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CPGNNews Strategic Report SR-002/2026 | Author: Yvon Bonhomme | October 2026

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OPENING | THE ASIA-PACIFIC BETWEEN THE GHOSTS OF HISTORY AND THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE FUTURE

There are regions of the world where geography demands caution, where historical memory shapes political calculations, and where decisions taken in a handful of capitals can alter the economic expectations of entire continents. The Asia-Pacific belongs to this category. It accounts for a substantial share of global industrial production, encompasses vital maritime routes, hosts technologies that underpin the contemporary economy, and is shaped by strategic rivalries whose consequences extend far beyond the borders of China, Japan, and the United States. Within this space, a fundamental tension is taking shape: Japan is seeking to strengthen its ability to protect its territory and interests in an environment it considers increasingly uncertain; China intends to defend its sovereignty claims, modernize its capabilities, and preserve its freedom of action; the United States, under President Donald Trump, is seeking to maintain a decisive position in the Indo-Pacific while redefining the terms of its alliances; and Australia, for its part, is deepening its security partnerships with Tokyo and Washington while remaining unable to disregard the importance of its economic relations with Beijing.

These policy directions are neither entirely new nor inherently incompatible. They are, however, unfolding at a time when trust among several key actors has weakened, interpretations of the same events diverge sharply, and a decision presented as defensive by one capital may be perceived as a threat by another. Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on the possible consequences of a crisis involving Taiwan have made these contradictions particularly visible. In November 2025, her comments triggered a forceful response from Beijing, underscoring how Taiwan remains a major point of friction between the two powers. Subsequent diplomatic and parliamentary initiatives have nevertheless shown that channels of dialogue have not entirely disappeared. The region thus remains caught between two opposing imperatives: intensified strategic preparedness and the continuing need to prevent an uncontrolled deterioration in relations.

The military context reinforces the significance of this evolution. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military expenditure reached $2.887 trillion in 2025, representing a real increase of 2.9% over the previous year. China’s military expenditure was estimated at $336 billion, while Japan’s reached $62.2 billion. Across Asia and Oceania as a whole, military expenditure rose by 8.1% to $681 billion. These figures point to an acceleration in defence efforts, but they cannot, on their own, measure the political intentions, operational effectiveness, or strategic quality of the states concerned. They nevertheless indicate that regional security is absorbing growing resources and that governments are adjusting their priorities to an environment they perceive as increasingly uncertain.

The title of this report evokes the ghosts of 1945 because the memory of the Second World War remains politically active in East Asia. For China, memories of Japanese aggression and the suffering inflicted on civilian populations occupy a central place in national historical consciousness. In Japan, defeat, the bombings, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the experience of reconstruction helped shape a political culture in which restraint in the use of force retains particular importance. These historical experiences are neither equivalent in their substance nor identical in their meaning, yet both influence contemporary perceptions of security and legitimacy. The past can fuel mistrust when it is invoked to intensify antagonisms; it can also serve as a reminder of the human cost of conflict and the need to preserve diplomatic mechanisms. History does not mechanically determine the future: what matters most is how it is used politically.

The challenge, therefore, is not to determine which power is inherently destined to dominate Asia, but to understand how actors with sometimes conflicting interests can pursue their objectives without turning their perceptions of one another into a mechanism of escalation. China cannot be reduced to an abstract threat; contemporary Japan cannot automatically be equated with imperial militarism; and the United States is neither an impartial arbiter standing outside these rivalries nor an actor without interests of its own. Australia, for its part, is not simply an extension of American strategy: it has its own priorities, economic constraints, and security calculations. It is within this balance of history, sovereignty, interdependence, and competition that a significant part of the world’s future will be shaped. For CPGNNews, the responsibility is to examine this equation without adopting the narrative of any single capital, while distinguishing established facts, political statements, national interests, and the interpretations that shape decision-making.

JAPAN AT A TURNING POINT: FROM A CAUTIOUS ECONOMIC POWER TO A MORE ASSERTIVE STRATEGIC ACTOR

The legacy of 1945 and the distinctive character of the contemporary Japanese state

Japan’s strategic transformation cannot be understood without revisiting the political order established after the Second World War. The defeat of 1945 profoundly reshaped the country’s institutions, its relationship with military force, and its understanding of the role it should play in the world. The 1947 Constitution, particularly Article 9, renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and rejects the maintenance of armed forces intended for warfare. In practice, however, constitutional interpretations developed over subsequent decades made it possible to establish and expand the Japan Self-Defense Forces. This legal and political framework became one of the defining features of post-war Japanese power: Tokyo prioritized economic reconstruction, industrialization, technological innovation, and the expansion of international trade within the framework of its security alliance with the United States, while maintaining a demanding domestic debate over the limits of its military role.

Japan thus became a major economic and technological power without adopting the conventional model of military power traditionally associated with great powers. This does not mean that it renounced its own security; rather, its defense capabilities developed within a distinctive political, legal, and historical framework. Today, that model is under increasing pressure. Japanese authorities believe that their strategic environment has deteriorated, particularly because of tensions surrounding Taiwan, Chinese military activities, North Korea’s missile programs, and uncertainty about the future direction of American policy. Tokyo consequently considers that the protection of its territory can no longer rely solely on strategic assumptions inherited from the Cold War. This evolution requires Japan to reconsider the relationship between its constitutional doctrine, its defense requirements, and its responsibility for regional stability.

The debate is therefore not simply about whether Japan must prepare for a more dangerous world. Every state has a responsibility to assess the risks facing its population. The decisive questions concern the nature and scale of that preparation, its legal limits, its democratic oversight, and the signals it sends to other powers. A stronger defense policy may enhance deterrence and reduce the temptation for external coercion; it may also intensify the concerns of neighboring countries that interpret Japan’s transformation through the memory of its past. Tokyo’s challenge is to make its policy credible enough to protect the country while ensuring that it remains sufficiently transparent and constrained to prevent measures presented as defensive from becoming another source of instability.

Sanae Takaichi and the politicization of strategic debate

Sanae Takaichi represents a firmer political approach to national security. Her outlook places considerable emphasis on strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities, maintaining the strength of the American alliance, and taking China’s strategic evolution seriously. This approach forms part of a broader Japanese debate about the state’s responsibilities in a regional environment perceived as increasingly risky. Her statements concerning Taiwan, however, have given this evolution a particularly sensitive dimension. When a Japanese leader discusses the circumstances in which a crisis surrounding the island could affect Japan’s national security, the issue extends beyond domestic politics: it touches on Beijing’s interests, Washington’s commitments, stability in the Taiwan Strait, and the expectations of other states across the region.

It is important to distinguish a political statement from an official doctrine and an operational decision. A statement may signal a shift in a government’s strategic thinking without automatically creating a new legal obligation or a commitment to intervene. Its significance depends on the exact wording, the context in which it was made, the applicable institutional mechanisms, and any subsequent clarification by the executive. China’s response nevertheless demonstrates how sensitive the issue remains. Beijing regards Taiwan as part of its territory and opposes external intervention that it considers contrary to its sovereignty. Taiwan’s authorities, for their part, maintain their own democratic institutions and reject Beijing’s claim to determine their future unilaterally. The United States follows a distinct policy based on its legal commitments and strategic choices, while Japan is situated close to a dispute whose consequences could affect its territory, maritime routes, and economy.

