INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS │ CPGNNEWS │ By the Editorial Team │ 27 September 2026.
Born in the Caribbean, Open to the World!
WHEN A MAJOR POWER RETURNS THROUGH CULTURE
For many years, Russia’s presence in Africa was primarily associated with weapons, mining contracts, political alliances, military relations and, more recently, the changing security landscape of the Sahel. That perception is not without basis, but it is becoming insufficient to understand a quieter development unfolding alongside it: Moscow is once again investing in languages, universities, scientific exchanges, cultural institutions and human relationships. On 9 September 2026, the Russian agency Rossotrudnichestvo announced the establishment of eight new partner “Russian Houses” in African countries: Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mali, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. These structures are expected to build on existing local organizations and develop Russian language teaching, university cooperation, scientific and cultural exchanges, as well as artistic activities.
The announcement deserves more than a simple comment on the opening of new cultural centers. It reveals a deeper evolution in the way a major power seeks to establish a lasting presence. A cultural building is visible, an exhibition can be identified, a language class can be photographed and an inauguration ceremony can attract media attention. Yet the substance of an influence policy does not necessarily lie in these immediately observable manifestations. It can gradually take shape through students who go abroad for training, teachers who develop joint programs, researchers who establish collaborations, artists who travel, translators who create bridges, and former students who, years later, continue to maintain professional relationships with the institutions and societies they encountered. Cultural power is therefore less spectacular than military power, but it can be slower, more diffuse and, in some cases, more durable.
It would nevertheless be misleading to turn this development into automatic evidence of a strategy of domination. A strategy of presence is not necessarily a strategy of domination. Russia is far from being the only power to regard language, education and culture as instruments of external engagement. France has its cultural and linguistic network, Germany the Goethe Institut, the United Kingdom the British Council, and China the Confucius Institutes, while Türkiye and other powers have developed their own educational and cultural networks. Cultural diplomacy is therefore part of a broader international phenomenon, with different institutional models and varying degrees of proximity to the foreign policies of the countries from which these networks originate.
The question raised by the new Russian Houses is therefore more significant than their mere existence. It concerns the gradual transformation of an external presence into a human, educational and cultural network, while also requiring Africa to be viewed differently: not as an empty space onto which foreign powers project their strategies, but as a collection of societies, governments, universities, media organizations and individuals capable of accepting, negotiating, modifying or rejecting the offers placed before them. It is in this tension between Russian initiatives and African choices that the deeper story lies.
“RUSSIAN HOUSES”: FAR MORE THAN CULTURAL CENTERS
At first glance, a “Russian House” may appear to be a conventional instrument of cultural diplomacy. It offers language classes, organizes events, presents Russian literature and history, facilitates academic or scientific exchanges and develops activities intended to bring societies closer together. It is precisely this apparent ordinariness that deserves attention. Cultural infrastructures do not function merely as showcases: they can become meeting points for public administrations, universities, associations, students, artists, researchers, journalists and entrepreneurs. Their significance should therefore not be measured solely by the number of events they organize, but also by their ability to generate relationships that survive beyond a ceremony or a communication campaign. The September 2026 announcement illustrates this logic. The eight new African centers do not necessarily depend on the construction of entirely new buildings: Rossotrudnichestvo intends to work with local structures that are already active, an approach that reduces establishment costs while allowing Russian initiatives to enter existing networks. The center thus becomes less an isolated institution than an additional node within an already established environment. In Togo, for example, the announced activities include Russian language teaching, university partnerships, scientific and cultural exchanges, film screenings and programs aimed at young people.
This model offers a strategic advantage to any power that employs it: it provides a way of entering a society through spaces that are not strictly political. A language is not a diplomatic negotiation, a university scholarship is not a treaty, and an artistic residency is not a military agreement. Yet each of these initiatives can create a relationship. This is where the distinction between presence and influence becomes essential. Presence is observable; influence is a possible effect. Between the two lies a complex set of human interactions that cannot simply be assumed or measured. International comparison helps clarify the phenomenon: the Confucius Institutes, Alliance Française, British Council and Goethe Institut demonstrate that promoting a language or culture abroad can become a durable infrastructure for international relations. Research examining such networks emphasizes that their functioning must be assessed in relation to their state of origin, their activities, their governance arrangements and their adaptation to local environments. Russian Houses should therefore be studied within this broader landscape. What matters is not only what they claim to be, but what they actually do in each national environment.
