority. The manner in which these challenges are addressed therefore has significance beyond the immediate West African context.

13. What the Caribbean Can Learn from ECOWAS

The Caribbean can draw several lessons from the ECOWAS experience.

The importance of credible enforcement mechanisms. ECOWAS has developed instruments intended to respond to coups and violations of constitutional order. Although these mechanisms have produced mixed results, they demonstrate the value of establishing regional principles backed by credible institutional responses.

The need for regional security capacity. ECOWAS has developed mechanisms for collective security and military deployment that have been used in different crises. The experience illustrates both the value of regional capacity and the political, financial and operational difficulties involved in maintaining it.

The importance of economic integration. ECOWAS has promoted intra regional trade, regional infrastructure and cross border economic activity. These efforts demonstrate that integration can provide a broader economic platform for states whose individual markets are often too small to generate sufficient scale.

The importance of vigilance over governance. ECOWAS has established regional principles concerning democracy and good governance. Its experience shows that regional integration cannot be separated entirely from questions of political legitimacy, constitutional order and institutional accountability.

14. What the Caribbean Can Also Avoid

The Caribbean can also draw lessons from the difficulties experienced by ECOWAS.

Excessive bureaucratization. ECOWAS has sometimes been perceived as a heavy institutional structure characterized by complex and lengthy procedures. CARICOM can seek to preserve institutional efficiency by ensuring that regional mechanisms remain proportionate to their objectives.

The politicization of institutions. Regional institutions can lose credibility when they are perceived as instruments of national political interests. CARICOM therefore has an interest in protecting the independence, neutrality and credibility of its institutions.

The excessive concentration of decision making. When regional decisions are dominated by heads of government, public participation can remain limited. CARICOM can strengthen its legitimacy by expanding the role of civil society, professional organizations, young people and other stakeholders in regional decision making.

CPGNNews Perspective

Regional integration is not the disappearance of sovereignty. It is the capacity to make sovereignty more effective when it is exercised collectively.

This perspective offers a foundation for a pragmatic form of regionalism capable of reconciling integration with diversity, national identities and political autonomy. For both the Caribbean and West Africa, the central question is no longer whether sovereignty should exist, but how sovereign states can use regional cooperation to increase their collective capacity in a world where individual states, particularly smaller ones, increasingly face challenges that they cannot manage alone.

IX. WHAT KIND OF ECOWAS FOR THE NEXT DECADE?

Three Possible Futures for West Africa

The future of ECOWAS can no longer be approached through a single trajectory. The rupture with the member states of the Alliance of Sahel States has profoundly altered the political architecture of West Africa and opened a period of uncertainty whose consequences will likely extend beyond the institutional framework of the organization itself. Over the next decade, several scenarios can be envisaged, ranging from the gradual weakening of ECOWAS to its comprehensive renewal, through partial restoration or a lasting coexistence with the AES. None of these scenarios is predetermined. Their realization will depend on political developments within the member states, the evolution of the security environment, the economic capacity of regional institutions and, above all, their ability to rebuild legitimacy among the populations they are intended to serve.

Scenario 0 — Collapse

Why it remains possible

The collapse of ECOWAS remains an extreme scenario, but it cannot be entirely dismissed. A worsening of political fragmentation, a prolonged deterioration of the security environment, the organization’s inability to respond effectively to crises and a sustained loss of confidence could gradually hollow out the institution. In such a situation, ECOWAS could retain its legal existence while losing much of its political, economic and security capacity, eventually becoming little more than a forum for consultation without genuine regional influence.

The history of regionalism shows that an organization does not necessarily disappear through a dramatic institutional rupture. It can also weaken progressively when its members cease to regard its mechanisms as indispensable. The real danger, therefore, may be less a formal disappearance than a process of functional disintegration, characterized by the multiplication of parallel arrangements, the reduction of common commitments and the gradual transfer of regional functions to alternative frameworks.

Why it remains unlikely

Despite these risks, a full collapse remains unlikely. West African states continue to face challenges that none of them can manage alone: cross border security, trade, population mobility, infrastructure, energy, climate change and crisis management. ECOWAS also possesses five decades of institutional experience, legal mechanisms, administrative networks and an economic architecture that continue to generate concrete interdependencies.

The cost of an effective disappearance of the organization would also be substantial. Fragmentation would not eliminate common problems; it would instead reduce the collective capacity available to address them. Collapse would therefore require states to accept significant economic, political and security costs in exchange for greater institutional autonomy. That equation remains difficult to justify in a region where interdependence remains deep.