Takaichi must therefore navigate a dual requirement. Domestically, her government must demonstrate that it takes security concerns seriously. Diplomatically, it must prevent overly categorical statements from narrowing negotiating options or locking the country into a position whose consequences would be difficult to control. Firmness does not necessarily mean escalation: it can strengthen deterrence when accompanied by clear objectives, institutional coordination, and active diplomatic channels. It becomes more dangerous when red lines remain ambiguous, public statements are interpreted as automatic commitments, or domestic political pressure makes it difficult to adjust course. Takaichi’s policy should therefore be assessed through concrete decisions, the coherence of her government’s actions, and its ability to combine strategic preparedness with diplomatic restraint, rather than through a single isolated statement.

Defense spending and the transformation of Japan’s priorities

SIPRI data confirm the scale of Japan’s budgetary shift. In 2025, the country’s military expenditure reached $62.2 billion, representing real growth of 9.7% compared with 2024 and an increase of 61% compared with 2016. According to the institute, this amounted to approximately 1.4% of gross domestic product, the highest share since 1958. This development forms part of the defense-strengthening program initiated in 2022 and reflects a gradual reassessment of the resources considered necessary to protect Japanese territory. It does not, by itself, prove that Japan has abandoned the post-war pacifist doctrine; rather, it indicates that Japanese leaders are seeking to adapt their security instruments to changes in the regional environment.

This financial effort comes amid economic and demographic constraints. An aging population, pressure on public finances, social needs, and the requirement to sustain industrial innovation oblige the authorities to make choices among competing priorities. Higher military expenditure may address genuine security requirements, but it also entails budgetary decisions whose effects must be assessed over the long term. Democratic debate must therefore extend beyond the amount of funding allocated. It should examine the objectives being pursued, the effectiveness of investments, their compatibility with the constitutional framework, the quality of parliamentary oversight, and their relationship with diplomacy, regional cooperation, and civilian resilience policies.

It would be just as mistaken to regard every increase in defense spending as proof of militarism as it would be to assume that every additional expenditure automatically improves security. Defense capability also depends on training, the quality of planning, civil preparedness, institutional continuity, economic resilience, and the ability to prevent crises. Japan must therefore answer a fundamental question: how can it adapt its security capabilities without losing the political and diplomatic achievements that have contributed to its stability since 1945? This question concerns the entire region, because the way Tokyo explains, constrains, and implements its transformation will influence how its neighbors perceive its intentions.

BEIJING AND CHINA’S STRATEGY: SOVEREIGNTY, MODERNIZATION, AND REGIONAL INFLUENCE

An expanding power defending its own priorities

China is the second major pole in the region’s strategic equation. Its economic development, industrial capacity, scientific and technological investment, and modernization of its defense institutions have altered the balance of power in Asia. Beijing seeks to protect its territory, preserve domestic political stability, defend its sovereignty claims, and expand its influence in an environment it regards as increasingly defined by competition with the United States. Understanding this policy requires recognizing that Chinese leaders do not perceive the regional order as a neutral structure. They believe that the American military presence, Washington’s alliances, and strategic cooperation among neighboring states can restrict China’s freedom of action. This perception helps explain their opposition to arrangements they regard as designed to contain Chinese influence, although it does not automatically justify every action taken by Beijing.

A state’s security concerns do not eliminate the rights of other states or its obligations under international law. Maritime disputes, tensions surrounding Taiwan, and disagreements over freedom of navigation must be examined through the relevant facts, applicable legal instruments, and conduct of all parties involved. China has legitimate interests in security and development; its neighbors have the same rights to security and political autonomy. Regional stability therefore requires that these interests be discussed without allowing any actor’s economic or military power to confer a superior right to determine the common rules unilaterally.

This equation is particularly complex because economic relations remain extensive. China is a major trading partner for Japan, Australia, and numerous Asian economies. Businesses, workers, and consumers benefit from exchanges connecting regional markets, but interdependence does not guarantee peace. It can also become an instrument of pressure when trade relations are used to secure political concessions. Beijing has an interest in demonstrating that the assertion of its power can coexist with sufficient predictability to reassure its neighbors. Those neighbors, in turn, must preserve their freedom of decision without turning every disagreement into a permanent confrontation.

XI JINPING, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE LIMITS OF TRUST

Under Xi Jinping, national sovereignty, security, and the strengthening of Chinese power occupy a central place in the country’s political discourse. Reunification with Taiwan remains a major objective for Beijing, which has not renounced the use of force. This position is a fundamental source of concern for Taiwan and for states that believe a coercive change to the status quo would have major regional and international consequences. Nevertheless, reducing all of China’s policy to the Taiwan question would be misleading. Beijing also pursues economic, technological, diplomatic, and institutional objectives: expanding trade relations, increasing its influence in international organizations, securing supplies, and defending its interests in maritime areas essential to its economy.

These objectives sometimes reinforce one another. Industrial power supports economic and strategic capabilities; commercial relations create instruments of influence; diplomacy helps consolidate partnerships. Yet the accumulation of these resources does not guarantee acceptance by other states. A power may secure material advantages while generating mistrust that reduces its diplomatic room for maneuver. Japan illustrates this contradiction. The two countries are closely connected through trade, investment, and human exchanges, and they share interests in regional stability and predictable markets. Nevertheless, historical disputes, maritime claims, and statements concerning Taiwan have contributed to a deterioration in trust.

Beijing may regard Japanese statements as interference in a sovereignty issue, while Tokyo considers the situation surrounding Taiwan directly relevant to its own security. This disagreement cannot be resolved simply by repeating each government’s initial position. It requires clarification of intentions, communication mechanisms, and a distinction between political statements, legal commitments, and actions capable of changing the status quo. Xi Jinping’s diplomatic effectiveness will therefore also be measured by his ability to defend China’s interests without closing off opportunities for compromise. A foreign policy can be firm without being inflexible; it can uphold principles while preserving mechanisms for preventing incidents and managing disagreements.

CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPARENCY

SIPRI estimated China’s military expenditure at $336 billion in 2025, a real increase of 7.4% over the previous year. According to the institute’s data, Chinese military spending has increased for thirty-one consecutive years, underscoring the enduring priority assigned to defense modernization. These estimates must nevertheless be interpreted cautiously. Accounting methods, the availability of public information, and differences between announced budgets and estimated expenditure complicate international comparisons. SIPRI figures provide a useful methodological basis, but they do not constitute a complete and perfectly comparable accounting of every category of national expenditure.