WHY AFRICA HAS BECOME A STRATEGIC ARENA
Russia’s evolving engagement cannot be understood without considering the broader transformation of Africa’s international environment. For several years, African governments have had access to an expanding range of external partners and have often sought to diversify their relationships. This diversification may respond to economic, security, diplomatic, energy or educational considerations, or simply to a desire to avoid excessive dependence on a single partner. Russia is part of this competition, but it is only one actor among many. Analyses of its engagement across the continent also show that Russian relations vary considerably from one African region to another: long established ties in Southern Africa do not necessarily follow the same logic as the more transactional relationships observed in parts of the Sahel.
This diversity is fundamental. There is no single “Africa” confronting Russia, but rather societies whose histories, political systems, economic interests, historical experiences and international perceptions differ considerably. Afrobarometer data published in February 2026 provide a particularly useful illustration. Across 38 African countries surveyed as part of Round 10, based on data collected in 2024 and 2025, 36% of respondents viewed Russia’s economic and political influence positively, 23% negatively, while 42% did not express an opinion. Regional differences are significant, with 50% positive views in Central Africa and 43% in West Africa, compared with 27% in Southern Africa and 26% in East Africa. These figures obviously do not describe a uniform political reality. On the contrary, they show that perceptions of Russia remain highly differentiated across countries and regions, and that a considerable proportion of those surveyed had not yet formed a settled opinion.
This last figure is particularly important for understanding the contemporary competition over narratives. An external power does not operate only on existing opinions; it may also seek to build relationships in societies where perceptions remain open and evolving. Culture, education and information then become spaces of contact among others. This dynamic must also be placed within a much broader international competition. Western cultural infrastructures have a longer history in many African countries, while China has developed a particularly extensive network of Confucius Institutes. Turkish educational and cultural networks, initiatives by some Gulf states and various European programs also contribute to the circulation of languages, knowledge and narratives. Competition for students, knowledge, imaginations and human relationships is therefore becoming an important element of international politics in Africa, rather than a specifically Russian phenomenon.
FROM THE SOVIET LEGACY TO TWENTY FIRST CENTURY RUSSIA
Contemporary Russia is not starting from scratch. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union built an extensive network of relations with several African countries, notably through liberation movements, university cooperation, scientific and technical training and political exchanges. Generations of Africans studied at Soviet universities and sometimes maintained professional or personal ties with the Russian sphere. This historical memory, however, is not a form of capital that can automatically be transferred from one generation to another. Generations change, societies evolve and the political reference points of the contemporary world are no longer those of the Cold War. It is precisely for this reason that Moscow is seeking to transform this legacy into contemporary infrastructure. The objective is not necessarily to reproduce Soviet mechanisms, but to create new opportunities for contact adapted to current needs. Universities, scientific programs, professional training, technology and cultural exchanges now occupy an important place in this approach. A 2026 analysis by Carnegie also notes that Russia’s relations with Africa combine historical legacy with new forms of engagement, while facing varying limitations across regions and countries.
This transformation is particularly visible in the university sector. On 4 September 2026, Russian Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education Olga Petrova stated that 37,000 students from African countries were enrolled in Russian universities at the time. This is an official Russian figure, reported by African media, which CPGNNews presents as such and does not treat as an independently audited statistic. The figure nevertheless remains significant for understanding the scale Moscow claims for its African educational system. Its importance, however, lies in more than the number itself. An African student who goes to Russia to study may acquire scientific training, a language, professional skills and international experience; that student may later return home, work in another African country or pursue an international career. Foreign education creates experience and networks, but it does not mechanically determine an individual’s convictions. Reducing thousands of students to future political “conduits” would therefore be as simplistic as claiming that international education has no strategic dimension whatsoever.
