Analysis by Alejandro Valmont | CPGNNews
10 SEPTEMBER 2026
Thinking the Caribbean, Understanding the World!
The U.S. strike carried out on 9 September 2026 against a vessel described by the U.S. Southern Command as being engaged in narcotrafficking routes in the Caribbean Sea represents far more than another episode in the fight against transnational trafficking. According to the U.S. military command, an operation conducted by the Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere targeted a fast-moving vessel and killed three individuals described as “narco terrorists.” Reuters, however, reported that it had been unable to independently verify the U.S. account. Beyond the immediate controversy surrounding the nature of the target and the circumstances of the operation, the strike comes at a moment when maritime security, the fight against criminal networks, control of commercial routes, protection of critical infrastructure, energy vulnerabilities and competition among major powers are increasingly converging.
The central question, therefore, is no longer simply how to combat narcotrafficking. It concerns the gradual transformation of the Caribbean into a space where issues once addressed separately are increasingly becoming interconnected. Maritime security now intersects with geopolitics, energy with sovereignty, national crises with regional stability, and infrastructure with power. Cuba is experiencing a profound energy and social crisis while tensions with Washington remain acute. Haiti is facing a security, humanitarian and institutional crisis whose consequences extend well beyond its borders. At the same time, disruptions in global energy markets are once again exposing the vulnerability of island economies and small states dependent on imports.
The Caribbean can therefore no longer be regarded merely as a peripheral space observed from Washington, Beijing, Brussels or other capitals. It is once again becoming a strategic theatre in which military, economic, energy, commercial and diplomatic interests of the highest order converge. The fundamental question now is whether the states and societies of the region will be capable of transforming this renewed geopolitical centrality into collective agency, or whether they will once again accept that their strategic environment be defined primarily by the strategies of others.
A STRIKE THAT CHANGES THE NATURE OF THE DEBATE
The U.S. operation of 9 September deserves particular attention because it illustrates an important evolution in the way Washington is now responding to threats associated with maritime trafficking. For decades, the fight against narcotrafficking in the Caribbean has relied primarily on surveillance, intelligence, interdiction, law-enforcement cooperation, coast guard operations and coordination with regional states. The use of force has never been entirely absent from this security environment, but the dominant logic has remained one of interdiction and arrest. The resort to a lethal strike against a vessel suspected of travelling along narcotrafficking routes introduces a different dimension, inevitably raising questions concerning the characterization of the threat, the applicable legal framework, the sovereignty of the states concerned and the circumstances under which a military operation may replace traditional maritime law-enforcement mechanisms.
It is precisely this evolution that gives the event significance beyond the immediate operational toll. When a vessel suspected of involvement in drug trafficking is presented by U.S. authorities as the object of a military response, the boundary between domestic security, transnational criminality and strategic threat becomes increasingly difficult to define. The terminology used by U.S. authorities, including the expression “narco terrorists,” contributes to this conceptual shift. That designation represents the position of U.S. authorities and should not be presented by CPGNNews as an independently established legal classification. It may nevertheless alter the political and operational perception of the intervention and have significant consequences for how neighbouring governments assess their own security cooperation with Washington.
The Caribbean is therefore confronted with an issue that extends beyond the American response itself. States across the region must contend with genuine threats, including narcotrafficking, arms trafficking, organized crime, human trafficking and transnational corruption. At the same time, they must preserve their ability to determine for themselves how security is managed within their territorial waters and areas of jurisdiction. Effective security cooperation should not lead to the gradual disappearance of Caribbean states’ sovereign responsibilities. On the contrary, it should strengthen their institutional, judicial, maritime and policing capacities so that international cooperation takes place between partners capable of exercising their own responsibilities.
This is where one of the fundamental challenges of the new Caribbean environment lies. The more important the region becomes to the security strategies of major powers, the more central the question of regional sovereignty becomes. The Caribbean cannot be sustainably stabilized through a succession of external operations if the states that comprise it do not themselves possess the institutions required to control their territories, secure their ports, protect their populations and confront criminal networks. Military power can disrupt a criminal operation. It cannot, by itself, rebuild a state, restore credible justice or create the economic conditions that permanently reduce the appeal of criminal economies.