The increase in Chinese spending nevertheless reflects a long-term strategic direction. Beijing intends to modernize its capabilities and strengthen its regional position, citing defense requirements and the need to protect its interests in an environment shaped by the American presence and closer cooperation among several Asian states. The problem lies in the gap between declared objectives and the way other actors interpret the capabilities being deployed. When information is limited, governments tend to assess an adversary’s intentions through the most unfavorable scenarios. One power increases its capabilities as a precaution; its neighbors interpret that development as a threat and strengthen their own defenses in response. This mechanism can generate a cycle of mistrust in which every measure presented as defensive becomes the justification for another measure taken by a different actor.

China therefore has an interest in improving the transparency of its strategic outlook and preserving dialogue mechanisms with its neighbors. Other powers, for their part, have an interest in avoiding the automatic treatment of every Chinese modernization effort as proof of offensive intent. Rigorous analysis must distinguish available capabilities, declared intentions, observable conduct, and assumptions about future developments. This distinction is essential to preventing strategic competition from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

TAIWAN, THE CENTRAL FLASHPOINT: WHEN SOVEREIGNTY BECOMES A SYSTEMIC RISK

A political question whose consequences extend far beyond the strait

Taiwan is one of the principal points of tension in the contemporary international order because its political status, its relations with Beijing, and its ties with Western powers bring together several fundamental disputes: sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity, deterrence, and the role of international law in managing rivalries. The People’s Republic of China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and maintains that reunification is a major national objective. Taiwan’s authorities, who administer the island and maintain their own political, military, and democratic institutions, reject the subordination of their future to a unilateral decision by Beijing. The United States, for its part, maintains a distinct policy based on its legislation, commitments, and diplomatic practice, without this amounting to formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as an independent state. This framework remains deliberately complex and relies in part on strategic ambiguity intended to deter unilateral changes to the status quo.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the parties attach different meanings to stability and legitimacy. Beijing may regard military or political contacts between Taiwan and the United States as challenging its sovereignty claims; Taiwan may perceive Chinese military pressure as an attempt to restrict its freedom of decision; Washington may consider it necessary to maintain a credible deterrent to discourage a coercive change to the status quo. Tokyo, situated close to Taiwan and linked to the United States by a security alliance, cannot ignore the possible consequences of a major crisis in the strait. A confrontation would not necessarily remain confined to the actors directly involved. It could affect maritime routes, financial markets, insurance, supply chains, investment, and trade throughout the region.

Nevertheless, a crisis should not be portrayed as inevitable. Divergent interests do not automatically lead to war, and military capabilities alone do not determine political decisions. The human, economic, and diplomatic costs of a confrontation would be considerable for every party, including China. The decisive question is therefore whether leaders can preserve sufficiently robust communication and dispute-management mechanisms to prevent an incident, a miscalculation, or a decision made under domestic pressure from triggering an escalation. In a region where military signals are sometimes interpreted as political messages, clear communication and restraint in public statements are security instruments in their own right.

WHY JAPAN CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT

Taiwan’s geographical proximity to Japanese territory gives the issue a particular significance. A crisis in the strait could affect Japan’s southwestern islands, the maritime routes used for its imports and exports, and the safety of Japanese nationals in the region. It would also raise questions about the operation of the alliance with the United States, the possible use of facilities located in Japan, and the application of domestic law under exceptional circumstances. Proximity, however, does not mean that Japanese intervention would be automatic. Any decision would depend on the precise nature of the crisis, the relevant legal circumstances, government decisions, institutional procedures, and applicable obligations. Confusing Taiwan’s strategic importance to Tokyo with an unconditional military commitment would exaggerate the significance of political statements.

This distinction is precisely what makes Sanae Takaichi’s remarks politically sensitive. By linking a possible crisis around Taiwan to Japan’s security, she highlights a geographical and strategic reality that Japanese governments cannot dismiss. Yet any public formulation can also be interpreted in Beijing as a change in Japan’s intentions or as a signal to Washington. Effective strategic communication must therefore explain Japan’s security interests without suggesting that every possible future circumstance has already been predetermined. The objective should be to strengthen deterrence against coercive action while preserving the possibility of a peaceful solution and avoiding the transformation of a hypothetical crisis into an automatic commitment.

Japan must also ensure that its response is not confined to an exclusively military logic. Diplomacy, economic cooperation, parliamentary contacts, academic exchanges, and mechanisms for managing incidents can help reduce risks even when political differences remain profound. A credible security policy rests not only on the ability to respond to a crisis but also on the ability to prevent one. In this respect, the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing should be understood as a lasting relationship between interdependent neighbors, not as a confrontation whose outcome would necessarily be determined by the military superiority of one side or the other.

The global consequences of a crisis in the strait

Taiwan’s importance extends well beyond its political status. The island occupies a central position in certain global production chains for advanced semiconductors, components essential to telecommunications, data centers, the automotive industry, medical equipment, and numerous industrial applications. A prolonged interruption of production or transportation in the region could create shortages, delay investment, and increase costs in sectors far beyond East Asia. The effects would not depend solely on potential physical damage to infrastructure. Uncertainty, trade restrictions, sanctions, export controls, logistical disruptions, and precautionary decisions by businesses could themselves be enough to disorganize part of the global economy.

A major crisis would also trigger a reassessment of financial risks. Markets might revise their expectations for companies exposed to the region, investors could move some capital elsewhere, and maritime insurers might reassess premiums for vessels transiting areas considered dangerous. Governments would face difficult trade-offs between security objectives, protecting their businesses, and maintaining trade flows. Economies heavily dependent on energy imports, electronic components, or Asian maritime routes could experience disproportionate effects, even without direct involvement in the tensions.

For Caribbean countries, these consequences would be far from abstract. Island economies and states whose imports depend heavily on maritime transport could face higher freight costs, longer delivery times, and increased prices for essential goods. Higher energy and manufactured-goods costs could place additional pressure on public budgets, businesses, and households. The precise effects would depend on the duration of the crisis, the routes affected, market responses, and governments’ ability to diversify suppliers. The strategic lesson is clear: even when a state is not a party to a rivalry, its economic vulnerability can increase if its supplies depend on overly concentrated or insufficiently resilient global chains.

DONALD TRUMP AND AMERICAN STRATEGY: ALLIANCES, ECONOMIC PRESSURE, AND DETERRENCE

An essential alliance, but one subject to political uncertainty

The alliance between the United States and Japan remains a central pillar of the East Asian security architecture. It provides Tokyo with a framework for military and strategic cooperation, while allowing Washington to maintain a presence in a region essential to its economic and geopolitical interests. This relationship is not limited to a security guarantee. It also encompasses technological cooperation, intelligence sharing, diplomatic coordination, and discussions on regional stability. It is therefore a major instrument for both countries, but its credibility depends on how their leaders, institutions, and partners perceive it.

Under Donald Trump, relations with allies are frequently examined through an approach that emphasizes burden-sharing, economic benefits, and each partner’s contribution to collective security. This logic can lead the United States to demand additional efforts from its allies, but it also creates uncertainty about how Washington ranks its commitments. For Tokyo, the challenge is to preserve the strength of the alliance without relying exclusively on political statements whose practical significance may vary with circumstances. Japan must therefore strengthen its national capabilities, maintain close cooperation with the United States, and develop complementary relationships with other partners, while avoiding the impression that diversification weakens the alliance.