LANGUAGE, UNIVERSITIES AND TRAINING: THE NEW INFRASTRUCTURES OF POWER
Language is one of the more discreet forms of cultural power. It provides access to literature, history, scientific production, media and professional environments. When a state invests over the long term in teaching its language abroad, it does not automatically create political loyalty; it does, however, create a capacity for communication and an environment in which future relationships can develop more easily. The development of the Russian African Network University, or RAFU, illustrates this orientation. In 2026, the Russian consortium organized its first international Olympiad for prospective African master’s students. According to data published by RAFU, 1,447 candidates from 39 African countries took part in the pilot initiative. Nigeria accounted by far for the largest number of applications, with 873 participants, while Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, the Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone were also among the countries most strongly represented. The fields attracting the greatest interest were computer science, engineering and future technologies, as well as biomedicine and cognitive sciences.
The program was launched with twenty state funded master’s places at universities belonging to the consortium, covering four broad fields: economics and management; international relations and the humanities; computer science and engineering; and biomedicine and cognitive sciences. These elements show that the Russian offer is not limited to language instruction or disciplines traditionally associated with the humanities. It is also seeking a position in sectors that are likely to shape African economies in the coming decades. African demand is therefore a crucial variable. RAFU’s figures show that applicants are not attracted solely by a cultural relationship with Russia: they are also seeking skills, degrees and professional opportunities.
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, the Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone cannot be reduced to passive spaces within this process. Young people who apply are making choices based on their own trajectories. University ties can also produce deeper institutional relationships. RAFU is developing activities that connect Russian institutions with African partners and seeks to structure a university network extending beyond individual mobility. The strategic significance of such networks lies less in their immediate effect than in their capacity to create continuity: a student becomes a researcher, a researcher becomes a teacher, a teacher takes part in university cooperation, and that cooperation can in turn generate new students. The building is visible; the human network is less so, yet it is often the latter that gives a long term dimension to a policy of presence.
THE BATTLE OF NARRATIVES: CULTURE, MEDIA, RELIGION AND INFLUENCE
Contemporary cultural diplomacy is no longer limited to books, films or language classes. It operates in an environment where media, social networks, universities, religious communities, influencers and cultural institutions intersect. It is this overlap that makes careful analysis necessary. A cultural infrastructure can serve several purposes without each of those purposes necessarily being political. A scientific conference may remain scientific, a language class may remain a language class, and a religious activity may remain a religious activity. Yet a sufficiently extensive cultural network can also become a relational infrastructure through which people, ideas and representations circulate.
The report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, published on 5 March 2026 under the title Russia’s Information Influence in Africa: Opportunistic, Strategic, and Multifaceted, examines precisely this dimension. The report analyzes what it describes as a pro Russian information ecosystem that is both strategic and long term, but also opportunistic and adaptable. It identifies among the actors involved state representatives, state controlled or state supported media, cultural institutions, the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as local media actors and influencers. This analysis must nevertheless be understood within its own institutional framework: FOI is a research institute linked to Sweden’s defense system, and its study is developed from a security perspective. It is therefore an important source for understanding how some European observers assess Russia’s influence ecosystem, but it should not be transformed into evidence that every Russian cultural institution is participating in a clandestine operation.
The religious dimension illustrates this complexity. Since the establishment in 2021 of the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russian religious activities have also expanded in several African countries. This development belongs to an institutional logic different from that of the Russian Houses, but it forms part of the same broader environment of human and cultural relations. It would therefore be equally excessive to portray all Russian religious activity as a political instrument or to assume that it is necessarily devoid of geopolitical effects. What matters is to distinguish between institutions, their mandates and their concrete practices.
The central issue emerges when these different networks overlap. Culture, education, religion, media and diplomacy may remain institutionally distinct while nevertheless contributing to a greater density of relationships. It is this density, more than the existence of any particular center, that can generate a capacity for influence. And this is precisely why financial transparency, academic freedom, editorial independence and the ability of African partners to establish their own rules become essential.
THE GREY ZONE: WHEN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY MEETS SECURITY
Controversies begin when cultural diplomacy intersects with allegations of political or informational influence. Several Western and Ukrainian sources have examined Russian activities in Africa through the prism of the war in Ukraine and the broader competition over information. Some allegations go so far as to portray cultural structures as potential instruments for recruitment or for disseminating narratives favorable to Moscow. Such claims must be attributed to their authors and cannot be turned into established facts without independent corroboration. The FOI report takes an approach centered on the Russian information ecosystem as a whole rather than on cultural institutions alone. Its central argument is that Russian informational influence in Africa combines overt and covert methods and relies on multiple actors. It describes an adaptable system that responds to local contexts and is connected to the Kremlin’s broader foreign policy. This observation warrants analytical vigilance, but it does not remove the need to distinguish between institutions, individuals, programs and concrete practices.