THE CARIBBEAN SEA BECOMES STRATEGIC AGAIN
The renewed centrality of the Caribbean begins with geography. Located in immediate proximity to the North American continent and connected to the wider Atlantic, American and global spaces, the region constitutes a crossroads of maritime routes, ports, energy corridors, commercial networks and digital infrastructure. Undersea cables carrying an essential share of international communications, port facilities, energy terminals, tourism zones and maritime routes form a strategic system whose significance extends far beyond the borders of the island and coastal states in which these assets are located.
This geographical importance becomes even more apparent when maritime security is viewed as an integrated system. Narcotrafficking represents only one component of a broader network involving illicit financial flows, smuggling, arms trafficking, transnational criminal organizations and institutional vulnerabilities. The same maritime routes that facilitate the legitimate movement of goods can be exploited by clandestine networks. The same ports that sustain regional commerce can become points of vulnerability. The same digital infrastructures that connect economies can be exposed to cybersecurity risks and technological rivalries.
Energy adds another layer to this strategic centrality. The dependence of several Caribbean economies on imported hydrocarbons means that international disruptions can rapidly become national crises. A rise in oil prices affects transportation, electricity generation, the cost of goods, agriculture, cold-chain systems and public services, ultimately placing additional pressure on household purchasing power. Island geography often amplifies these effects because opportunities for substitution are limited and logistical costs can be high.
Economic vulnerability is now compounded by a climate and environmental dimension that is also reshaping the concept of security. Hurricanes, rising sea levels, coastal erosion, damage to infrastructure and population displacement can further weaken states already facing severe fiscal constraints. Caribbean security therefore cannot be conceived solely in military terms. It must encompass energy, food, climate, health, digital and institutional security. It is precisely this accumulation of vulnerabilities that makes the region strategically important to the outside world while simultaneously exposing it to the consequences of decisions made elsewhere.
CUBA: ANOTHER FACE OF THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS
The Cuban crisis illustrates another dimension of the Caribbean’s strategic fragility. On 4 September, the U.S. Embassy in Havana issued a health alert reporting an increase in intestinal illnesses and diarrhoeal diseases associated with deteriorating water and electricity infrastructure. Reuters also reported that the deterioration was affecting water supplies as well as food preservation and temperature control. The situation underscores a fundamental reality: when an energy system becomes fragile, supply difficulties do not remain confined to the electricity sector. They also affect access to water, sanitary conditions and the ability of public services to function normally.
The crisis is unfolding within an already deeply confrontational political environment between Havana and Washington. The United States continues to employ economic sanctions as an instrument of pressure against the Cuban government, while Cuban authorities attribute a significant share of the country’s difficulties to U.S. measures and the constraints affecting energy supplies. These two interpretations cannot simply be conflated. The structural weaknesses of the Cuban economy, the economic policies pursued by the government and the effects of U.S. sanctions must be examined separately if a complex crisis is not to be reduced to a single explanatory framework.
The economic pressure exerted by Washington nevertheless possesses an unmistakable geopolitical dimension. Sanctions targeting Cuban officials and companies form part of a broader strategy intended to place pressure on the government in Havana. At the same time, Cuba is seeking to attract greater foreign investment and reform certain economic mechanisms in an effort to reduce bureaucratic obstacles and support trade and tourism. The Cuban crisis therefore represents the intersection of several forces: domestic structural difficulties, energy constraints, external sanctions, the search for new economic partners and a determination to preserve a political autonomy deeply rooted in the country’s history.
This situation is helping to place Cuba once again at the centre of regional strategic calculations. Its geographical position, historical weight, international relationships and role in the political balance of the Caribbean make it an actor that cannot be separated from the region’s emerging dynamics. The Cuban question is therefore not simply a matter of relations between Washington and Havana. It forms part of a broader transformation of the Caribbean geopolitical environment, in which energy, sovereignty, sanctions and international partnerships are becoming increasingly interconnected.