The economic and human cost of disintegration

A lasting disintegration would have consequences extending far beyond regional institutions. The multiplication of barriers to trade could disrupt supply chains and increase transportation costs; political uncertainty could discourage investment; and regional projects in infrastructure, energy and mobility could be delayed or abandoned. Politically, the disappearance of a common framework for mediation would reduce the region’s capacity to manage crises collectively.

The human cost could be even greater. In a region characterized by extensive cross border mobility, commercial exchanges and shared security threats, excessive institutional fragmentation could directly affect populations, particularly border communities, mobile workers and economic actors dependent on regional corridors. The collapse of ECOWAS would therefore not simply mean the disappearance of an organization; it could produce a more fragmented, more expensive and more vulnerable regional environment.

Scenario 1: Restoration

A gradual return to the former model

Restoration would involve a gradual return toward an architecture broadly resembling the one that existed before the current crisis. The AES states could re establish relations with ECOWAS following political negotiations, changing circumstances or a reassessment of their security and economic priorities. Such a development would make it possible to progressively restore institutional mechanisms, normalize relations and revive selected common policies.

This scenario would not necessarily mean a simple return to the status quo ante. The current crisis has exposed deep tensions concerning regional governance, sanctions, sovereignty and perceptions of ECOWAS. Any lasting restoration would therefore have to incorporate at least some of the lessons of the rupture.

Necessary political conditions

Restoration would require several developments to converge: changes in the political positions of the AES states, greater flexibility on the part of ECOWAS in managing political crises and a sufficiently improved security environment to permit renewed institutional dialogue. It would also require a political willingness on both sides to move beyond the increasingly entrenched narratives of confrontation.

The issue of sanctions would be particularly important. While sanctions have served as an instrument of pressure intended to defend constitutional order, their perception in parts of the region has contributed to the view that ECOWAS represents a confrontation between regional institutions and national sovereignty. A credible restoration would therefore need to find a new balance between defending shared principles and recognizing national political realities.

Obstacles and limitations

The obstacles remain substantial. The AES states have created their own mechanisms of cooperation and developed a shared political identity that would not necessarily disappear even if relations with ECOWAS improved. ECOWAS, for its part, would have to acknowledge that the crisis has also exposed weaknesses within its own institutional model.

Restoration would therefore be possible, but it would not be sustainable if it merely reinstated previous mechanisms without addressing the underlying causes of the rupture. Its probability can be regarded as low to moderate in the medium term, with its prospects heavily dependent on political and security developments across the region.

Scenario 2: Coexistence

ECOWAS and the AES as separate blocs

Coexistence represents another trajectory, and perhaps a more realistic one than a complete return to the previous regional order. Under this configuration, ECOWAS and the AES would retain their respective structures, political orientations and institutional frameworks while avoiding permanent confrontation. The rupture would become a durable reality, but it would not necessarily evolve into systematic hostility.

Such coexistence would recognize a fundamental reality: institutional boundaries do not correspond to economic, social or geographical boundaries. Populations would continue to move, goods would still need to travel through the same corridors and shared resources would continue to require coordination.

Sectoral cooperation

Cooperation could therefore develop in areas where common interests are strong enough to transcend political differences. Cross border security, trade, transportation, energy, natural resource management, counter trafficking efforts and selected diplomatic issues could become areas of functional cooperation.

Such an approach would not seek to restore full institutional integration. It would instead prioritize pragmatic mechanisms negotiated on a case by case basis, capable of addressing the concrete needs of populations and economies. Cooperation would become less ideological and more operational.

Mobility, trade and security

Preserving mobility and trade would be one of the principal tests of coexistence. Millions of people depend on cross border exchanges for their livelihoods, while the landlocked economies of the Sahel remain structurally connected to the ports and corridors of coastal states. A complete disruption of these flows would therefore be costly for the entire region.

Security would constitute another imperative. Armed groups, criminal networks and trafficking operations do not stop at institutional boundaries. Even if politically separated, ECOWAS and the AES would have strong incentives to maintain forms of operational coordination. This very necessity could push both spaces toward a form of functional regionalism in which cooperation is determined less by political affinity than by interdependence.

A new form of pragmatic regionalism

Coexistence could therefore give rise to a new form of West African regionalism, less centralized and less institutionally ambitious, but more strongly oriented toward practical results. It would not eliminate political differences between the two blocs; rather, it would seek to prevent those differences from destroying the mechanisms essential to the region’s economic and social life.