This is where transparency becomes more important than generalized suspicion. A Russian House that organizes language classes, academic conferences and exhibitions is not, by that fact alone, a clandestine structure. A university institution that hosts Russian or African students is not, by that fact alone, a political instrument. Conversely, when a cultural program is associated with coordinated information campaigns, opaque funding, pressure on media organizations or activities outside its stated mission, these elements may justify a specific investigation. Serious analysis begins precisely where generalization ends. This distinction is all the more necessary because Russia is not the only power to use culture and education as instruments of foreign policy. Western cultural networks, China’s Confucius Institutes and Turkish or other educational initiatives are likewise built around institutional relationships that may have diplomatic effects. The relevant question, therefore, is not whether a power uses culture abroad, but how it uses it, with what degree of transparency, within what limits and with how much autonomy granted to local partners.
The grey zone is therefore not a conclusion in itself, but an area for inquiry in which each element must be placed at its appropriate level of evidentiary strength: what can be established should be established; what constitutes a statement should be attributed; what amounts to an allegation should be presented as such; and what remains hypothetical should remain identified as a hypothesis. Only under these conditions can analysis avoid both complacency and alarmism.
EIGHT NEW RUSSIAN HOUSES: IS MOSCOW SCALING UP ITS PRESENCE IN AFRICA?
The announcement of 9 September 2026 nevertheless constitutes a sufficiently concrete development to warrant serious attention. Eight new partner centers are to be developed in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mali, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Rossotrudnichestvo presents these structures as instruments of cultural, educational and scientific cooperation, with their establishment based on local partners. The geographical choice is noteworthy because the countries concerned form neither a political bloc nor a homogeneous region. They belong to different geographical, linguistic and political environments. Mali represents a particular case because of the intensity of its contemporary relationship with Moscow, while Kenya and Senegal have different diplomatic traditions and international environments. The simultaneous presence in countries as diverse as these suggests that Russian cultural policy is seeking to move beyond the Sahel alone.
The local partnership model also deserves attention. Rather than imposing an entirely new infrastructure everywhere, directly built and controlled from Moscow, the announced approach relies on organizations that are already established within the societies concerned. This can facilitate local adaptation, reduce costs and accelerate implementation, but it also means that the actual impact of the Russian Houses will depend to a considerable extent on their African partners, their governance, their autonomy and the way they define their own programs. The September announcement should not, moreover, be interpreted in isolation. It forms part of a broader international expansion, since eleven new partner centers were announced abroad, eight of them in Africa. The concentration of this new wave in Africa is therefore real, without necessarily meaning that Africa has become the sole priority of Russian cultural policy or that these eight centers will automatically produce measurable political influence.
The more relevant question is the transition from establishment to durability. An opening ceremony creates immediate visibility. An institution that operates for ten or fifteen years produces something different: habits, partnerships, alumni, teachers, scientific collaborations and a shared institutional memory. It is this second dimension that will ultimately make it possible to determine whether Moscow is genuinely scaling up its presence.
AFRICA IS NOT A PASSIVE CHESSBOARD
Any analysis of Russia’s presence in Africa remains incomplete if it fails to take into account the choices of African actors. African governments do not mechanically accept foreign proposals. They select them, negotiate them, sometimes combine them with those of other partners, and may also abandon them when their interests change. Universities do much the same, as do students. This relative autonomy is essential to understanding why the same external offer can produce very different outcomes from one country to another. Afrobarometer data are particularly revealing in this regard. Across 38 countries, 42% of respondents did not express an opinion about Russian influence, while positive and negative perceptions varied significantly from one country to another. This diversity calls for a different way of discussing influence: a power may open a cultural center without obtaining the political support it expected, finance educational programs without beneficiaries adopting its diplomatic positions, or establish a university network that, over time, becomes a space for cooperation independent of its initial political objectives.