HAITI, THE WEAKEST LINK
If Cuba represents one of the region’s most significant expressions of energy and political vulnerability, Haiti today represents one of its most acute forms of institutional and security fragility. United Nations figures illustrate the scale of a crisis that can no longer be regarded as an exclusively national phenomenon. During the first quarter of 2026, at least 1,642 people were killed and 745 injured in violence documented by the United Nations system. Violence also expanded beyond the capital, particularly into the Artibonite and Centre departments.
By the beginning of June, approximately 1.5 million people had been internally displaced. At the same time, UNICEF estimated that 2.8 million children were in need of humanitarian assistance and that nearly 5.7 million people were facing, or at risk of facing, high levels of acute food insecurity. These figures do not describe a humanitarian crisis alone. They reveal the simultaneous erosion of security, economic activity, governance, public services and social cohesion.
The regional dimension of the Haitian crisis is now impossible to ignore. When populations are displaced on a massive scale, supply chains are disrupted, judicial and administrative institutions lose their ability to function and criminal networks gain significant territorial space, the consequences inevitably spread to neighbouring countries. Migration, trafficking, illicit financial flows and pressure on regional security mechanisms consequently become collective concerns.
Yet treating Haiti exclusively through a security lens would constitute a strategic error. The Haitian crisis is also a crisis of a state whose institutional capacities must be rebuilt, an economy that must recover sustainable engines of growth, and a population that must regain meaningful access to justice, education, healthcare, employment and security. An effective regional policy toward Haiti should therefore combine security, institutional reconstruction, economic development and humanitarian protection. Military or policing responses may be necessary under certain circumstances, but they cannot become a permanent substitute for a strategy of national reconstruction.
Haiti’s geographical position gives it particular importance within the Caribbean strategic architecture. Located at the heart of major regional maritime routes and sharing the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic, Haiti sits at the intersection of multiple migration, commercial and security dynamics. Its stabilization is therefore not simply a matter of international solidarity. It is also a strategic interest for the Caribbean as a whole and for external partners seeking to secure maritime routes, trade and regional infrastructure.
ENERGY HAS BECOME A GEOPOLITICAL WEAPON
Energy gives the Caribbean crisis an additional strategic depth. On 9 September, Brent crude moved above $100 a barrel amid rising tensions in the Middle East and disruptions to maritime transportation. On 10 September, Brent remained above that threshold, at around $100.50. For Caribbean economies dependent on imported hydrocarbons, such a development is not merely a financial phenomenon. It can quickly become a national security issue because it simultaneously increases the cost of transportation, electricity, agricultural production and essential imports.
This vulnerability demonstrates why energy must now be regarded as a central component of sovereignty. A state may possess complete legal sovereignty while remaining deeply vulnerable if it controls neither its energy supplies nor its critical infrastructure nor the mechanisms necessary to protect its population from international shocks. In this context, the energy transition is no longer simply an environmental question. It is also a strategic one.
For Caribbean states, the development of renewable energy could gradually reduce this vulnerability, provided that it forms part of a coherent regional strategy. Solar and wind power, geothermal energy in territories possessing the necessary potential, and improvements to electricity grids could all contribute to strengthening energy resilience. Yet such a transition requires substantial investment, transparent governance and forms of cooperation that allow small states to pool technical and financial capabilities.
The challenge extends beyond electricity generation. Ports, energy terminals, telecommunications networks, data centres, undersea cables and transportation systems now constitute a critical infrastructure architecture whose protection is becoming a national and regional security concern. Those who control, finance or secure these infrastructures inevitably exercise influence over the strategic environment in which states operate. Global competition for the Caribbean will therefore be shaped as much by infrastructure and investment as by security operations.
CAN THE CARIBBEAN REMAIN OUTSIDE THE NEW GLOBAL COMPETITION?
The answer is becoming increasingly difficult to affirm. The United States possesses an exceptional historical, geographical and security interest in the region, but it is no longer the only actor seeking economic or strategic influence across the Caribbean. China, the European Union, Canada, Latin American countries and other international partners are likewise seeking to expand their commercial, diplomatic, technological and infrastructure relationships with Caribbean states.