This scenario could prove durable precisely because it would accept the plurality of political trajectories while maintaining a minimum level of functional interdependence.

Scenario 3: Renewal

A more flexible ECOWAS

Renewal would be the most ambitious scenario. It would require not merely repairing existing mechanisms but fundamentally reconsidering the very conception of regional integration. ECOWAS would become more flexible, more adaptive and more strongly focused on results. Sanctions mechanisms could be reassessed, procedures simplified and member states granted greater room for maneuver in selected areas without abandoning the organization’s fundamental objectives.

Such reform would begin from a simple observation: sustainable integration cannot be built solely on treaties and institutions; it must also generate visible and credible benefits for states and their populations.

Integration centered on results

The new ECOWAS would therefore place concrete achievements above institutional declarations. Regional infrastructure, trade facilitation, energy, mobility, employment, agricultural transformation and digital development would become central indicators of integration performance.

This approach would bring the organization closer to its original purpose: making integration an instrument of development rather than an institutional architecture detached from everyday realities.

A new security architecture

Renewal would also require a new security architecture. This could strengthen intelligence sharing, regional response capabilities and coordination among states while seeking pragmatic forms of cooperation with AES countries. Security could no longer be understood solely as an institutional issue; it would have to be linked to development, governance, counter trafficking efforts and conflict prevention.

A new economic architecture

Economically, renewal would seek to deepen integration around trade, infrastructure, energy, industrialization and digital transformation. The objective would be to gradually convert the size of the regional market into genuine economic power while developing mechanisms capable of distributing the benefits of integration more evenly among member states.

This redistributive dimension would be essential. An integration process perceived as benefiting primarily the most powerful economies or major urban centers risks generating new frustrations. Regional cohesion therefore also depends on the ability to make the benefits of integration visible in communities and households.

The place of citizens

Renewal would finally place citizens at the center of the regional project. Participation, transparency, accountability and access to information could no longer be treated as secondary considerations. Permanent consultation mechanisms would allow civil society organizations, professional associations, young people and other social actors to participate more directly in shaping regional policies.

The legitimacy of the next ECOWAS will depend less on the sophistication of its institutions than on the ability of ordinary people to understand their purpose and recognize their results.

Digital transformation and climate

A renewed ECOWAS would also need to fully integrate the transformations already reshaping economies and societies: digitalization, artificial intelligence, the energy transition and climate change. These issues can no longer be treated as peripheral policy areas. They directly affect economic competitiveness, security, employment, sovereignty and societal resilience across West Africa.

Regional cooperation could allow states to pool certain investments, harmonize regulations and strengthen their collective capacity to respond to major technological and environmental transformations.

Relations with the AES

Under a renewal scenario, relations with the AES would not necessarily have to be framed in terms of return or exclusion. A more flexible architecture could allow different levels of participation and cooperation depending on the sector and the interests involved. The principle would be to preserve as many essential areas of cooperation as possible, even where full institutional integration remains impossible.

This approach would acknowledge a fundamental reality: the region can be politically fragmented without becoming economically, socially or geographically disintegrated.

The Most Plausible Scenario?

A fourth possibility: hybridization

Given current dynamics, the most plausible scenario may ultimately correspond to none of the three preceding models in pure form. It could take the form of hybridization, combining elements of restoration, coexistence and renewal. ECOWAS could remain the principal regional architecture while becoming more flexible, while the AES would retain its own political and institutional framework.

This hybridization could take the form of an ECOWAS based on variable geometry, in which groups of states move at different speeds in selected areas; enhanced cooperation, allowing groups of states to pursue deeper collaboration in particular sectors; or strategic partnerships, including arrangements with the AES and other regional organizations.

The value of such a model would lie precisely in its refusal to impose institutional uniformity on a region that has become politically more diverse. It would preserve essential interdependencies while recognizing the plurality of political choices. It would be less ambitious than a model of comprehensive integration, but potentially more resilient because it would begin from existing realities rather than seek to deny them.

The next decade may therefore be neither the decade of ECOWAS’s disappearance nor that of a simple return to the past. It may instead become a period of gradual transformation in West African regionalism, moving from a model based primarily on institutional uniformity toward one built more strongly around flexibility, functionality and measurable results. The real question, then, may no longer be simply whether ECOWAS will survive, but what form of regionalism West Africa will be capable of creating in order to remain politically diverse without becoming economically and humanly divided.