African interests themselves must also be taken into account. A student may be seeking engineering training, a university may be looking for a laboratory partner, a ministry may want to increase the number of scholarships available, a cultural institution may be seeking funding or international exchanges, and a government may wish to diversify its external partnerships. All these motivations can coexist without amounting to ideological alignment with Moscow. If African societies do not constitute a single bloc in relation to Russia, then the construction of a lasting Russian presence cannot be understood solely through government decisions. It also unfolds within universities, alumni networks, cultural institutions, media organizations, religious communities and, more broadly, through human relationships that can outlast changes of government and diplomatic crises.
This reality leads directly to the question of the long term. A foreign policy may be decided by a government and disappear with it; a human network, by contrast, may continue to function after its founders are gone. The real depth of Russia’s strategy will therefore depend less on the multiplication of inaugurations than on the ability of the relationships being created today to generate cooperation tomorrow.
A RELATIONSHIP BUILT FOR A GENERATION
Cultural power operates on a different timescale from diplomatic crises. A political alliance can change within a few years, and an economic contract can be renegotiated, but an academic relationship can continue for decades through the people who sustain it. A student trained at a foreign university may become a doctor, engineer, professor, entrepreneur, diplomat or institutional leader. That person does not need to become an advocate of the host country for the experience to have lasting effects. They may simply retain a language, professional contacts, working habits and an in depth understanding of another society. This is where the figure of African students announced by Russian authorities acquires its broader significance. It does not make it possible to measure Moscow’s political influence and should certainly not be interpreted in that way. It does, however, indicate the existence of a substantial body of educational relationships. The potential strategic effect therefore lies not in any presumed political conversion of these students, but in the gradual creation of a human environment in which Russia becomes one of several possible destinations for university study, scientific work and professional development.
RAFU represents another stage in this process because it seeks to organize the relationship on a more structured institutional basis. The 1,447 applications from 39 African countries for the first edition of its international Olympiad demonstrate genuine demand for some of the programs offered by Russian universities. Nigeria, with 873 applications, also shows that this demand is not limited to countries with historically close ties to Moscow. It may instead be driven by academic opportunities themselves. Human networks, however, possess one fundamental characteristic: they partly escape the control of those who created them. Former students may become interlocutors for African governments, private companies, universities, international organizations or other powers. They may remain close to Russia or move away from it, maintain a personal relationship without adopting a political position, or develop new forms of cooperation that Moscow had not initially anticipated. A human network is therefore an infrastructure of relationships, not a ledger of loyalties.
This reality helps explain why investment in education can be regarded as a long term strategy without mechanically producing the political outcomes being sought. Moscow can build channels of communication, but African societies will largely determine how those channels are used. This is where presence becomes potential influence, and where potential influence encounters the limits inherent in any policy of power.
IS MOSCOW SEEKING LASTING INFLUENCE?
At this stage, reducing Russia’s strategy to the multiplication of Russian Houses would miss the broader picture. These centers are neither the entirety of Moscow’s strategy in Africa nor isolated objects. They are visible points within a much broader network in which language, education, culture, information and human relationships can reinforce one another. Analyses of Russian policy on the continent likewise describe a combination of diplomatic, economic, cultural, informational and security instruments, with varying degrees of intensity across different regions.
The coming decade will make it possible to assess the actual depth of this strategy. Several scenarios are possible: Russian Houses may remain primarily language and cultural centers with limited audiences; they may become more significant university platforms as student mobility expands; or they may become part of broader networks linking media, universities, religious institutions and economic actors. Conversely, their development may remain limited if funding is insufficient, local partners lack capacity, or African audiences favor other international networks. These scenarios are not predictions; they are the principal variables to observe. One particularly important question will concern competition among networks. Africa is now at the center of an international environment in which several powers are simultaneously offering scholarships, training, infrastructure, language programs, media platforms, cultural exchanges and scientific partnerships. Russia is therefore not operating in an empty space. It is entering an environment that also includes Chinese, European, American, Turkish, Indian, Arab and African initiatives.
The real measure of this presence will therefore not simply be the number of centers opened, but their ability to generate relationships useful enough for African partners to sustain them. The question then becomes institutional: do African societies possess their own research capacities, media production capabilities, scientific training systems and means of comparing competing narratives? Can they receive multiple external offers without becoming dependent on a single one? Can they transform external investment into lasting local capabilities? It is at this level that the question of intellectual sovereignty arises.