This multiplication of actors could represent a considerable opportunity for the region. Diversifying partnerships theoretically allows small states to negotiate better terms, reduce certain dependencies and gain access to additional capital, technologies and markets. But it also creates risks when governments lack sufficiently coherent national and regional strategies. Under those circumstances, diversification can become multiple dependency rather than genuine strategic autonomy.
The essential question therefore becomes one of bargaining power. An individual Caribbean state possesses limited leverage when negotiating with a major economic or military power. A region capable of coordinating certain common positions, by contrast, can exert greater influence in trade, energy, environmental and security negotiations. Regional integration therefore has significance beyond economics. It can become an instrument of collective sovereignty.
The Caribbean already possesses numerous regional institutions, but the new global competition may require a higher level of strategic coordination. Maritime security, energy infrastructure, cybersecurity, disaster management, migration and the protection of natural resources are areas in which national borders are often insufficient. The objective is not to create a bloc hostile to any particular power. It is to enable the region to engage with all major powers from a position of its own, with the capacity to define its interests and defend them.
THE RISK OF TREATING THE CARIBBEAN SOLELY AS A SECURITY SPACE
The rise of security concerns could lead to a dangerously reductive interpretation of the Caribbean. If the region is defined primarily as a narcotrafficking corridor, a migration zone, a maritime surveillance area or a potential theatre of military intervention, its other strategic dimensions risk being progressively marginalized. A region does not become stable simply because it is monitored more intensely. It becomes stable when its institutions, economies and societies possess the capacities necessary to absorb shocks and reduce the factors that generate instability.
Transnational criminality flourishes where institutions are weak, economic opportunities are scarce, access to justice is limited and populations lack credible prospects. This does not mean that economic development can replace security forces. It means rather that sustainable security must be understood as an architecture in which policing, justice, governance, education, employment and social protection reinforce one another.
This approach is particularly important for Haiti, but it also applies to the region as a whole. A policy that concentrates substantial resources on maritime interdiction while neglecting judicial institutions, ports, financial systems, customs administrations, anti-corruption mechanisms and the creation of economic opportunities can produce only partial stabilization. Criminal networks adapt to security operations. They change routes, methods and organizational structures. The response must therefore be institutional as well as operational.
The Caribbean must also avoid another trap: the progressive militarization of problems that are, in some cases, fundamentally issues of governance. Security is indispensable, but it cannot become the sole language through which the region is presented to the world. The Caribbean is also a civilization space, a cultural crossroads, a commercial environment, a centre of innovation, tourism, scientific research, human exchange and creative production. An international strategy that sees the region only through the prism of its vulnerabilities could paradoxically reinforce the very fragilities it claims to address.
THE NEW AMERICAN PARADOX
Washington now faces a strategic paradox. U.S. policy seeks, among other objectives, to prevent the Caribbean from becoming a space of uncontrolled transnational criminality, illicit trafficking and geopolitical rivalries capable of threatening American interests. The United States therefore has a direct interest in strengthening regional stability. Yet an intensification of security operations, sanctions and military pressure can also generate perceptions of domination or of a return to a sphere-of-influence logic, particularly in a region whose history still carries the memory of external intervention.
The issue is not whether the United States exercises influence in the Caribbean. That influence derives naturally from its economic, military, financial and geographical power. The real question concerns how that influence is exercised. A durable strategic relationship cannot rest exclusively on one partner’s ability to impose its priorities. It must also be grounded in trust, consultation, predictability and recognition of the political autonomy of the states concerned.
This question becomes particularly sensitive when U.S. security policies involve states facing profound internal crises. In such circumstances, governments may understandably prioritize immediate external assistance, but that assistance should not result in permanent dependency. The objective should be to strengthen local capacities so that Caribbean states progressively become capable of securing their territories, borders, ports and institutions, with international support complementing rather than replacing their sovereignty.