CPGNNews Strategic Outlook

BEYOND RESTORATION: THE CASE FOR STRATEGIC RENEWAL

The central question is no longer whether ECOWAS can restore the regional order that existed before the current crisis, but what kind of regional architecture West Africa can build in light of the realities now confronting it. The rupture with the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States, the institutional weaknesses exposed by successive political crises, persistent security threats, economic interdependence, and the rapid transformation of West African societies have profoundly altered the environment in which the organization must operate. The challenge is therefore not merely institutional. It is strategic. It concerns the region’s capacity to preserve spaces for cooperation, provide regional public goods, and maintain a degree of cohesion despite increasingly divergent political trajectories.

The ECOWAS that emerges from this period is unlikely to be either a simple continuation of the previous model or a rejection of the achievements accumulated since 1975. It will instead have to find a new balance between integration and sovereignty, between common principles and political diversity, and between institutional ambition and operational effectiveness. Its ability to adapt will be one of the decisive factors shaping the organization’s future.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

DOES ECOWAS NEED TO REINVENT ITSELF?

1. A Crisis That Goes Beyond the Institutional Question

Since its creation in 1975, ECOWAS has progressively expanded its scope, evolving from a primarily economic project into a regional architecture also involved in governance, security, free movement and political stability. This evolution is one of the major achievements of West African regionalism. It demonstrates the ability of an organization created under very different historical circumstances to adapt its instruments to changes in its environment.

The current crisis nevertheless exposes the limits of that trajectory. The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has made visible a political divide that cannot be reduced to a simple institutional dispute. It reflects divergent perceptions of sovereignty, security, governance and the role of regional organizations in shaping national choices. It also comes at a time when the region is simultaneously facing escalating armed violence, economic vulnerabilities, demographic transformation, climate pressures and growing public demand for tangible results.

From this perspective, the ECOWAS crisis can be understood as a transitional phase. It does not necessarily signal the disappearance of the regional project, but it does require its foundations, methods and priorities to be reconsidered. The issue is therefore not whether an institutional structure can be preserved for its own sake, but whether that structure remains capable of addressing the strategic needs of contemporary West Africa.

2. What the Freetown Sequence Reveals

The political sequence surrounding the Freetown summit illustrates the search for a new equilibrium. The renewal of the organization’s political leadership, the emphasis placed on security concerns and the continued willingness to preserve a channel of dialogue with the AES countries point to a growing recognition that the regional environment has changed. These developments suggest that the response to the crisis can no longer rely exclusively on traditional mechanisms of institutional pressure.

They do not, however, resolve the organization’s structural difficulties. The question of trust remains central, both among governments and between regional institutions and the populations they are intended to serve. Security remains decisive, while economic integration must still demonstrate its capacity to deliver benefits sufficiently visible to reinforce public support. The legitimacy crisis therefore cannot be overcome through changes of personnel or isolated decisions. It requires a deeper transformation in the way ECOWAS defines its priorities, exercises its responsibilities and accounts for its actions.

3. The Conditions for Strategic Survival

The first condition is trust. A regional organization cannot exercise durable authority without a minimum level of political confidence among its members and sufficient legitimacy among its populations. Such confidence requires predictable rules, consistent application of principles, greater transparency and the institutional capacity to acknowledge the limits of its own instruments.

The second condition is collective security. The multiplication of transnational threats demonstrates that no single state can sustainably address the region’s security challenges alone. Intelligence cooperation, border management, counter trafficking efforts, conflict prevention and the protection of economic corridors will remain indispensable, including within a more fragmented institutional environment. In this respect, the search for functional cooperation with the AES countries could become more important than the immediate pursuit of full political convergence.

The third condition is economic. Integration will retain its legitimacy only if it improves living conditions in tangible ways. Regional trade, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, industrial transformation, professional mobility and digitalization are the areas in which ECOWAS can most directly demonstrate its relevance. A regional organization is strongest when its populations can identify the benefits of its existence in their everyday lives.

The fourth condition is civic ownership. The future of ECOWAS cannot be built indefinitely around heads of state summits and intergovernmental mechanisms alone. Young people, businesses, universities, professional organizations, the media and civil society must have greater opportunities to participate in shaping the regional project. Engagement with populations is no longer merely a democratic addition. It has become a condition of legitimacy and effectiveness.

4. Toward a More Pragmatic West African Regionalism

The evolution of the regional system points toward a form of regionalism that will probably be more complex than the model envisioned when ECOWAS was established. The organization may remain one of West Africa’s principal frameworks for cooperation while operating in an environment in which several levels of organization, alliances and cooperation mechanisms coexist.