THE CPGNNEWS PERSPECTIVE
THE CENTRAL ISSUE DOES NOT LIE WITHIN THE “RUSSIAN HOUSES” THEMSELVES
The central issue does not lie in the buildings themselves, but in what is built around them. A Russian House may be modest, serve a few dozen students and organize several cultural events each month. Yet if it becomes part of a broader university, linguistic, media and human network, its significance may extend far beyond its physical size. Conversely, a prestigious center may have little lasting influence if it does not respond to the expectations of the society in which it operates. This is why CPGNNews considers that the educational and cultural benefits of Russia’s presence should be acknowledged without preventing scrutiny of its potential influence. The two realities can coexist. A university scholarship can provide a young African with skills that their country needs while also contributing to an international rapprochement policy; a language program can provide genuine access to a culture while increasing the visibility of the state that finances it; scientific cooperation can produce useful results while creating lasting institutional ties. These dimensions do not cancel one another out: they overlap, and it is precisely this overlap that makes analysis necessary.
The phenomenon is by no means exclusively Russian. China’s Confucius Institutes, French, British and German networks, as well as other international cultural and educational initiatives, demonstrate that major powers all understand the importance of human relationships in contemporary competition. The difference therefore does not lie in the existence of cultural diplomacy itself, but in its practices, objectives, transparency and the degree of autonomy granted to partners. African societies have an interest in being able to compare these offers rather than being confined to a single ideological reading of any one of them. Intellectual sovereignty does not mean closing the door to external influences. It requires societies to possess the institutions, expertise and resources necessary to receive multiple narratives, compare them, verify them and produce their own analysis. It is therefore not a fixed condition, but an institutional capacity built through adequately funded universities, independent media, research centers capable of producing their own data and a sufficiently organized civil society able to participate in public debate.
This is perhaps where the real African issue lies. If Moscow invests in languages, universities and human networks, the African response need not necessarily be to close those doors. It could instead consist in strengthening domestic institutions sufficiently so that international openness expands the capacity to choose rather than reducing it. A society with multiple partners, multiple sources of information and its own analytical capabilities is better positioned to turn external competition into an internal resource. The question is therefore not only what Moscow wants to build in Africa. It is also what Africans will do with what Moscow offers. The relationship will never be determined entirely by the actor making the offer; it will also depend on those who receive it, negotiate it, transform it and, at times, reject it.
AFRICA ENTERS THE AGE OF COMPETITION OVER NARRATIVES
The announced expansion of Russian Houses across Africa marks a development that extends well beyond the cultural sphere. It reflects Moscow’s effort to consolidate its presence through instruments whose effects develop more slowly than those of a military agreement or an economic contract: language, education, universities, science, cultural exchanges and human relationships. This strategy is unfolding in an Africa where external powers are multiplying and African societies have a broader space for negotiation than they once did. Russia is offering its own networks, but it is not alone. China, Europe, the United States, Türkiye, the Gulf states, India and African organizations are likewise developing instruments of influence, cooperation or cultural diplomacy. Competition is therefore no longer limited to resources or diplomatic alliances. It also concerns students, researchers, languages, media, imaginaries and human networks.
The coming years will show whether the new Russian Houses become simply cultural spaces, genuine university platforms or components of a broader international network. Their future will depend as much on Moscow as on the African partners that host them. Students will determine their own trajectories, universities will shape their partnerships, media organizations will establish their own standards, governments will negotiate their interests, and civil societies will observe, accept, challenge or redirect these initiatives. The essential question is therefore not which of Moscow, Beijing, Washington or Brussels will prevail. It is whether African societies will be able to transform this external competition into internal capacity. If they have strong universities, independent media, research centers capable of producing their own data and citizens able to compare different narratives, international openness can become a source of capacity rather than a factor of dependency.
Perhaps this is where the paradox of Russia’s new diplomacy in Africa lies. Moscow is seeking to build relationships for a generation. Yet the African generations entering these networks are not objects of strategy. They are actors in their own future. The question that remains is therefore the one running through this entire dossier: who will tell the story of Africa tomorrow, the powers seeking to expand their influence there, or Africans themselves?