The new American paradox is therefore also a paradox of power. Washington possesses the capabilities required to intervene rapidly in its immediate strategic environment. Yet the true measure of that power will not be limited to its ability to conduct operations against vessels suspected of narcotrafficking. It will also be measured by its ability to contribute to the emergence of stronger, more autonomous Caribbean states within a regional architecture capable of managing its own crises. A stable Caribbean cannot be sustainably built against the societies that compose it. It must be built with them.
THE CPGNNews VIEW
The Caribbean did not become strategic in September 2026. It has always been strategic. What is changing today is the convergence of several dynamics that were previously examined separately. Maritime security now intersects with narcotrafficking. The energy crisis intersects with sovereignty. Digital infrastructure intersects with technological competition. Population displacement intersects with regional stability. Cuba intersects with the rivalry between Washington and Havana. Haiti intersects with the question of state capacity. And behind each of these issues lies the same reality: the Caribbean occupies the intersection of several systems of power.
This renewed centrality can become either an opportunity or a vulnerability. It will become an opportunity if the states of the region succeed in transforming their geographical position into negotiating power, diversifying their partnerships, developing their infrastructure, strengthening their institutions and building a genuine regional security architecture. It will become a vulnerability if the region remains divided, dependent and defined primarily by the security priorities of external powers.
For CPGNNews, therefore, the real issue is not whether the Caribbean constitutes a new front of global power. It has already become once again a major arena of strategic competition. The decisive question is who will participate in defining the rules of this new centrality. Can Caribbean peoples become actors in this transformation, or will they remain geographical objects upon which major powers project their own strategies? The answer to that question will determine, over the coming years, the true geopolitical significance of the Caribbean moment.
THE CARIBBEAN: OBJECT OR SUBJECT OF POWER?
The Caribbean is entering a new phase in its strategic history. The U.S. strike of 9 September 2026 does not, by itself, mark the beginning of this transformation, but it reveals with particular clarity a process that was already underway. The region now stands at the intersection of several lines of tension that extend far beyond narcotrafficking: maritime security, the movement of goods, energy, migration, critical infrastructure, diplomatic rivalries and the capacity of states to exercise effective sovereignty. Cuba, Haiti and the maritime routes of the Caribbean thus appear as different manifestations of the same strategic problem: a region whose international importance is increasing at precisely the moment when several of its states remain profoundly vulnerable.
This situation places Caribbean societies before a historic choice. They can continue to endure the geography that has placed them at the centre of major-power interests, becoming successively spaces for military projection, commercial corridors, energy markets, zones of influence or territories in which external actors manage crises. Or they can begin transforming geography into political power. This requires stronger states, more credible institutions, economies that are better interconnected, greater control over strategic infrastructure and a collective capacity to negotiate with major powers without surrendering their own interests.
The fundamental question of the Caribbean’s new centrality is therefore not which power will dominate the region. It is whether the Caribbean will accept being defined by the competition of others or whether it will define for itself what it wants to become. In a world where power is measured as much by control over routes, energy, data and infrastructure as by military capability, sovereignty can no longer be merely a legal assertion. It must become a practical capacity to decide, negotiate, protect and build.
The Caribbean is once again being watched by the world. But being watched is not enough. The challenge of the coming decade will be to determine whether the region can finally look outward from the standpoint of its own interests, with a regional vision strong enough to transform vulnerability into leverage, geographical position into influence and diversity into collective power.
CPGNNews STRATEGIC INSIGHT
The next strategic contest in the Caribbean will probably not be fought solely around ships, ports or narcotrafficking routes. It will also be fought around energy, data, infrastructure, investment, supply chains, human capital and the capacity of states to govern effectively. Twenty-first-century power no longer resides solely in the possession of a fleet or the ability to project military force. It also resides in the ability to control, protect or influence the systems that enable societies to function.
From this perspective, Caribbean sovereignty should not be understood as a rejection of international cooperation. It should be understood as the capacity to cooperate without surrendering control over fundamental choices. The real strategic contest in the Caribbean may therefore be less about the confrontation among major powers than about whether the region remains a space upon which others project their power or becomes a space capable of projecting its own will.
CPGNNews | Strategic Reports
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