It would nevertheless be excessive to reduce American policy to a commercial transaction. The United States pursues enduring strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, including maintaining its influence, securing its partners, preserving freedom of navigation, and protecting its economic and technological interests. Administrations may differ over methods, priorities, and diplomatic tone, but institutions, legal commitments, and national interests contribute to a degree of continuity. The uncertainty stems less from the automatic disappearance of American strategy than from questions about the circumstances in which Washington would be willing to commit resources, bear the costs of a crisis, or accept a compromise with Beijing.

For Japan, the answer is neither to assume that the United States will inevitably abandon it nor to regard American support as unconditional in every circumstance. It requires a realistic assessment of shared interests, formal commitments, available capabilities, and potential differences. An alliance is more robust when it rests on clearly identified interests, coherent planning, and regular communication rather than on unspoken expectations. Strategic predictability then becomes a deterrent factor: it enables partners to understand the limits and conditions of their cooperation while reducing the risk that an adversary will interpret ambiguity as an opportunity to test their resolve.

Washington between competition with Beijing and the pursuit of an agreement

American strategy toward China combines several objectives that can come into tension. Washington seeks to protect its security interests, preserve its technological position, limit certain industrial dependencies, and prevent a rival power from unilaterally imposing its rules in areas considered essential. At the same time, the two countries remain linked by substantial economic exchanges and share responsibilities on several international issues. An effective American policy must therefore distinguish the areas in which competition is considered necessary from those in which cooperation remains possible. An approach that treated every relationship with China as total confrontation could increase economic costs, reduce diplomatic channels, and encourage Washington’s partners to adopt more cautious strategies.

Donald Trump’s personal diplomacy may place considerable emphasis on leaders’ meetings and bilateral negotiations. Such contacts can facilitate agreements, temporarily reduce tensions, or clarify certain intentions, but they cannot replace institutions and follow-up mechanisms. An understanding announced at a summit becomes durable only if its provisions are sufficiently precise, if administrations can implement them, and if the parties have ways to address disagreements. In a relationship as complex as that between Washington and Beijing, public statements must therefore be assessed in light of concrete decisions concerning trade, technology, regional security, and communication channels.

Japan and Australia must take this reality into account. A temporary rapprochement between the American and Chinese presidents could reduce certain immediate risks, but it would not necessarily eliminate structural disagreements over Taiwan, strategic technologies, or the regional security architecture. Conversely, a deterioration in Washington–Beijing relations could increase pressure on American allies, forcing them to clarify their positions in areas where their economic interests and security requirements do not always coincide. Washington’s partners must therefore prepare for several possible scenarios without confusing a diplomatic episode with a lasting transformation of the balance of power.

Deterrence cannot replace diplomacy

Deterrence rests on the belief that hostile action would entail sufficiently significant costs to discourage the actor considering it. It depends on available capabilities, the credibility of commitments, leaders’ perceptions, and their understanding of the consequences. It does not, however, operate automatically. An actor may misinterpret an adversary’s intentions, overestimate its own ability to control a crisis, or believe that a rapid decision will provide a decisive advantage. When several powers strengthen their capabilities in response to one another’s measures, the risk of miscalculation may increase even if no government initially wants a conflict.

A responsible deterrence policy must therefore be accompanied by communication and crisis-management instruments. Communication channels between political and military officials, notification procedures where appropriate, mechanisms to prevent incidents, and diplomatic contacts can limit the consequences of a misunderstanding. They do not guarantee peace, but they reduce the risk that a local event will be interpreted as the beginning of a wider offensive. These mechanisms are particularly important in maritime and airspace environments where forces from several countries operate in close proximity.

For Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra, the challenge is to maintain a credible capacity to respond while avoiding rhetoric that would narrow opportunities for de-escalation. For Beijing, the challenge is symmetrical: to defend its interests and express its disagreements without multiplying signals that could be interpreted as preparation for a coercive change to the status quo. Responsibility cannot therefore be attributed exclusively to a single capital. Stability depends on how all actors align their objectives, capabilities, and communications. Military strength can help deter aggression; it cannot replace the negotiations required to resolve the political disputes that fuel tensions.

AUSTRALIA, A STRATEGIC PIVOT BETWEEN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE PACIFIC AND EAST ASIA

A geography that is becoming a strategic advantage

Australia occupies a distinctive position in the Indo-Pacific. Its territory connects the maritime spaces of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, while its economic relationships, security partnerships and cooperation with island states give it influence that extends beyond its population size. Canberra maintains a close alliance with Washington, develops defence cooperation with Tokyo and must simultaneously preserve substantial economic relations with China, which remains a major trading partner. This combination of interests requires a foreign policy capable of bringing together deterrence, diplomacy, economic resilience and regional cooperation.

The strategic rapprochement between Australia and Japan forms part of a broader evolution in Asian security partnerships. Both countries have an interest in preserving maritime stability, securing their supplies, improving their ability to respond to crises and reducing certain industrial vulnerabilities. Their cooperation may encompass information sharing, training, research, technology, logistics, infrastructure protection and the development of more diversified supply chains. Stronger cooperation does not necessarily mean establishing a military alliance identical to the one linking each country to the United States. It may also take the form of sector-specific agreements, regular consultations and joint projects tailored to the respective interests of the two governments.

The possibility of a security treaty between Canberra and Tokyo must therefore be approached with caution. Proposals for a more formal rapprochement reflect an ongoing strategic debate, but they should not be confused with a concluded agreement or an existing legal obligation. A treaty would entail significant political choices, including the definition of commitments, geographical scope, consultation procedures, relationship with existing alliances and treatment of situations in which national interests do not fully coincide. Before further institutionalising their cooperation, the two countries must determine whether a new legal instrument would provide sufficient added value compared with mechanisms already in place.

Supply chains and the economics of security

Cooperation between Australia and Japan is not confined to military affairs. It also responds to an economic concern: reducing the risks associated with excessive concentration in certain supply chains, particularly in sectors essential to the energy transition, advanced industry and strategic technologies. Australia possesses substantial natural and energy resources, while Japan has industrial, technological and financial capabilities that can support their processing and use. Well-designed partnerships could help diversify suppliers, develop processing capacity and stabilise trade. Their success, however, would depend on the necessary investment, commercial conditions, environmental constraints, infrastructure availability and the economic viability of individual projects.

Economic security has become increasingly important because governments recognise that commercial dependencies can turn into vulnerabilities during a crisis. An economy may be deeply integrated into global markets while remaining exposed to production disruptions, export restrictions or political pressure. The response does not necessarily require ending trade with China or relocating all domestic production. A more realistic strategy involves diversifying sources of supply, identifying the most critical dependencies, building reserves where justified and developing alternatives in sectors where a disruption would have particularly serious consequences.