This development should not necessarily be interpreted as a failure of regionalism. It may also represent a form of variable geometry regionalism, in which states cooperate more closely in certain sectors while retaining greater freedom of action in others. Security, trade, energy, infrastructure, mobility and the management of shared resources could become areas of pragmatic cooperation regardless of deeper political disagreements.

The central challenge will be preventing this diversification of cooperation frameworks from becoming permanent fragmentation. Institutional pluralism can coexist with regional interdependence, provided that channels of dialogue remain open, minimum common rules are preserved and sufficiently strong shared interests continue to hold the West African space together.

5. A Lesson That Extends Beyond West Africa

The ECOWAS experience now extends beyond the West African context. It represents an instructive case for the Global South because it demonstrates that regional integration never advances in a straight line. It progresses when institutions succeed in transforming interdependence into common interests, but retreats when populations or governments conclude that the costs of integration outweigh its benefits.

It also demonstrates that sovereignty and integration are not necessarily contradictory. In an international environment shaped by economic competition, technological transformation, climate risks and new forms of conflict, certain dimensions of sovereignty can be exercised effectively only through cooperation. The real question is therefore not whether to choose between national sovereignty and regional integration, but in which areas the collective exercise of certain capacities enables states to strengthen rather than diminish their autonomy.

Finally, the West African experience reminds us that regional power cannot be measured solely by the size of a market, the number of member states or the existence of common institutions. It depends on the capacity to translate these assets into concrete outcomes: security, prosperity, mobility and public confidence. It is precisely on this terrain that the next phase of West African regionalism will be decided.

THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE: DELIVERING RESULTS

The future of ECOWAS will probably be determined neither by a simple restoration of the previous model nor by the multiplication of new institutions. It will depend above all on its ability to demonstrate its relevance in a profoundly transformed environment. A regional organization retains its value when it enables its members to achieve together what would be more difficult to accomplish separately, when it protects shared interests and when it produces benefits that populations can actually perceive.

West Africa is therefore entering a period in which the institutional question will gradually give way to a more fundamental one: what can regional integration still deliver in a space that is politically fragmented but economically, socially, geographically and environmentally interdependent? The answer will shape not only the future of ECOWAS, but also the form of African regionalism over the coming decade.

CPGNNews Strategic Outlook

The future of ECOWAS will not be determined by nostalgia for its past model, but by its capacity to transform West Africa’s interdependence into a renewed collective capacity for action. Its credibility will depend less on the force of its declarations than on the quality of its results; less on the centrality of its institutions than on their usefulness; and less on restoring an old order than on building a regional order adapted to the realities of the twenty first century.

ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE 1: THE FIFTEEN FOUNDING FATHERS OF ECOWAS (1975)

Founding State	Head of State in 1975	Status
Benin	Mathieu Kérékou	Military
Burkina Faso	Sangoulé Lamizana	Military
Côte d’Ivoire	Félix Houphouët-Boigny	Civilian
The Gambia	Dawda Kairaba Jawara	Civilian
Ghana	Ignatius Kutu Acheampong	Military
Guinea	Ahmed Sékou Touré	Civilian
Guinea-Bissau	Luís Cabral	Civilian
Liberia	William Tolbert	Civilian
Mali	Moussa Traoré	Military
Mauritania	Moktar Ould Daddah	Civilian
Niger	Seyni Kountché	Military
Nigeria	Yakubu Gowon	Military
Senegal	Léopold Sédar Senghor	Civilian
Sierra Leone	Siaka Stevens	Military
Togo	Gnassingbé Eyadéma	Military

Source: ECOWAS official website

ENCLOSURE 2: ECOWAS: TIMELINE (1975–2026)

• 1975: Treaty of Lagos signed; ECOWAS established with 15 member states.
• 1977: Cape Verde joins ECOWAS, bringing membership to 16 states.
• 1978: Protocol on Non-Aggression adopted.
• 1990: ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) established and deployed in Liberia.

• 1993: Treaty of Lagos revised; regional institutions strengthened.
• 1997: ECOWAS intervenes in Liberia.
• 1998: ECOWAS forces deployed in Sierra Leone.
• 2000: Mauritania withdraws from ECOWAS, reducing membership to 15 states.
• 2001: Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted.
• 2011: ECOWAS Commission established.
• 2013: Integrated Maritime Security Strategy adopted.
• 2020: Military coup in Mali.
• 2021: Military coup in Guinea.
• 2022: Military coups in Burkina Faso.
• 2023: Military coup in Niger; Alliance of Sahel States (AES) established.
• 2024: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announce their intention to withdraw from ECOWAS.