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Russia is developing a presence in Africa that no longer rests solely on diplomatic, economic and security dimensions, but also on language, education, culture, research and human networks. On 9 September 2026, Rossotrudnichestvo announced eight new partner Russian Houses in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mali, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. According to Russian Deputy Minister Olga Petrova, 37,000 students from African countries were studying at Russian universities in September 2026; CPGNNews treats this figure as an official Russian figure rather than an independently audited statistic. RAFU, for its part, recorded 1,447 applications from 39 African countries for its first international Olympiad initiative, with strong interest in computer science, engineering, future technologies, biomedicine and cognitive sciences.
Afrobarometer data show that African perceptions of Russia remain deeply differentiated: across 38 countries surveyed, 36% of respondents viewed Russia’s economic and political influence positively, 23% negatively and 42% did not express an opinion. The Swedish FOI report, meanwhile, describes Russia’s information influence ecosystem in Africa as strategic, long term, adaptable and multifaceted. It should nevertheless be read as an analysis produced by a research institute within Sweden’s defense system, not as evidence that all Russian cultural institutions pursue clandestine objectives. The central issue is therefore not simply Russia’s expansion. It concerns the capacity of African societies to develop their own institutions, knowledge networks and analytical capabilities in the face of growing international competition.
CPGNNews METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
This article explicitly distinguishes between four levels of discourse. A fact is presented as a fact. When a figure comes from an official institution, its provenance is specified. A statement is attributed to its author. Russian figures concerning African students, for example, are presented as figures communicated by Russian authorities. An allegation is attributed to the person or institution making it. Claims concerning possible influence or recruitment operations are not transformed into facts when they lack sufficient independent corroboration. An analysis remains identified as analysis. The interpretations presented in “The CPGNNews Perspective” constitute our editorial team’s strategic reading and are not presented as established facts.
CPGNNews also considers that the analysis of international power cannot be complete without taking into account the agency of the societies concerned. Africa is neither a passive recipient of external strategies nor a homogeneous space. Governments, universities, media organizations, students, researchers, cultural institutions, religious communities and citizens have their own interests and decision making capacities. Our approach ultimately rests on a simple principle: understand before judging, document before asserting, attribute before interpreting.
In an international environment where competition over narratives is itself becoming an element of power, the primary responsibility of a public interest media organization is to provide readers with enough facts, context and analytical diversity to help them understand the world without imposing a conclusion upon them.
CPGNNews — Independent International Public Interest Media │ Research • Investigation • Analysis • Journalism.
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTATION
The information, statistical data, statements and factual elements used in this analysis were established on the basis of institutional, statistical, academic and documentary sources, supplemented, where necessary, by recognized media sources. These references were used to establish facts, cross check information and provide analytical context.
INSTITUTIONAL AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1. African Union: documents and statements concerning relations between the African Union and the Russian Federation, including Russia–Africa consultations and cooperation mechanisms.
2. Rossotrudnichestvo: official information concerning the development of the Russian Houses network in Africa and cultural, educational and institutional cooperation activities.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: official statements, diplomatic documents and communications concerning Russia–Africa relations.
4. Russian African Network University (RAFU): information concerning university programs, educational initiatives and the 2026 International Olympiad.
STATISTICAL SOURCES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS
1. Afrobarometer: Popular perceptions of Russia lag, even as its influence grows across Africa, 27 February 2026. Data from a survey conducted across 38 African countries on perceptions of Russia and its influence.
2. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI): Anna Ida Rock, Russia’s Information Influence in Africa: Opportunistic, Strategic, and Multifaceted, FOI-R–5873–SE, 5 March 2026.
ACADEMIC AND ANALYTICAL SOURCES
1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: research examining Russia’s role in Africa, the evolution of its instruments of influence and the limits of its presence on the continent.
2. Real Instituto Elcano: analyses examining the evolution of Russia’s security and strategic presence in the Sahel and its regional and international implications.
3. Academic research on Russian strategic narratives: particularly studies examining the adaptation of Moscow’s narratives to different audiences in the Global South, especially in Africa and Latin America.
VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE
Whenever available, CPGNNews prioritizes primary and institutional sources for the establishment of factual information. Secondary sources are used for cross checking, contextualization or when primary sources are not directly accessible.
Figures, statements and other elements attributed to an institution, government, research organization or external publication are presented within their appropriate context and do not, in themselves, constitute CPGNNews validation of the interpretations or positions of their authors.
CPGNNews — Independent International Public Interest Media │Research • Investigation • Analysis • Journalism.
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