For Japan and Australia, the success of this approach will depend on their ability to avoid two extremes. The first would be to regard economic dependence as a problem that can be solved only by a general break with China, at considerable cost to businesses and consumers. The second would be to assume that the benefits of trade are sufficient to neutralise strategic risks. A resilience policy requires sector-by-sector analysis based on verifiable data, cost assessments and a precise understanding of the consequences of disruption. It must also recognise that diversification can itself create new dependencies if it relies on too small a number of alternative suppliers.

Pacific island states must not become mere objects of rivalry

The intensifying competition among major powers does not concern only Tokyo, Beijing, Washington and Canberra. Pacific island states are directly affected by decisions involving maritime security, infrastructure, telecommunications, financing and access to resources. Their governments seek investment, stronger institutional capacity and solutions to vulnerabilities that include climate change, natural disasters, debt, transport costs and the limitations of domestic markets. In this context, presenting international relations as a compulsory choice between China and the United States risks undermining their diplomatic autonomy and overlooking their own priorities.

Australia and Japan have an interest in developing partnerships with these countries that produce tangible results: reliable infrastructure, vocational training, more resilient healthcare systems, digital connectivity, sustainable management of marine resources and support for administrative capacity. Security cannot be sustainable if it is confined to military cooperation without considering the economic and social conditions that shape the stability of societies. A state with fragile infrastructure, expensive transport and under-resourced public services remains vulnerable to external pressure, whatever the nature of its military partnerships.

Island countries must also be able to define their own priorities and negotiate with several partners without automatically being suspected of serving a rival power’s interests. A regional policy that respects their sovereignty should prioritise transparent contracts, long-term cost assessments, stronger local capabilities and the participation of affected communities. If Australia and Japan wish to consolidate their influence, their advantage cannot rest solely on strategic proximity to Washington. It must also be measured by the quality and continuity of the projects they offer and by their capacity to respond to needs expressed by Pacific governments and communities.

A useful rapprochement that must not become a bloc-based strategy

The development of Australian-Japanese cooperation can contribute to stability if its objectives are clearly defined and its instruments remain consistent with the two countries’ international commitments. Closer consultations can improve coordination, reduce uncertainty and strengthen their capacity to respond to crises. They can also generate civilian benefits in research, technology, disaster relief and infrastructure protection. But a partnership is not automatically stabilising simply because it strengthens the capabilities of its members. Its impact also depends on how other states perceive it and on the political signals accompanying its implementation.

If Beijing interprets all cooperation among Tokyo, Canberra and Washington as a framework designed to exclude China permanently from the regional order, mistrust could intensify and opportunities for dialogue could diminish. Conversely, if partner governments explain their objectives, maintain communication channels and clarify that their cooperation is intended to strengthen security and resilience rather than make confrontation automatic, they can reduce the risk of misinterpretation. This does not mean that fundamental disagreements will disappear. The aim is to prevent a situation in which every initiative by one group of countries is systematically interpreted by another as preparation for confrontation.

Australia’s most valuable contribution to regional stability may therefore lie in connecting security partnerships with mechanisms for economic and diplomatic cooperation. Canberra has a particular capacity to engage with partners whose interests and political systems differ, even when those relationships become difficult. Japan can contribute complementary industrial, technological and financial resources. Together, they can strengthen their preparedness while supporting inclusive regional mechanisms. Their objective should not be to construct an architecture that makes dialogue with China impossible, but to help create an environment in which no actor could reasonably assume that coercion would deliver lasting gains without significant consequences.

THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF MILITARY SPENDING: WHAT THE FIGURES REVEAL AND WHAT THEY DO NOT

Global spending is rising despite contrasting national trends

Data published in April 2026 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in its study Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025, establish a central finding: global military expenditure reached $2.887 trillion in 2025, following a real increase of 2.9% compared with the previous year. This marked the eleventh consecutive annual increase and the highest level recorded by the institute. Over the 2016–2025 decade, global spending rose by 41%. Military expenditure as a share of global gross domestic product increased from 2.4% in 2024 to 2.5% in 2025, while average global military spending per capita reached $352. These figures point to a structural trend: governments are committing substantial resources to security amid international conflicts, rivalry among major powers and uncertainty over the reliability of certain defence commitments.

The global increase does not mean that every state is moving in the same direction or that every rise reflects an identical form of preparation. US spending fell by 7.5% in real terms in 2025, reaching $954 billion, notably because of a reduction in certain military assistance expenditures financed through exceptional appropriations in previous years. China, by contrast, increased its estimated spending by 7.4%, to $336 billion, while Russia devoted approximately $190 billion to its military effort, an increase of 5.9%. Europe recorded a 14% rise, to $864 billion, while spending in Asia and Oceania increased by 8.1%, to $681 billion. The global total therefore reflects different trajectories shaped by national circumstances, conflicts, perceptions of threats and budgetary choices that cannot be reduced to a single explanation.

The fifteen largest military budgets in 2025

The following table reproduces SIPRI estimates. Amounts are expressed in billions of current US dollars; annual changes represent real growth rates calculated by the institute, meaning that they are adjusted for inflation. Some countries’ figures are estimates, particularly where public data are incomplete. They provide a useful basis for comparison, but they are not a perfect measure of every resource actually devoted to national defence.

Rank	Country	2025 expenditure, US$ billions	Annual real change
1	United States	954.0	−7.5%
2	China	336.0	+7.4%
3	Russia	190.0	+5.9%
4	Germany	114.0	+24.0%
5	India	92.1	+8.9%
6	United Kingdom	89.0	−2.0%
7	Ukraine	84.1	+20.0%
8	Saudi Arabia	83.2	+1.4%
9	France	68.0	+1.5%
10	Japan	62.2	+9.7%
11	Israel	48.3	−4.9%
12	Italy	48.1	+20.0%
13	South Korea	47.8	+2.6%
14	Poland	46.8	+23.0%
15	Spain	40.2	+50.0%

Source: SIPRI, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025, April 2026. Figures identified as estimates in the original publication should be interpreted accordingly.

The concentration of spending is particularly significant: the five largest spenders, the United States, China, Russia, Germany and India, account for 58% of the global total. The fifteen largest spenders account for approximately 80%. This distribution reveals a major asymmetry between the resources available to the leading powers and those of states with more limited financial means. It does not, however, mean that the five leading spenders wield equivalent influence or that countries lower in the ranking lack strategic capabilities. Geography, alliances, institutional quality, infrastructure, industrial capacity, technology and the ability to mobilise partners also help determine a state’s actual weight.

The ranking must also be interpreted in context. Germany’s increase reflects the transformation of European defence priorities, while Ukraine’s rising expenditure is directly linked to the war and the scale of its national defence effort. Japan’s trajectory responds to a reassessment of regional risks, whereas China’s increase forms part of a long-term modernisation programme. Identical or similar percentage increases can therefore reflect profoundly different circumstances. A rapid rise may result from an increase starting from a relatively low base, an armed conflict or an exceptional decision; it does not establish that a country’s military capabilities have grown by the same proportion.