• 2025: Withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger takes effect on 29 January; attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau on 26 November.

• 2026: 69th ECOWAS Summit held in Freetown on 19 July; Bassirou Diomaye Faye elected Chair of the Authority of Heads of State and Government; General Birame Diop appointed President of the Commission.

Source: SWI / ECOWAS

ENCLOSURE 3: CURRENT COMPOSITION OF ECOWAS (2026)

Member State	Year of Accession
Benin	1975
Cape Verde	1977
Côte d’Ivoire	1975
The Gambia	1975
Ghana	1975
Guinea	1975
Guinea-Bissau	1975
Liberia	1975
Nigeria	1975
Senegal	1975
Sierra Leone	1975
Togo	1975

Source: ECOWAS / SWI

ENCLOSURE 4: WITHDRAWING STATES: BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER

Indicator	Value
Population of the three states (2025)	≈ 68 million
Share of ECOWAS population before withdrawal	16%
Share of ECOWAS economy	7%
People facing food insecurity (2025)	7.5 million

Source: ECOWAS Club / Afrique Diplomatique

ENCLOSURE 5: AES GROWTH INDICATORS (2025)

State	2025 Growth Rate	Main Factors
Niger	+6.9%	Crude oil, agriculture, production
Burkina Faso	+5.0%	Services, agriculture, gold
Mali	+4.9%	Moderate slowdown
AES overall	+5.5%	—

Source: BIDC Annual Report 2025

ENCLOSURE 6- BIDC: FINANCIAL INDICATORS AND MEMBER-STATE DISCIPLINE (2025)

Indicator	Change
Operating income	+17.12%
Profit	+13.28%
Total assets	+21.15%

Repayment Position

Status	States Concerned
No capital arrears	Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana
With arrears	Twelve other member states

Source: Cauris / BIDC Activity Report 2025

ENCLOSURE 7: ECOWAS PARLIAMENT BUDGET

Fiscal Year	Amount in UA	Execution Rate (30/06/2024)
2024 (approved)	23,215,994	Revenue: 37%; Expenditure: 27%
2025 (draft)	23,371,350	+0.67% compared with 2024
2025–2027 cycle	Budget envelope maintained	No increase

Source: ATOP

ENCLOSURE 8:  REGIONAL PROJECTS AND INVESTMENT

Indicator	Value
Companies benefiting from the Trade Liberalisation Scheme	+15,000
Products circulating with tariff advantages	+50,000
Regional projects identified	201
Estimated cost of projects	€131 billion
Countries involved in energy interconnection	14
Intra-community trade as a share of total trade	12–15%

Source: Africa24 TV / ECOWAS REPORT

ENCLOSURE 9: ECOWAS AND CARICOM

Similarities and Differences

• Similarities: Both are regional integration organizations created in the 1970s, facing challenges related to coordination among member states, policy implementation, and legitimacy among their populations.

• Differences: ECOWAS is larger, more linguistically diverse, and characterized by greater disparities in levels of development.

ENCLOSURE 10: THE THREE FUTURES OF ECOWAS

• Restoration: A gradual return to the previous model, including the possible reintegration of the AES states.

• Coexistence: Functional separation between ECOWAS and the AES, combined with sector-specific cooperation.

• Refoundation: A profound reform of ECOWAS, with greater flexibility, tangible results, and a central role for citizens.

• Hybridization: A combination of these scenarios, resulting in a variable-geometry ECOWAS.

DOCUMENTATION AND METHODOLOGY

This dossier was developed as a Global Strategic Study, in accordance with the methodology used in established strategic research and policy analysis. Its documentation combines institutional, academic and journalistic sources, with particular emphasis on data verification, source comparison and analytical rigor.

Institutional sources: ECOWAS, African Union, member states, CARICOM, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank and United Nations.

Security sources: Specialized datasets and reports, with a systematic distinction between verified information and estimates.

Economic sources: National and regional statistics covering trade, energy, infrastructure and investment.

Academic sources: Scholarly research on African regionalism, coups, Sahelian security and economic integration.

Journalistic sources: Used to document events, developments and official statements, but never treated as the sole basis for strategic analysis.

CPGNNews Editorial Principle: When a figure is disputed or varies significantly between sources, we identify the discrepancy rather than arbitrarily selecting the figure that best serves our argument.

CPGNNews Global Strategic Study — August 2026

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