Japan and China in their regional context

Japan’s military spending, estimated at $62.2 billion in 2025, rose by 9.7% in real terms. It represented approximately 1.4% of GDP, the country’s highest share since 1958 according to SIPRI. This increase forms part of the implementation of the defence-strengthening programme launched in 2022. It reflects Tokyo’s intention to adapt its capabilities to a regional environment it considers more demanding, particularly because of tensions around Taiwan and concerns about North Korea. Assessing the significance of this change nevertheless requires consideration of the resources allocated to other public policies, demographic constraints, social needs and the institutional limits governing Japan’s defence choices.

China, whose military expenditure is estimated at $336 billion, commands substantially greater financial resources than Japan. Yet a comparison based solely on absolute amounts cannot accurately measure relative capabilities. Cost structures, personnel, infrastructure, technological priorities, territorial requirements and the geographical distribution of forces all play decisive roles. Annual expenditure must also be distinguished from the results achieved: a large budget can support substantial modernisation, but its effectiveness depends on the quality of planning, training, organisation and the availability of the relevant capabilities.

The regional challenge is therefore not to turn statistics into a simplistic ranking of threats. Spending is a useful indicator of political priorities and financial effort, but it does not fully reveal a government’s intentions. It may finance territorial defence, infrastructure modernisation, international commitments or a greater capacity to project power. Interpretation requires a combined analysis of official doctrines, institutional decisions, observable conduct and diplomatic relationships. In the Asia-Pacific, this method is essential to prevent an exclusively quantitative reading from deepening the mistrust that the data are intended to help explain.

THREE SCENARIOS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC: MANAGED DETERRENCE, PROLONGED FRAGMENTATION OR A CRISIS OF MISCALCULATION

The developments examined in this report do not make it possible to predict the future trajectory of the Asia-Pacific with certainty. Political decisions, economic changes, elections, incidents and negotiations can rapidly alter expectations. A rigorous forward-looking analysis must therefore consider several coherent scenarios without presenting any one of them as inevitable. Three possible trajectories provide a framework for the discussion: rivalry managed through deterrence and dialogue, prolonged competition that gradually fragments economic relations, and a crisis triggered by miscalculation or a sequence of incidents.

Scenario One: Managed deterrence and pragmatic dialogue

Under this first scenario, governments pursue their security objectives but recognise that open confrontation would impose excessive costs. Japan continues to adapt its defence capabilities within the framework of its institutions and legal commitments; the United States maintains its alliances and regional cooperation mechanisms; China defends its positions while preserving diplomatic channels; and Australia deepens its partnerships without abandoning its economic interests. Disagreements over Taiwan and maritime issues persist, but the actors avoid unilateral decisions likely to turn political tension into an uncontrollable crisis.

This trajectory requires reliable communication mechanisms, regular contact between political and military officials, and the ability to distinguish statements intended for domestic audiences from decisions that actually commit governments. It also demands strategic discipline: not confusing firmness with humiliating an adversary, not treating every compromise as a defeat, and not systematically using economic relations as instruments of retaliation. Cooperation would not eliminate rivalry, but it would help contain its effects and preserve space for negotiation.

The benefits would be substantial. Continued trade would reduce the risk of supply-chain disruption; businesses would retain greater visibility for their investments; and governments could devote more resources to innovation, education, healthcare and infrastructure resilience. This scenario does not require the powers to share the same vision of the international order. It rests on a more limited but essential recognition: conflicting interests can be managed when every actor understands that the potential gains from escalation do not outweigh the costs and uncertainties it would create.

Scenario Two: Prolonged rivalry and gradual economic fragmentation

Under the second scenario, no major war breaks out, but competition among the major powers becomes more structural. Governments strengthen their economic security policies, companies diversify suppliers, and sensitive technologies face increasing restrictions. The United States, China, Japan and Australia maintain commercial relations, but trade is increasingly shaped by strategic imperatives, export controls, industrial policies and concerns about critical dependencies. Production chains become more redundant and sometimes more expensive as companies seek to reduce the risk of disruption, even when diversification reduces short-term economic efficiency.

This development would not necessarily mean the end of globalisation. It would instead represent a more fragmented form of globalisation, in which trade flows are increasingly organised around political trust, strategic proximity and supply security. Countries able to finance alternative infrastructure, develop domestic technologies or negotiate with several partners could preserve some room for manoeuvre. Smaller economies that depend more heavily on imports could, however, bear a disproportionate share of the costs without possessing the financial means to reproduce the industrial capabilities of major powers.

For businesses, the consequences could include more expensive investments, longer production timelines and a growing number of regulatory requirements. Governments would face trade-offs between competitiveness, technological sovereignty and national security. This fragmentation could also reshape relations between developing countries and major powers, as some governments seek investment or commercial advantages in exchange for political alignment. The central question would be whether diversification genuinely strengthens resilience or merely replaces one dependency with another. A sustainable strategy must weigh risks, costs and benefits rather than treating economic autonomy as an absolute objective independent of practical constraints.

Scenario Three: A regional crisis triggered by miscalculation

The most dangerous scenario would be a crisis developing from an incident, a misinterpreted decision or a succession of measures adopted under pressure. A military operation, a maritime incident, an especially forceful political statement or a decision concerning Taiwan could trigger a response that the other side considers disproportionate. Each government might then seek to demonstrate resolve, while opportunities for compromise narrow under the pressure of public expectations and fears of appearing weak. A situation that initially seemed limited could become increasingly difficult to control, not necessarily because the actors sought a general confrontation, but because successive decisions trapped them in an escalating dynamic.

The consequences would depend on the nature and duration of the crisis, but the risks would be substantial for the entire region. Maritime transport could be disrupted, financial markets could reassess risks, companies could suspend investments, and governments could introduce emergency measures. Tensions could also affect technology exchanges, energy supplies and the movement of essential goods. Countries not directly involved would nevertheless face economic consequences, particularly if their imports depended on routes or suppliers concentrated in East Asia.

This scenario must, however, be distinguished from a prediction. There is no basis for claiming that a major crisis is inevitable, and the fact that states are strengthening their defence capabilities does not prove that they want a conflict. Prevention depends precisely on recognising risks before they materialise. Communication channels, incident-management procedures, transparency where possible and continued diplomatic contact can reduce the likelihood of escalation. These mechanisms must be supported by leaders capable of resisting the temptation to prioritise demonstrations of force over control of their consequences.

Indicators to monitor in assessing the region’s trajectory

To determine which scenario is becoming more plausible, observers will need to examine concrete decisions rather than rely solely on political statements. The first indicators concern changes in defence budgets and doctrines, cooperation mechanisms among Japan, the United States and Australia, and measures taken by Beijing around Taiwan and in contested maritime areas. Diplomatic meetings, military contacts, incident-prevention procedures and governments’ ability to clarify their intentions will also provide important signals. Military spending can rise alongside active diplomacy; conversely, an apparent period of calm may conceal deteriorating trust if communication mechanisms weaken.

Economic indicators will be equally revealing. These include trade and technology restrictions, supply-chain diversification, maritime transport costs, insurance premiums, investment in sensitive sectors and business decisions concerning their presence in the region. The accumulation of restrictions could signal deeper fragmentation, while cooperation agreements and transparency mechanisms could help limit the effects of rivalry. No single indicator will establish a definitive trend, however. Stronger conclusions will depend on their combined direction, duration and consistency with political decisions.

Forward-looking analysis must remain open to unexpected developments. Changes in the global economic environment, a change in leadership, diplomatic mediation or a shift in national priorities could alter the region’s trajectory. The purpose of rigorous analysis is therefore not to announce a single future, but to identify the conditions that would make each scenario more likely, the signals through which it could be detected and the measures that could limit its negative consequences. This approach is particularly important for countries that lack the means to influence major strategic decisions directly but must anticipate their consequences.

GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES: TRADE, TECHNOLOGY, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

Supply Chains Exposed to Geopolitical Risk

The rivalry between China, the United States, Japan and their partners cannot be analysed independently of the way the global economy is organised. Production chains connect companies, suppliers, research centres, transport infrastructure and markets spread across several continents. A product manufactured in one country may depend on components designed in another, raw materials extracted elsewhere, and equipment whose production is concentrated in a limited number of locations. This specialisation has helped reduce certain costs and increase productivity, but it has also created dependencies whose significance becomes particularly apparent when political relations deteriorate.

A crisis in the Indo-Pacific could disrupt these networks through several simultaneous mechanisms: transport interruptions, higher insurance costs, export restrictions, sanctions, temporary facility closures or precautionary decisions by companies. The consequences would not necessarily be confined to sectors directly associated with defence. Electronics, telecommunications, automotive manufacturing, medical equipment and energy technologies could also be affected if essential components or materials became more difficult to obtain. The duration of the disruption, available inventories and the capacity to turn to alternative suppliers would determine a substantial part of the economic impact.

Governments therefore face an industrial policy challenge: how can critical dependencies be reduced without incurring excessive costs or undermining the benefits of international trade? Targeted diversification can strengthen resilience, particularly when it concerns components that are difficult to replace or products essential to the operation of infrastructure. However, widespread relocation of production could increase manufacturing costs, weaken competition and require substantial public resources. The most effective response depends on an accurate assessment of risks, the availability of alternatives and the economic or social importance of each supply chain.

Technology, Semiconductors and Industrial Sovereignty

Technological competition has become one of the principal arenas of rivalry among major powers. Semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, advanced software, digital infrastructure and data-processing capabilities play essential roles in industrial productivity, scientific research and the development of many contemporary technologies. The geographical concentration of certain stages of production exposes the global economy to particular risks when political tensions affect trade or investment. The question is not simply which country manufactures a component, but also where the expertise, equipment, raw materials, software and infrastructure essential to its production are located.

Japan possesses significant industrial and technological strengths in certain segments of global value chains, while China is seeking to reinforce its domestic capabilities and reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. The United States, for its part, considers control over certain technologies a matter of competitiveness and national security. These policies can support research and diversification, but they can also generate tensions when they restrict access to markets, equipment or expertise. Their effectiveness must be assessed in terms of actual results, costs and consequences for scientific and economic cooperation.

Technological autonomy does not necessarily mean complete self-sufficiency. In many sectors, production depends on complex international cooperation and expertise distributed across several countries. Attempting to eliminate every dependency can become extremely expensive, if not unrealistic. A more robust policy is to identify critical vulnerabilities, maintain alternative capabilities, diversify suppliers and invest in education, research and infrastructure. It must also establish transparent rules so that security restrictions do not become a general instrument of protectionism or a means of arbitrarily limiting competition.

Energy, Maritime Transport and the Vulnerability of Import-Dependent Economies

Energy security is another essential dimension of Asian rivalry. Economies deeply integrated into maritime trade depend on uninterrupted shipping routes for supplies of energy, raw materials and manufactured goods. A crisis in the maritime spaces of East Asia could force vessels to take longer routes, cause delays and increase logistical costs, even if production facilities suffered no direct damage. The effects would depend on the duration of the disruption, the routes affected, available port capacity and the decisions made by transport operators and insurers.

The consequences would be particularly severe for economies with limited reserves, narrow fiscal margins or a high dependence on imports. Rising energy costs can feed through to transport, agricultural production, services, electricity and consumer prices. The most vulnerable businesses may reduce their activities or pass additional costs on to consumers, while governments may be forced to increase certain public expenditures or revise budgetary priorities. The effects would not be identical across countries: they would depend, among other factors, on the energy mix, supplier diversification, import structure and the ability of institutions to cushion economic shocks.

Energy resilience must therefore be designed as a long-term policy. It requires diversified supplies, improved energy efficiency, stronger storage infrastructure where economically justified, and the development of energy sources suited to local resources and needs. International partnerships can contribute to this objective, but they cannot replace national planning. Countries that anticipate risks, publish reliable data and develop coordination mechanisms will be better positioned to limit the consequences of an external crisis.

The Caribbean and Haiti Amid Great-Power Rivalries

For Caribbean states, competition between Washington and Beijing should not be viewed solely as a distant diplomatic confrontation. Its effects may be felt in infrastructure financing, access to markets, port investment, communications technology, energy supplies and trade relations. Caribbean countries have an interest in developing diversified partnerships, assessing long-term financial commitments and preserving their capacity to make independent decisions. Diversification does not mean refusing to cooperate with a major power; it means ensuring that economic and diplomatic choices are guided by national needs, transparent contracts and the public interest.

Haiti is particularly affected by this need for resilience. Fragile infrastructure, constraints on public finances, vulnerable supply chains and the need to strengthen productive capacity all reduce the country’s room for manoeuvre when international shocks occur. A crisis in the Indo-Pacific would not automatically disrupt every Haitian import directly, but it could contribute to higher costs or complicate the supply of products that depend on concentrated global production networks. It would therefore be imprudent to announce quantified effects without precise data on trade routes, suppliers and the structure of imports. Nevertheless, incorporating the risk of international disruption into economic planning and supply-security policies is a reasonable and necessary step.

Haiti’s response should form part of a broader strategy for human development and economic sovereignty. Strengthening local productive capacity, modernising infrastructure, improving logistics, investing in training and diversifying partners can reduce certain vulnerabilities. Regional cooperation is also important because several Caribbean economies face comparable constraints involving transport, energy, financing and exposure to external shocks. A more coordinated regional voice could facilitate information-sharing, cooperation mechanisms and greater consideration of small states’ interests in international discussions.

The fundamental challenge is not to confuse autonomy with isolation. No country can eliminate every dependency in a globalised economy, but each can seek to understand its dependencies better, diversify risks and improve its decision-making capacity. For Haiti and other Caribbean states, a coherent foreign policy must rest on clearly defined priorities, an administration capable of assessing agreements and institutions that are accountable for the choices they make. Major powers can offer financing, partnerships and technologies; the responsibility for determining the conditions under which those proposals serve development objectives belongs to the states receiving them.

THE CPGNNews PERSPECTIVE | THE CARIBBEAN CANNOT REMAIN A SPECTATOR AS THE WORLD REDRAWS ITS BALANCE OF POWER

The rivalry between Japan, China, the United States and their partners highlights a reality that small economies cannot afford to ignore: decisions made by major powers often have consequences far beyond the places where those decisions are taken. A crisis in the Taiwan Strait could affect supply chains, energy markets, maritime shipping costs and the financing conditions facing businesses. A lasting fragmentation of global trade could reshape investment, industrial relationships and access to certain technologies. These effects would be neither uniform nor automatic, but they demonstrate that economic vulnerability also depends on external factors that governments cannot fully control.

For the Caribbean, this situation demands a perspective that goes beyond diplomatic alignment. Regional states must be able to maintain relations with the United States, China, Japan, Australia, Europe and other partners without every act of cooperation being reduced to a choice between rival blocs. Such freedom, however, requires institutions capable of evaluating projects, negotiating balanced terms and making long-term financial obligations public. Diversifying partners is meaningful only when accompanied by a diversification of domestic capabilities: production, skills, infrastructure, research, education and the quality of governance.

From this perspective, Haiti must treat international relations as a field requiring sustained technical and institutional preparation. Economic security cannot be limited to reacting when prices rise or supplies are interrupted. It requires knowledge of dependencies, a coherent trade policy, better coordination among public institutions and the ability to identify the sectors whose continuity is essential to the country’s functioning. It also requires a diplomacy that defends national interests through reliable data and explicit objectives rather than symbolic alignments lacking a long-term strategy.

The role of public-interest media is equally important. High-quality international coverage must explain power relations without mechanically reproducing official narratives, distinguish facts from interpretations and make visible the human and economic consequences of strategic decisions. It should also help societies with limited diplomatic or economic resources understand how global transformations affect their own choices. International information should not be reserved for major capitals, financial markets or specialist institutions; it should strengthen the ability of citizens and decision-makers to anticipate developments, compare options and debate the collective interest.

The Caribbean cannot determine the course of relations between Washington and Beijing on its own, any more than it can prevent a regional crisis in East Asia. It can, however, strengthen its ability to understand the consequences, defend its interests and develop partnerships that reduce its vulnerabilities. For Haiti, this ambition requires education, knowledge, economic resilience and institutional quality to become strategic priorities. The objective is not to choose a side in every global rivalry, but to preserve the freedom of decision necessary for sustainable and dignified development.

Born in the Caribbean and open to the world, CPGNNews seeks to contribute to a media environment in which no region is condemned to remain a spectator to its own future.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: STRENGTHENING SECURITY WITHOUT MAKING CONFLICT INEVITABLE

Japan’s military build-up, China’s military modernisation, the reaffirmation of American priorities and the strategic rapprochement between Tokyo and Canberra all point to a profound transformation of the international environment. The Asia-Pacific has become a region where sovereignty, technology, trade, energy and security reinforce one another. Choices made there will have consequences for the global economy, diplomatic balances and states’ ability to preserve their autonomy in an increasingly competitive international system. The memory of 1945 remains present, but it should not be used to impose a historical condemnation on contemporary societies. Rather, it serves as a reminder of the cost of political errors, the fragility of strategic balances and the need to distinguish the legitimate defence of national interests from the temptation to impose one’s will by force.

Japan must be able to adapt its defence capabilities to its strategic environment while preserving the constitutional constraints, democratic accountability and diplomatic prudence that shape its post-war political identity. China must be able to defend its security interests, but its power does not grant it an unlimited right to determine the future of its neighbours. The United States must preserve the credibility of its commitments without neglecting the consequences of its decisions for its partners’ confidence. Australia and the other states in the region, meanwhile, have an interest in developing partnerships that strengthen resilience without reducing international relations to a bloc-based logic. None of these objectives can be achieved sustainably if dialogue mechanisms are sacrificed for displays of force.

The Taiwan question concentrates many of the risks of this period, but it does not encompass the entirety of relations among the major powers. Supply chains, energy security, advanced technologies and maritime infrastructure are also areas in which cooperation and competition coexist. A realistic policy must recognise that states can be competitors in some sectors and partners in others. Complete economic separation would be costly and difficult to achieve; total interdependence without safeguards against critical risks can, however, become a source of vulnerability. The most sustainable course is to diversify essential dependencies, improve transparency and preserve cooperation mechanisms capable of limiting the consequences of crises.

The future of the Asia-Pacific will not be determined by military budgets or economic power alone. It will also depend on the quality of political decisions, leaders’ ability to exercise restraint in their statements, the strength of institutions and their willingness to recognise the limits of coercion. Deterrence can reduce certain risks, but it cannot replace diplomacy or the trust required to manage disputes. Stability does not require the absence of rivalry; it requires a framework in which competing interests do not automatically lead to escalation.

For small economies, particularly those in the Caribbean, this transformation represents both a risk and a call to prepare. They may lack the means to change the decisions of major powers, but they can improve their understanding of dependencies, diversify partnerships and invest in capabilities that strengthen their autonomy. Haiti, in particular, must make economic resilience, education and training, infrastructure and institutional quality central components of a long-term national strategy. In an interdependent world, sovereignty is measured not only by the freedom to proclaim choices, but also by the ability to implement them, bear their consequences and protect the population from external shocks.

The true historical turning point in the Asia-Pacific therefore lies not simply in the return of military power to the forefront. It lies in the ability of societies and governments to decide whether competition will become the dominant principle of their relations or whether it can be governed by institutions, rules and dialogue mechanisms. The ghosts of 1945 must not dictate the future, but they should remind us of the cost of political failure. The challenge is not to deny rivalries, much less to idealise the intentions of major powers. It is to ensure that the legitimate pursuit of security does not, through accumulated mistrust and errors of judgement, produce the very insecurity that every actor claims to want to avoid.

SOURCES AND DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025, April 2026. The principal source for comparative data on global, national and regional military expenditure.
   https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2025

2. SIPRI: Global military spending rise continues as European and Asian expenditures surge, press release, 27 April 2026. An overview of the main trends observed in 2025.
   https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-military-spending-rise-continues-european-and-asian-expenditures-surge

3. SIPRI: SIPRI Yearbook 2026, Summary. Additional data on military expenditure and its global distribution.
   https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/yb26_summary_en_1.pdf

4. Japan: Constitution of Japan, particularly Article 9; national strategic documents published in 2022, including the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program.

5. United Nations: Charter of the United Nations, particularly the principles concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prohibition of the threat or use of force.

6. Additional institutional and diplomatic sources: Official documents issued by the governments of Japan, China, the United States and Australia concerning their security policies, bilateral relations and positions on Indo-Pacific stability.

Editorial note: the military expenditure figures for 2025 are estimates published by SIPRI in April 2026. The forward-looking interpretations in this report are analytical scenarios, not certain predictions. Before publication, dated political statements from 2025 and 2026, the latest diplomatic developments and any announcements of agreements between governments should be cross-checked against the corresponding primary documents.

Yvon Bonhomme
Editor-in-Chief
CaribPulse Global News Network

Born in the Caribbean, Open to the World!

CPGNNews Strategic Report SR-002/2026 | October 2026

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